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ABSTRACT 
 
Autobiographical memory has been theorized to serve as an adaptive function in 
coping with negative mood state. To gain a better understanding of whether 
autobiographical memory changes with negative mood state, a number of 
experiments examined the relative accessibility of cognitive content and ability to 
recall specific event memories in those who had a previous history of depression 
or showed some aspects of current depressive symptoms.  
 
Five separate studies involved 288 participants and examined the effects of 
negative mood components on autobiographical recall. Studies 1 – 4 examined 
the autobiographical content by cueing content using a cue word technique to 
evoke autobiographical memories by means of a modified version of the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Negative 
mood state was induced by Velten mood induction technique, and self-reported 
mood was measured using University of Wales Institute of Science and 
Technology Mood Adjective Checklist (UWIST-MACL; Matthews, Jones & 
Chamberlain, 1990) before and after mood induction. The ability to recall specific 
event memories was measured in Study 5 by the Sentence Completion for 
Events from the Past Test (SCEPT; Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007). 
 
The results indicate that negative mood does influence autobiographical recall in 
terms of content and memory. These results indicate that autobiographical 
memory is a phenomenon that is in part dependent on negative mood state and 
in part dependent on current depressive symptoms and history of depression. 
Increased rumination was particularly responsive to induced negative mood state 
in those with current depressive symptoms. Reduced levels of activity, alertness, 
loss of interest and diminished pleasure are aspects of negative mood that seem 
to be particularly important components of mood state at the time of recall. To 
gain further insights into mood state effects in autobiographical recall, future 
directions in mood research should focus on and differentiate between the 
separate mood state components that are more important in bringing about 
changes in recalled content, especially in those with either a history of 
depression or showing current depressive symptoms. 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The general aims of this thesis are to investigate the effects of mood state on the 
content of recalled autobiographical memories. This introductory chapter reviews 
previous theoretical and empirical work examining autobiographical memory. 
Theoretical review starts by examining the characteristics and structure of 
autobiographical memory, paying particular attention to the ‘autobiographical 
knowledge base’ (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Autobiographical memory is 
hierarchically organised in an interlinked network of increasing sensory (i.e. 
memory for vividness and perceptual qualities) and affective information (i.e. 
mood and emotional aspects) associated with the memory event. Specific 
memories have high sensory and affective qualities and include contextual 
details such as time, place, person, whereas general memories lack sensory and 
affective qualities and contextual details. The empirical work falls into two main 
areas: 1) the influence of negative mood on triggering previous cognitive content 
associated with that similar mood state; 2) the influence of mood on type of 
memory that is recalled with reference to sensory, affective and contextual detail, 
so-called overgeneral memory when lacking such qualities. The first three 
empirical chapters report on the development of a sufficiently sensitive procedure 
to examine cognitive content involved in autobiographical memories. The last two 
empirical chapters examine general versus specific memories, firstly using the 
cued autobiographical memory procedure, and secondly using the sentence 
completion procedure to examine the effects of mood on type of autobiographical 
memories.   
 
1.2 Autobiographical memory characteristics 
The term autobiographical memory refers to be an individual’s record of 
experiences from his/her personal life in the form of an internal life story, which is 
a construction of past experiences (Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Herman, Raes, 
Watkins & Dalgleish, 2007). Research suggests that mood states influence the 
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manner in which the record of experience is processed, evaluated and recalled 
(Holland & Kensinger, 2010). Memory recall is thought to be influenced by mood 
congruence i.e. that mood states might influence the priming of similarly affective 
memories to the current mood state at the time of recall (Federmeier, Kirson, 
Moreno & Kutas, 2001; Isen, 1999). Another approach suggests that mood 
influences a number of processes in memory recall e.g. vividness, sensory detail 
and emotionality (Kensigner & Schacter, 2006). This stream of research focuses 
structural organization of the memory system. The organization has been 
conceptualised as a continuum, with general information held at one end and 
specific information at the other end (Conway, 2005). The distinction is between 
general memories versus specific memories. Autobiographical memory research 
has indicated that some psychopathology maybe associated with a difficulty in 
retrieving specific autobiographical memories (Sumner, Griffith & Mineka, 2010). 
 
A key characteristic of autobiographical memory is that it focuses on personal 
experience (Conway, 1990). Autobiographical memories tend to entail a greater 
degree of personal material than other memories which act as an identifying 
feature of such memories. Additionally the experience of remembering tends to 
be always present i.e. the experience of reflecting upon a past personal event 
demonstrates that the person doing the remembering plays a central part in the 
remembered memory and is able to refer to the time, place, persons involved 
and date of the event. The veridicality represents the reported accuracy or 
trueness of the remembered content and seems to vary in relation to how 
important that event is to that individual. Conway (1990) argued that 
autobiographical memories do not constitute a veridical record of an experienced 
event but rather are interpretations of events that are never true in the sense that 
they are literal representations of events. Specific event autobiographical 
memories tend to feature sensory information, such as remembering being hot or 
cold or whether it was a bright or dark day, and affective information, such as 
feeling happy or sad and whether it was exciting or boring. Table 1a (on the next 
page) lists ways that autobiographical memories are different from episodic or 
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semantic memories. 
 
Table 1a: Characteristics of autobiographical memory 
    Memory type                                                                         
    Autobio-  Episodic  Semantic 
    graphical  memory  memory 
    memory  
 
Self reference   High   Low   Rare 
 
Experience of   Always   Usually but  Rarely 
remembering   present   not always  present 
       present 
 
Interpretation   Frequently  Rare   Rare 
(personal)    present 
 
Veridicality    Variable  High   Social 
consensus         more important 
 
Duration of   Usually event  Usually lifetime  Lifetime 
memory    specific   periods 
 
Context specific   Always    Always   Never 
sensory and    present   present   present 
perceptual 
attributes 
 
Imagery   Frequently  Frequently  May be present  
    present   present   but rare  
 
Affective   Always    Low   Rare 
present in    
event-specific 
memory  
 
Table adapted from Conway (1990, p14) 
 
It should also be recognised that there is a certain amount of overlap between 
autobiographical, episodic and semantic memory because the retrieval of 
autobiographical memory containing personal experience may also involve the 
use of episodic and semantic memory and vice versa (Conway, 1990). For 
example, giving someone the memory cue ‘school’ might start a search involving 
semantic information on what is the nature of school and recalling episodic 
memories of school, which then might lead to event-specific memories of a 
personal experience that happened when they were at a specific school.  
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1.3 Autobiographical memory structure 
According to Conway (1996) autobiographical memory is a specific form of 
memory involving an individual’s record of experiences from his/her personal life, 
which is used to construct past experiences. It is believed that autobiographical 
memory is arranged in a hierarchy – a series of ordered grouping of memories 
within a system – with lifetime periods which are arranged around themes 
(Conway, 1996). For example, we can place an event in a particular period 
because we remember that it occurred while we were in primary school, or more 
specifically because it was just after we got married. Themes can range from 
distinctive and unique, which would be at the bottom of the hierarchy (such as 
‘my first job’), to the other side of the continuum towards themes that are 
repeated, such as my ‘journeys to and from work’, which are classified as 
subordinate themes. Conway (1996) further suggests that the next level down 
contains specific knowledge about an event which it is argued contains 
information from senses and affective mood states. 
 
Therefore, memory recollection could be seen as on a continuum from general 
memories without sensory and affective information to specific events with 
sensory and affective information evident. Such a hierarchy would suggest that 
general memories would be accessed more frequently than specific events. 
Williams et al. (2007) suggested that because of the frequency of rehearsal of 
general memories compared to specific memories, the latter are less easily 
recalled. Furthermore, Williams & Dritschel (1992) argued that specific memories 
include contextual details such as time, place, person and action which act as 
identification tags, whereas general memories lack contextual details and 
therefore lack or have fewer identification tags. For example, general memories 
lack temporal detail of the timing (e.g. the skiing holiday in France), sometimes 
called “extended memories”, which have consequently been accessed and 
rehearsed less because of the lack of temporal detail. Another category of 
general memory also lacks temporal location, but rather than describing an 
extended period focuses on a number of periods of similar lifetime themes (e.g. 
going to the supermarket), sometimes called ‘categoric memories’, which pull 
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together routines and commonalities. Particular episodic autobiographical 
memories in our personal past tend to have time and place specific information 
about a specific episode, whereas some memories only contain knowledge about 
facts or names. These factual or so-called ‘semantic memories’ tend to have 
unique knowledge about facts, but lack the temporal qualities of episodic 
autobiographical memories (e.g. name of the primary or secondary school you 
attended).  
 
The cognitive processes underlying recall of autobiographical memories are 
thought to be under generative or direct mechanisms (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). Generative retrieval is hypothesised as starting with a general 
lifetime themes search which could successfully end with event-specific 
knowledge. Retrieval following this pattern is a conscious, effortful and controlled 
process. Direct or so-called spontaneous retrieval is when event-specific 
knowledge is directly activated by unprompted memory cues. This is automatic 
rather than a conscious process. The structure and proposed mechanisms for 
recalling autobiographical memories have been suggested by Conway & Rubin 
(1993). The Conway & Rubin (1993) structure indicates that autobiographical 
memory is organised in an interlinked network of specificity ranging from the 
lifetime periods to general memories and ending at specific events holding 
sensory and affective information (Figure 1 on the next page).  
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Figure 1: The structure of Autobiographical Memory 
Figure adapted from Conway & Rubin (1993) 
 
According to the Conway & Rubin (1993) model, the process of memory recall is 
a dynamic and strategic cognitive operation involving a number of processes 
including monitoring and verification. The monitoring and verification refers to the 
iterative process of checking the memory against similar memories and looking 
for event-specific information. It is thought that autobiographical retrieval carries 
not only the knowledge into consciousness but activates some affective 
components associated with the original event. However, rather than affect being 
fully dependent on the consequences of an event, it is recognised that affect is 
also generated by the type of memory processing (Hayes, Conway & Morris, 
1992).  
 
1.3.1 Word cueing technique to elicit autobiographical memories 
The cue word technique involves the participant being supplied with a cue word 
and asked to recall a memory associated with that word. Sometimes instructions 
are given to the participant to elicit a specific event memory by asking for a 
memory that happened to them that lasted for less than a day (Williams et al., 
Lifetime Periods 
General Events 
Event-Specific Knowledge 
General 
Specific 
Retrieval 
When I 
worked at … 
Going to 
dance on 
Saturday … 
The Friday 
evening that I … 
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2007). The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) 
was developed to assess autobiographical memory by using cue words (see 
Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Hierarchy processes in cued autobiographical retrieval using a cue word 
technique  
Cue word
Semantic autobiographical 
memory
Episodic autobiographical 
memory
Specific event autobiographical memory
Sensory / 
perceptual
Verbal / 
Abstract
Type of representation
 
Figure adapted from Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Herman, Raes, Watkins & Dalgleish 
(2007) 
 
Cue words can be relatively emotive words (i.e. death, torture, bomb) or more 
neutral words (paper, hat, log). It is possible to measure objective aspects of 
autobiographical memory (response latencies and recent or remote events) and 
subjective characteristics (ratings of arousal, vividness, valence, etc). The 
technique has been found to be relatively robust across variations in the cueing 
procedure (Williams et al., 2007).  
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1.4 Mood states and mood state induction 
1.4.1 Multi dimensions of mood 
Understanding of mood state is thought to require a multiple dimensional 
understanding rather than a unitary conceptualization of mood (Matthews, Jones 
& Chamberlain, 1990). Multiple dimensional understanding of mood state has a 
number of affective components ranging from unpleasant to pleasant emotions 
(valence component) and from low to high arousal (arousal component). Mood 
states (or affective states) can be characterised by a circumplex containing the 
two dimensions of valence and arousal (Matthews et al., 1990; see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Dimensions of affect (adapted from Matthews, Jones & Chamberlain, 
1990)  
High Arousal
Low Arousal
Unpleasant Pleasant
ExcitementFear
RelaxedDysphoric
 
 
Pleasant emotions are those that are experienced as desirable and involve 
meeting basic hedonic needs, whereas unpleasant emotions are those 
experienced as repugnant and do not meet hedonic needs (Matthews et al., 
1990). Individuals experiencing sadness, unhappiness and loneliness are 
positioned on negative valence (unpleasant mood). Depressed mood is 
characterized by negative valence, or sometimes called low hedonic tone (Flett, 
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Vredenburg & Krames, 1997). There is a similar continuum between high and 
low arousal (Matthews et al., 1990). Individuals experiencing inactiveness, 
passiveness and apathy are positioned on a lack of energy (low arousal). 
Depressed mood is characterized by low arousal (Flett et al., 1997). Arousal, 
unlike valence, is difficult to label as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’, as it is often 
dependent on the situation. For example, a drop in arousal when relaxing might 
be experienced as pleasant prior to sleep but unpleasant when about to embark 
on an enjoyable but energetic task (Figure 3). 
 
1.4.2 Mood induction techniques 
A review of mood induction procedures included the following main categories of 
induction: Imagination, Velten, Film, Music, Social Interaction, Gift and Facial 
Expression (Westermann, Spies, Stahl & Hesse, 1996). Imagination technique 
involves imagining or remembering situations or events in order to evoke the 
intended mood. The Velten technique uses self-referent statements describing 
positive or negative self-statements. Film technique involves showing a short clip 
and asking participants to imagine the situation and 'get involved' in the feelings 
suggested. Music technique involves listening to classical or modern music and 
being instructed to get into the mood expressed by the music. Social Interaction 
technique involves the experimenter manipulating the immediate environment in 
order to induce emotional states. The Gift and Facial Expression techniques 
involve the experimenter giving a small gift or asking the participant to show a 
facial expression that matches the emotional state that is desired. 
 
The techniques can be grouped under three main headings: imagining 
procedures, interpersonal procedures and suggestive techniques (Clark, Beck & 
Alford, 1999). Those procedures based on imagination include film or story 
inductions, as both techniques require the participant to imagine emotion-laden 
events. Imagining procedures involve the induction of mood by requiring the 
participant to imagine emotional-laden events from their lives (Brewer, Doughtie 
& Lubin, 1980) or by identifying with emotive situations (Gross & Levensen, 
1995). Interpersonal induction procedures include Social Interaction, Gift and 
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Facial Expression, as these techniques involve some kind of interpersonal 
interaction as the main catalyst in the procedure. Suggestive techniques, which 
include the Velten and Music induction procedures, are seen as the most 
rigorous, as these techniques avoid priming specific events and can allow 
standardization in the induction procedure. 
 
A combination of mood induction techniques has been used to possibly enhance 
the desired mood state (Teasdale & Dent, 1987; Yeung, Dalgleish, Golden & 
Schartau, 2006). When choosing a mood induction procedure, it is important to 
select a technique that will not interfere with the dependent variables under 
observation (Westermann et al., 1996). For instance, a film or story may prime 
cognitions that are related to the film or story. It may be important for a 
researcher looking at cognitive content to avoid mood induction procedures that 
involve such techniques (Westermann et al., 1996), as the content elicited may 
reflect the cognitive content in the mood induction – in this case the film clip – 
rather than that produced by the associated mood state.  
 
1.4.3 Velten mood induction technique 
The Velten procedure has been used extensively by researchers interested in 
mood and cognition in experimental situations (Kenealy, 1986). The procedure 
involves participants reading a list of sixty graduated self-referent statements. In 
Velten’s (Velten, 1968) original study, subjects read 60 self-referent statements 
related to three specific mood states – depression, elation and neutral – and 
allocated to each of these three conditions. The study included two further 
groups involving acting depressed and acting elated as a means of controlling 
demand characteristic. The seven dependent measures included seven tasks, 
including Multiple Affect Adjective Checklists (MAACL), word association and 
spontaneous verbalisations. The results showed significant differences between 
depression and elation in five of the seven measures. The study demonstrated 
that the Velten technique had induced the required mood, whereas the demand 
characteristic groups showed no significant difference in mood. 
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The Velten technique has certain strengths as a mood induction technique, and 
been used extensively (Baker & Guttfreund, 1993; Bates, Thompson & Flanagan, 
1999; Sinclair, Mark, Enzle, Borkovec & Cumbleton, 1994). The procedure 
accommodates group administration, and the negative mood induction procedure 
of the techniques has been shown to mimic depressed mood state (Scher, 
Ingram & Segal, 2005). There are a number of advantages to group 
administration, such as the group procedure is more homogenous than individual 
administration and has the benefit of collecting a large amount of data with the 
minimum time period (Bates et al., 1999).  
 
The negative state produced by the technique has been shown to effectively 
produce a mood change with similar characteristics to depressive states 
(Goodwin & Williams, 1982). This is important to researchers interested in 
making connections between induced mood state and pathological states. It has 
been noted that mood induction procedures seem to induce cognitive content 
similar to the depressed state (Scher et al., 2005). The cognitive response to the 
negative mood state, or so-called cognitive reactivity, has been defined as the 
relative ease with which maladaptive cognitions or cognitive styles are triggered 
by mild (non-pathological) mood fluctuations.  
 
The review of mood induction procedures indicates some heterogeneity in the 
type of mood induction procedures used in previous research. The most cited 
mood induction technique was Velten mood induction procedure. Velten 
technique allows standardization, and can be argued to be the most rigorous 
technique in inducing a mood state. It has advantages which enable group 
administration. This facilitates a homogenous procedure which mitigates 
procedural anomalies.  
 
1.5 Two theoretically important mood state phenomena 
Investigating the mood state effects evoked by mood induction techniques is an 
essential aspect of discovering mood effects on autobiographical memories but a 
clearer understanding of important mood state phenomena could provide a 
 12 
theoretical understanding to any mood state effects observed in autobiographical 
memory. Mood state is thought to affect the manner in which memories are 
recalled and evaluated by facilitating recall or processing of similarly affective 
memories (Forgas, 1995). There are two theoretically important mood state 
phenomena that contribute to understanding mood effects on memory recall: 
mood dependent and mood congruent processing effects.  
 
The first theoretical phenomenon, mood dependent effect, is where the mood 
state at recall matches the mood state at the time the event was experienced, 
and is more easily remembered (Kenealy, 1986). According to this, retrieval will 
be more likely while experiencing the same affective state that was experienced 
when the memory was encoded. The second theoretical phenomenon, mood 
congruence, is where a certain mood will tend to enhance processing of 
memories or stimuli that correspond to the concurrent mood state (Teasdale & 
Fogarty, 1979). This effect shows an influence of emotion at the retrieval stage; 
when a person is in a particular mood, they will tend to remember information 
that is congruent with the concurrent mood. In both cases it is thought that mood 
state at the time of event and at recall acts like a filter to particular memories of 
past events. Both state dependent and mood congruent findings show the 
influence that mood can have on memory. Bower (Bower, 1981 & 1991) argues 
that mood congruent and state dependency findings can be explained by a 
Network Theory of Affect. 
 
The notion of mood state dependence suggests that some cognitive constructs, 
such as dysfunctional assumptions, are non-accessible under normal mood 
states, but become ‘primed’ by negative mood, which could activate a number of 
negative cognitive constructs. Dysfunctional assumptions have been the 
traditional focus of mood related cognitions. The term 'dysfunctional assumption' 
describes the way in which a person organises his or her experience and 
perception of the world, which are overly rigid and inflexible and dictates the way 
he or she deals with new experiences (Williams, Conway & Cohen, 2008). A 
study by Miranda, Gross, Persons & Hahn (1998) highlighted a problem with the 
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cognitive theories of clinical depression in that stable beliefs predispose 
vulnerable individuals to depression. The problem is that when depression 
remits, the dysfunctional assumptions are either difficult to detect or absent 
(Miranda et al., 1998). Empirical evidence seems to refute the stability 
hypothesis, that dysfunctional assumptions are stable, and indicates that some 
cognitive events appear to covary with depressive symptoms and may only be 
accessible during negative mood states (Miranda & Persons, 1988). 
 
An important feature of cognitive theories of negative cognitive structures is that 
they remain latent until activated by an environmental stressor such as primed 
mood or adverse life event (Beck, 1970). Once the negative cognitive structures 
are activated, they negatively bias information processing which causes 
depressed mood (Beck, 1970). Theory proposes that negative cognitive 
structures need to be activated by an external stressor to produce negative 
affect. Miranda et al. (1998) propose that the stressor is negative mood state, 
which activates a variety of negative cognitive structures. These act as facilitators 
in bringing about depressed symptomatology. The cognitive facilitators are 
considered to be unstable and surface level cognitions that “effect an 
independent variable on a dependent variable by various transformation 
processes inside an active organism” (Kwon & Oei, 1994, p.336). Cognitive 
facilitators are often interlinked and bias in one cognitive process may affect 
others as well, such as selective attention, sensory and affective information, 
memory recall and cognitive structures.  
 
This section has discussed current understanding of key aspects of priming 
mood and key theoretical aspects of mood state effect on autobiographical 
memory that could contribute to researchers investigating mood state effect on 
autobiographical retrieval. Specifically, it has focused on researchers interested 
in the effect that priming has on broader cognitive content such as appraisal of 
sensory and affective information rather than traditional measurement of 
dysfunctional assumptions. Kwon & Oei (1994) have differentiated between 
stable and transient and surface and deep level cognitions. Dysfunctional 
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attitudes are seen as linked to stable and deeper level cognitions, whereas 
automatic thoughts are seen as transient and surface level cognitions (Kwon & 
Oei, 1994).  
 
1.6 Studies involving primed mood 
Investigating mood state effects and techniques for bringing about temporary 
mood change is a necessary aspect for researchers interested in mood state 
effects, but a clearer understanding of how mood state effects act upon particular 
groups with known affective condition could provide a valuable insight into any 
mood state effects observed in autobiographical memory (van Vreeswijk & de 
Wilde, 2004). There is more known about the cognitive styles of already 
depressed individuals but far less about those individuals who are vulnerable to 
depression by virtue of a previous episode of depression (Scher et al., 2005). 
Conversely, there is more known about primed mood effects in those with 
previous history of depression but far less about those that have naturally 
occurring symptomatology due to dysphoria or clinical depression. This is 
undoubtedly due to the ethical constraints in inducing negative mood in those 
with a current mood disorder. The studies which investigate cognitive styles in 
the already depressed and mood priming in the vulnerable can be subdivided 
into those using self-reported questionnaires or performance-based measures 
(Scher et al., 2005). Self-reported questionnaires tend to assess cognitive 
reactivity by measuring attributes such as cognitive appraisals of 
autobiographical events, dysfunctional attitudes and automatic thoughts (Scher 
et al., 2005). In contrast, performance-based measures tend to assess 
information processing bias, such as dichotic listening tasks, attention 
deployment and emotional Stroop tasks (Scher et al., 2005). There is some 
evidence which indicates that vulnerability for depression is sufficient for biased 
cognitive styles to be visible, while other findings suggest that, in addition to 
vulnerability, acute negative mood shift is a necessary condition to trigger biased 
cognitive styles (Yeung et al., 2006). The studies in self-reported questionnaires 
or performance-based measures in the respective vulnerable and symptomatic 
categorisation can be used as a springboard for further discussion. 
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1.6.1 Mood state effects in those with a previous history of depression  
or so-called vulnerable individuals 
Studies such as Miranda & Persons (1988), who used mood priming technique, 
and Roberts & Kassel (1996), who used naturally occurring mood, demonstrated 
converging data that cognitive style is related to mood state in vulnerable 
individuals but not in the non-vulnerable group. The interpretation of these 
findings is somewhat difficult because they could indicate either that low mood 
triggers negative cognitive styles or that negative cognitive styles trigger low 
mood. Miranda & Persons (1998) did test the hypothesis that latent negative 
cognitions are present in vulnerable individuals but need low mood to activate 
these cognitive styles, and found evidence to support the hypothesis. In another 
study, Miranda et al. (1998) used mood induction in vulnerable and non-
vulnerable individuals, and examined dysfunctional attitudes under mood stress. 
The study indicated that increases in negative mood were associated with 
increased dysfunctional attitudes in vulnerable but not non-vulnerable people. It 
is interesting to note that the non-vulnerable group decreased their self-rated 
endorsements of dysfunctional attitudes under mood stress. This finding is 
difficult to interpret without considering the effect on a broader range of cognitive 
processes, such as attention and memory changes. 
 
The self-reported questionnaire technique and assessing endorsements of 
attitudinal change has been the main research technique to assess cognitive 
reactivity (Segal, Kennedy, Gemar, Hood, Pedersen & Buis, 2006). The use of a 
mood prime combined with self-rating of adjectives or dysfunctional attitudes has 
been used to assess what has become more recently known as mood state 
dependence. The technique has been utilised by many researchers, including 
Teasdale & Dent (1987), who investigated mood dependence in recovered and 
never-depressed participants using a word adjective rating technique before and 
after a mood prime. The findings suggested that recovered depressed 
participants recalled more negative adjectives than never-depressed participants. 
The authors also found that recovered depressed participants did not differ from 
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never-depressed participants in a normal mood state prior to mood induction. 
Analogous results have been reported by Miranda & Persons (1988) and Gemar, 
Segal, Sagrati & Kennedy (2001), both of which teams used the dysfunctional 
attitude scale to assess cognitive reactivity. The former study investigated 
dysfunctional attitudes in women with a prior history of depression. The analysis 
indicated that post Velten procedure, dysfunctional attitudes increased with 
negative mood only for participants with a history of depression. Similarly, the 
latter study investigated mood-induced changes in never and recovered 
depressed groups, and found that, after mood induction, formerly depressed 
compared to never-depressed people had greater incidence of reported 
dysfunctional attitudes. 
 
There have been a number of studies focusing on self-reported techniques by 
manipulating the valence of memory cues and assessing the resultant 
autobiographical content evoked. Eich, Macaulay & Ryan (1994) investigated 
subjects’ memory for previously generated events, which were better when mood 
at testing matched the mood at generation. The results supported mood 
dependent memory, and indicated that internal states such as mood can 
generate mood dependent recall. Gillihan, Kessler & Farah (2007) used a 
random assignment to memory valence with participants blind to their 
assignment. Depending on the questionnaire received, the subjects were asked 
to report memories that were positive, neutral, or negative. The findings 
suggested that valence does indeed exert a mood-altering effect on memory 
recall, and may do so even without the individual’s awareness. Isen, Shalker, 
Clark & Karp (1978) investigated the effect of good mood on cognitive processes. 
The mood was evoked by winning a computer game. The authors found that 
subjects who had an induced positive mood were better able to recall positive 
material in memory. 
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1.6.2 Mood state effects in those with current symptoms of depression  
or so-called symptomatic individuals 
The empirical evidence from primed mood research and memory performance in 
those with symptomatology or previous vulnerability is relevant to researchers 
investigating mood state effects on autobiographical recall. Depressive 
symptomatology, or those individuals with a previous history of depression who 
might not be showing current symptomatology, are possible moderating factors 
that might influence mood state effects in memory recall. A number of studies 
suggest that individuals who have a previous history of depression or symptoms 
of depression have a greater increase in negative thinking following negative 
mood prime than never-depressed individuals when using self-reported 
endorsements (Persons & Miranda, 1992; Teasdale & Dent, 1987). Persons & 
Miranda (1992) argue that unhelpful beliefs in memory develop in a negative 
affective state and become linked to this negative mood state in memory. 
Therefore, unhelpful beliefs that are strongly linked to a mood state in memory 
remain latent unless the associated mood state is also activated. Persons & 
Miranda (1992) argue that a failure to find cognitive reactivity, i.e. the ease with 
which cognitions are triggered by mood fluctuations, in some studies is because 
they have either failed to check for the presence of symptomatology or failed to 
prime a negative mood state. For example, Dykman (1997) investigated negative 
priming in recovered and never-depressed groups to see what impact mood has 
on facilitating access to latent dysfunctional attitudes. The findings showed that 
there was no significant difference in dysfunctional attitudes between the two 
groups. The null findings might be down to the absence of checking of current 
depressive symptoms. For instance, even mild symptomatology in never-
depressed people may already be producing reactivity prior to negative priming. 
Again, Brosse, Craighead & Craighead (1999) investigated the effects of mood 
amongst previously depressed and never depressed individuals, and found a 
significant relationship between primed mood and cognitive reactivity. However, 
they did not find any difference between previously depressed and never 
depressed. The study could be criticised for failure to adequately check for 
current symptomatology in the never depressed group. 
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There has also been difficultly in demonstrating mood effects in self-reported 
endorsements of depressive cognitive styles in non-clinical groups who had a 
previous vulnerability by virtue of a previous history of depression but show no 
current dysphoric mood. For example, Lethbridge & Allen (2008) followed up a 
cohort of vulnerable individuals, and found that cognitive reactivity to the initial 
mood induction during initial assessment did not predict relapse. The research 
with previously depressed individuals indicates that a biased cognitive style is 
only visible under mood stress conditions. The induction of a sad mood seems to 
facilitate or prime the cognitive style. This observation that mood primes or 
facilitates the observation of cognitive styles doesn’t seem to work for the never-
depressed individuals. One of the aims of thesis was to determine whether the 
cognitive content of autobiographical memory is a trait-like or, conversely, a more 
state-like manifestation.  
 
The findings reviewed in this section suggest that several aspects of cognitive 
appraisal in autobiographical memory in vulnerable individuals require further 
investigation. These will be addressed in the following chapters, and will form the 
basis for a number of research studies in this thesis. First, it is necessary to 
examine and review findings in studies investigating naturally occurring dysphoric 
mood and its effect on autobiographical memory, as it has clearly been 
demonstrated that autobiographical recall is not a simple mood-dependent 
epiphenomenon (Raes, Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2007). Rather, it appears to 
also be a characteristic of naturally occurring dysphoric mood and of those who 
have also previously suffered an episode of depression (Raes, Hermans, 
Williams, Beyers, Brunfaut & Eelen, 2006a). 
 
1.7 Mood state effects in those with naturally occurring depressed mood 
Deficits in memory have contributed to our understanding of mood and 
autobiographical memory, particularly in the case of memory performance in 
naturally occurring mood disorders such as depression. One of the basic 
assumptions is that mood biases will be present in every stage of processing 
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from perception, encoding, attention, storage and recall (Koster, De Raedta, 
Leyman & De Lissnyder, 2010). The literature on memory and naturally occurring 
mood disorders such as dysphoria and depression is relevant to researchers who 
are interested in contributing evidence to the research problem of whether the 
autobiographical content of naturally occurring disorders is dependent on mood 
state or related to trait-specific factors. There is also another important issue, 
which is whether such memory deficits or biases constitute a present vulnerability 
factor or part of a naturally occurring mood disorder.  It was argued by Beck, 
Rush, Shaw & Emery (1979) that temporary mood changes would have little 
effect on cognitive biases in the absence of stable dysphoric or depressed 
symptoms. High levels of dysphoric mood combined with acute negative mood 
changes might have an increased resonance due to the presence of a relatively 
stable mild dysphoric mood state e.g. in those showing current dysphoric 
symptomatology (Miranda & Persons, 1988).  
 
Specific evidence supporting the mood state hypothesis has been reported by 
Miranda, Persons & Byers (1990). The authors investigated depressed patients’ 
natural variation in mood during the day and reported that dysfunctional thinking 
increased when mood was worse and decreased when mood was better. Indirect 
evidence but pertaining to more specific cognitive characteristics has been 
reported by Teasdale & Dent (1988). The authors assessed the relationship 
between depression and negative thinking on a number of global negative 
adjectives used to describe themselves. The findings suggested that depression 
was significantly and independently predicted by initial level of depression and by 
the number of global negative adjectives used to describe themselves. Evidence 
in the literature, to which the review now turns, suggests a number of cognitive 
sequelae of a stable dysphoric mood.  
 
1.7.1 Depressive symptomatology impacting on autobiographical recall 
For clarity, cognitive changes resulting as a consequence of mood state will be 
termed cognitive sequelae. Also, individuals currently showing depressive 
symptoms will be referred to as symptomatic or having current symptomatology. 
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Individuals showing current depressed symptomatology and those with a history 
of depression are thought to react to negative affect with greater increases in 
dysfunctional cognitions (Miranda et al., 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1988; Segal, 
Gemar & Williams, 1999). The current research is interested in contributing to 
evidence of whether autobiographical content in individuals with symptomatology 
or history of depression is a factor in their cognitive output. Cognitive sequelae 
can only be monitored through the content or the processes they generate. 
Cognitive phenomena, such as thoughts, and various cognitive processes – such 
as predictions of certainty in future events, preferential processing of negative 
self-referential information, increased ruminative self focus and susceptibility to 
resource limitations – have all been reported in those showing current 
symptomatology, and may be reactive to transitory mood (Oei, Hibbert & O’Brien, 
2005). 
 
It has been noted that symptomatic individuals seem to have difficulties in the 
ability to conceptualize and anticipate future events (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, 
Rose & MacLeod, 1996). It has also been suggested by Anderson, Spielman & 
Bargh (1992) that dysphoric groups are more pessimistic and predict more 
negative events in the future. The authors suggest that this might be due to the 
inability to explicitly weigh up the probabilities that a future event will happen. The 
symptomatic individual will have a spontaneous implicit thought that a negative 
event will arise, and will be unable to challenge this automatic thought explicitly 
to discount the unlikely probability it will occur at a particular future date. 
 
The self and autobiographical memory has been an area that has seen an 
increasing number of research studies. According to Patterson & Seligman 
(1984), symptomatic individuals get locked into particular attributional styles 
about how people see themselves and others. These cognitive styles can have a 
counterproductive effect, not only on the way people see themselves but on the 
way they relate to other people. Bargh & Tota (1988) conducted an experiment 
with non-symptomatic and symptomatic individuals under conditions of cognitive 
load, and found that symptomatic individuals responded with the same response 
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latencies for depressive and non-depressive self-referential content, while the 
non-symptomatic showed increased latencies for depressive self-referential 
content. This suggests that dysphoric individuals have a propensity to 
automatically process information about themselves which is negatively self-
referential. However, for other self-referential content no difference was found 
between symptomatic and non-symptomatic individuals. 
 
1.7.2 Cognitive load impacting on cognitive content and memory generality 
Investigating mood state effects on symptomatic groups and resultant cognitive 
content is a necessary aspect to the field of memory research, but a clearer 
understanding of how cognitive load affects memory generality could provide a 
valuable insight to any mood state effects observed in autobiographical retrieval. 
Cognitive load is a term that refers to the load on working memory during 
increased cognitive demands (Baddeley, 1990). The current research is 
interested in the effects of mood on autobiographical content, because negative 
mood itself can be seen as a cognitive load which seems to affect a number 
cognitive processes. According to Williams et al. (2007), reduced cognitive 
resources result in a number of cognitive sequelae such as increased rumination 
and reduced overgeneral autobiographical retrieval.  
 
When cognitive resources are under cognitive load there seems to be an 
increase in ruminative self focus (Raes et al., 2007). A study focusing on the 
relationship between overgeneral memory and ruminative self focus has been 
undertaken by Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema (1990). Overgeneral memory involves 
focusing on cognitive processes involved in memory retrieval, which implies 
reduced memory specificity (Raes et al., 2007). The Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1990) study used a negative mood induction procedure with individuals with 
naturally occurring dysphoric mood and used an experimental procedure to study 
the effects of rumination by asking them to focus in on their thoughts and 
feelings. The individuals were then assessed, and it was found that high 
ruminative self focus correlated with greater negative mood. A second study 
focusing on the relationship between overgeneral memory and ruminative self 
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focus was completed by Ciesla & Roberts (2007). The authors randomly 
assigned participants to either a rumination or distraction procedure following a 
sad mood induction. The study found that rumination was more strongly 
associated in those showing depressive symptoms. The depressive symptom 
group also reported higher levels of negative cognitions post mood induction. It 
has been observed by Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) that experimental 
instruction to rumination about thoughts and feelings has not been found to 
induce negative mood in non-symptomatic individuals suggesting that negative 
mood state is a necessary prerequisite. 
 
Memory retrieval in non dysphoric groups has been another research area with 
preliminary findings indicating that the autobiographical memory retrieval process 
could be susceptible to resources limitation or so-called cognitive load (Goddard, 
Dritschel & Burton, 1998). The research involved a time study which participants 
completed whist undergoing a dual task design to tax ‘mental capacity’ under 
experimental conditions. The finding indicated that high cognitive load produced 
more overgeneral recall in participants. The finding could indicate that when 
‘mental capacity’ becomes taxed during cognitive load, this leads to greater 
reliance on implicit or automatic cognitive processes. Wegner (1994) argues 
these processes are seen in dysphoric individuals who are distracted by 
rumination and thus seem unable to challenge negative cognitive styles which 
non-dysphoric individuals otherwise might. 
 
The previous findings of pessimistic content in recall and individuals predicting 
more negative events in the future when in depressive state, increased negativity 
of thoughts about events, increased ruminative self focus and increase in 
memories that lack time, place and person detail, or so-called overgeneral 
memories, are of interest to researchers examining mood state effects on 
autobiographical recall because these factors could be important outcome factors 
that affect retrieval during negative mood state. 
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1.8 Studies involving overgeneral memory as a cognitive characteristic 
The literature on mood and overgeneral memory in naturally occurring mood 
disorders such as depression is relevant to the current research, as the 
researcher is interested in contributing evidence to the research problem of 
whether autobiographical memory retrieval in symptomatic or vulnerable people 
is dependent on mood state or related to trait-specific factors. Overgeneral 
memory seems not to be a simple mood-dependent epiphenomenon of 
depression but a trait characteristic of the depressed and formerly depressed 
(Raes et al., 2007). 
 
The phenomenon of overgeneral memory has been investigated predominantly 
in those already showing signs of depression compared to primed studies which 
predominantly utilise non-depressed individuals. Studies involving memory 
specificity have involved participants showing signs of depression, but very little 
is known about those individuals with a previous episode of depression but 
currently showing no signs of symptomatology. Overgeneral memory as a 
cognitive characteristic will be discussed in this section, as it is a characteristic 
affected by some components of mood especially arousal (McBride & Cappeliez, 
2004). Overgeneral memory represents a cognitive process which focuses on 
how information is encoded, altered, combined and stored in memory rather than 
focusing on shifts in attention, rumination, self-evaluation and future predictions.  
 
1.8.1 Mood effects on overgeneral memory in the symptomatic 
The literature on depressive symptomatology and overgeneral memory is 
relevant to the current research as the researcher is interested in contributing 
evidence to the research problem of whether pre-existing symptomatology is a 
moderator in the effects of mood on autobiographical memory retrieval. The 
effects of pre-standing mood on memory was first highlighted by Williams and 
Scott (1988), who observed that patients with depressed mood have a tendency 
to be ‘over general’ in recalling autobiographical events. The non-depressed 
were able to recall more specific memories in response to positive cue words 
than depressed individuals, who recall significantly more general memories. They 
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concluded that patients had a longer delay in recalling positive memories 
because of the non-congruent mood between the current mood states and the 
memory to be recalled. It was further suggested that there might be a tendency 
to recall less specific positive events compared to specific negative events. 
 
Barnard, Watkins & Ramponi (2006) investigated non-symptomatic participants 
who were not prone to excessive levels of rumination. The participants were 
asked to retrieve autobiographical memories with variants of an animal-related 
category fluency task. The findings indicate that self-focused rumination on the 
material had no effect on reducing specific recollection in the non-dysphoric. In a 
second study, Barnard et al. (2006) investigated rumination of self-related 
material. The results indicated that the self-related material had the effect of 
reducing specific recollection in the non-dysphoric.  
 
Researchers have also focused their attention on the mechanisms underlying 
overgeneral memory. For example, Maccallum, McConkey, Bryant & Barnier 
(2000) investigated the impact of hypnotically induced mood on the specificity of 
autobiographical memory in a non-dysphoric group. Participants were asked to 
retrieve specific autobiographical memories in response to positive and negative 
cue words. When in a sad mood induced condition, participants provided fewer 
specific memories in response to positive rather than negative cues. Findings 
suggest that impaired recall of specific memories may be mediated by state 
factors associated with sad mood. It could be argued that the study did have a 
number of methodological weaknesses, such as not controlling for previous 
history of depression, not testing the relationship between autobiographical 
memory specificity to current emotional state, and using only highly hypnotisable 
subjects. 
 
Research also indicates that the ‘overgeneral’ memory could be a stable trait that 
is relatively unaffected by mood state (Williams, 1996; Williams & Dritschell, 
1988).  Williams & Dritschell (1988) investigated differences in those who were 
currently suicidal and those who had been but were currently not suicidal, and 
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found that both groups had fewer specific autobiographical memories than a 
control group. Similarly, research such as Brittlebank, Scott, Williams & Ferrier 
(1993) found no differences in those who were depressed and those who were in 
remission and their overgeneral memories. Equivocal evidence was also 
demonstrated in an investigation by Kuyken & Dalgleish (1995), which involved a 
post hoc review of participants who were vulnerable to depression by virtue of 
previous episodes and participants with no previous episodes. The findings 
suggested that there were no differences in overgeneral memory between the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups. It is important to note that the Kuyken and 
Dalgleish study was in the absence of current low mood state. 
 
1.8.2 Mood effects on overgeneral memory in the vulnerable 
Overgeneral memory has been shown to be persistent in those recovered from 
depression (Raes, Watkins, Williams & Hermans, 2008). Formerly depressed 
and currently depressed have been found to have higher levels of overgeneral 
memory compared to never depressed individuals (Mackinger, Pachinger, 
Leibetseder & Fartacek, 2000). The current research is interested in contributing 
to evidence of whether overgeneral autobiographical memory represents a trait 
or state dependent phenomena. There has been some difficulty in finding 
overgeneral memory within non-clinical groups showing previous vulnerability by 
virtue of a previous history of depression (Raes et al., 2008).  
 
Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert (1997) argued that valence reflects the degree to which 
a stimulus is negative or positive, and arousal reflects the intensity of the 
stimulus. The current research is interested in contributing to evidence of 
whether valence and arousal levels are important mood-related variables on 
cognitive sequelae in autobiographical memory. McBride & Cappeliez (2004) 
designed a study to investigate the effects of manipulating valence and arousal 
components of mood on specificity of autobiographical memory. In their first 
study, no difference was found in autobiographical memory specificity among 
formerly depressed and never-depressed subjects. In a second study by McBride 
& Cappeliez (2004), exercise was used as a way to prime low and high arousal 
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mood states. The authors then investigated the effects of manipulating valence 
and arousal components on specificity of autobiographical memory. Their results 
indicated that low arousal state evoked an increased proportion of overgeneral 
memories. The authors suggest that this memory phenomenon may be 
influenced by the arousal component of mood. 
 
The effects of primed states have been investigated with both positive and 
negative mood affects. Svaldi & Mackinger (2003 & 2004) investigated recall of 
autobiographical mood congruent memories with recovered depressed and 
never-depressed people. The results indicate that a positive mood induction 
leads to a mood congruent increase of specificity, while negative mood induction 
leads to a mood incongruent decrease of specificity. There are equivocal findings 
of the effects of positive and negative effects on memory specificity. Yeung et al. 
(2006) investigated whether reduced autobiographical memory specificity (AMS) 
could be induced in healthy volunteers with no history of depression, using a 
negative mood manipulation. Results showed a reduction in AMS following 
negative mood induction, compared to a neutral induction, whereas positive 
mood induction had no effect on AMS. The effect of experimentally induced 
retrieval style seems to impact on judgements of negative experience (Raes, 
Hermans, Williams & Eelen, 2006b). The authors investigated students who 
habitually retrieve less specific memories and found that participants who were 
induced to retrieve memories in an overgeneral way experienced more distress 
following a negative event than participants who were induced to retrieve 
memories in a specific way. 
 
Overgeneral memories could have more state like components than previously 
thought, and could possibility be modifiable by manipulation of mood state 
conditions. Williams, Teasdale, Segal & Soulsby (2000) suggest that the 
mindfulness-based cognitive intervention helps reduce overgeneral 
autobiographical memories in those recovered from depression in the former 
research and in those currently depressed in the latter research compared to 
control groups. Research suggests that there might be clinical efficacy in 
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targeting some of the deficiencies seen in those vulnerable to depression. It has 
been suggested that overgeneral memory is based upon defective retrieval 
strategy which abandons the recall before it reaches the knowledge base of 
specific memories. The premature abandonment is likely to produce a memory 
that is not only overgeneral but less vivid and clear (Coluccia, Bianco & 
Brandimonte, 2006). The overgeneral memory bias is thought to be related to a 
number of cognitive characteristics seen in vulnerable individuals and to have 
consequences for maintaining and exacerbation of affective state (Barnard et al., 
2006; Yeung et al., 2006). Overgeneral phenomenon is thought to be linked to 
the poor problem-solving skills which have been observed in symptomatic 
patients and possibly also in those vulnerable to depression (Evans, William, 
O’Loughlin & Howells, 1992). It is argued that if those who are symptomatic or 
have a vulnerability to depression have difficulty in producing specific memories 
and take longer to produce these memories, they will be at a disadvantage when 
it comes to using such techniques in everyday problem-solving (Williams, 1996). 
The proposition that autobiographical memories in low mood states might lack 
specificity in the symptomatic and vulnerable is likely to be of interest to 
researchers examining the effects of primed negative mood state on memory 
recall.  
 
1.9 Summary and aims 
The literature on naturally occurring mood suggests that individuals suffering 
from depression have difficulty in retrieving specific memories and instead 
retrieve summarised schematics or overgeneral memory.  A recent meta-analysis 
reinforces this robust finding (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). The literature 
further suggests that biases in cognitive functioning, e.g. increased negativity and 
increased worries about the self, appear in addition to overgeneral memory in 
depression (Miranda et al., 1998). There are unanswered questions about the 
cause of the observed findings due to negative mood or depressive 
symptomatology. The cognitive biases in naturally occurring mood could stem 
from the co occurring concomitants of depression rather than negative mood 
state per se. The literature review indicates that the strongest evidence for 
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changes in cognitive functioning and overgeneral memory occurs in individuals 
with a current depressive symptomatology for a mood state dependent process. 
 
Priming studies which in the main have focused on vulnerable but currently in 
remission or non-vulnerable individuals suggest that negative primed mood 
induces biases in cognitive functioning on self-reported measures in vulnerable 
individuals but not non-vulnerable. Similar but less equivocal findings in 
overgeneral memory indicate that induced mood produces overgeneral memory 
in the vulnerable but is absent or less pronounced in the non-vulnerable. The 
strongest evidence in the literature comes from self-reported questionnaires that 
measure cognitive products, but there is further evidence from performance-
based measures. Studies assessing attentional functioning via Stroop tests 
(Golden, 1978) have been equivocal, but dichotic listening tasks have been less 
equivocal in demonstrating cognitive reactivity. 
 
Despite the growing evidence in both naturally occurring mood studies and mood 
priming studies indicating the occurrence of cognitive biases and overgeneral 
memory, there are a number of studies showing negative findings. This may be 
due to lack of consistency of measures employed in studies to assess cognitive 
functioning. Research in both naturally occurring mood and priming studies have 
concentrated on cognitive products rather processes or structures. The 
nomenclature of the different cognitive levels is important because cognitive 
theory suggests changes in cognitive products will occur with remission of 
depression or negative mood because of their reactivity to mood state, but 
cognitive processes and structures are seen as more enduring predispositions 
that may be less reactive to mood state (Segal, 1988). The negative findings are 
further complicated by the lack of consistency in criteria of depressive 
symptomatology which vary between studies. It is clear that a single study 
looking at different groups based on a single criterion on identical tasks may be 
more informative than cross study comparisons. Additionally, the tasks need to 
focus on wider cognitive functioning rather than single measures and include 
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memory and cognitive functions. Furthermore, the role of mood state in 
producing the biases in memory and cognitive functioning is not well understood.  
 
The general aim in the present research is to expand standard frameworks on 
autobiographical memory, which predominantly examine specificity of the 
memory, towards examining the content and the appraisal within the 
autobiographical memory. The research intends to examine the reactivity of 
autobiographical content and appraisals to negative mood components, thereby 
expanding traditional frameworks within autobiographical memory. The present 
research also intends to examine autobiographical memory in conjunction with a 
traditional framework of memory in terms of specificity when in negative mood 
state. Both the reactivity of autobiographical appraisals and the categorical 
approaches taken is intended to extend the literature on mood state effects within 
autobiographical memory by comprising both reactivity and specificity of memory 
in a series of studies.  
 
The present research program intends to investigate the effects of negative 
mood in retrieval of autobiographical content. The effects of naturally occurring 
low mood on autobiographical memory has been found to increase overgeneral 
memory. It is thought that overgeneral memory could be a mechanism related to 
a decrease in sensory and affective detail as well as cognitive content in 
autobiographical memory. In the first instance, the present research is interested 
in establishing whether a link exists between negative mood and 
autobiographical retrieval, initially by examining the sensory and affective 
information contained in autobiographical memory, and then by examining how 
cognitive content retrieval is effected by negative mood. The research intends to 
examine the effects of pre-existing symptomatology and vulnerability to 
depressed mood which might be linked to changes in autobiographical retrieval. 
Finally, it will consider the importance of negative mood effects on self-focused 
retrieval – a hypothesised factor related to autobiographical memory recall which 
may influence autobiographical content and generality of memory. The research 
is interested in the relationships that exist between mood and autobiographical 
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memories, and wants to investigate the above predictions deduced from the 
literature against the data from the present research. It seems that mood affects 
autobiographical memory in complex ways, sometimes interacting with several 
variables at any one time. 
 
The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that several aspects of 
autobiographical recall in negative mood require further investigation. The 
literature reviewed in this section highlights negative mood may be related to 
autobiographical memory retrieval patterns. The purpose of this program of 
research is to investigate the role of negative mood in the retrieval of both 
autobiographical content and generality of memory. Initially, the role of negative 
mood in autobiographical retrieval has to be established.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
STUDY 1: Autobiographical memory responsiveness to an induced 
negative mood state: Sensory and emotional appraisals in  
students. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As a first step in assessing the role of mood in the retrieval of autobiographical 
memories, the first study of this research investigated whether change in mood 
effects change in sensory and emotional aspects of autobiographical memory 
retrieval. 
 
2.1.1 Theoretical background 
There is a weight of evidence that suggests that negative mood is associated 
with bias in cognition styles and difficulty in retrieving specific autobiographical 
memories (Sumner et al., 2010). Mood effects have been examined by inducing 
the intended state using a variety of mood induction procedures (see section 
1.4.2 in literature review). Park & Bannaji (2000), for instance, investigated the 
effects of mood on shifts in processing style and judgement appraisal. The study 
utilised a video to induce intended mood state and measured the effect on 
sensitivity and bias in judgements. They found negative mood increased 
sensitivity to the information presented while also showing a corresponding 
decrease in errors in judgement. The authors concluded that negative mood 
state encourages more intensive cognitive based and effortful processing.  
 
Other studies have reported an effect of mood on biases in memory (see section 
1.7.1 in literature review). The empirical evidence of the effects of negative mood 
state on memory has come from primed mood studies and research into naturally 
occurring mood states (see section 1.6 and 1.7 in literature review). Importantly 
for this study, which utilised non-clinically diagnosed subjects, evidence has 
come from non-depressed individuals with no reported history of depression 
(Barnard et al., 2006; Yeung et al., 2006). The mood induction experiments with 
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non- and never-depressed support the observation of reduced autobiographical 
memory specificity when in negative mood states.  
 
Previous empirical studies provide important insights into how mood may change 
certain variables in autobiographical memory. Firstly, there is strong evidence 
that mood may decrease one’s ability to recall vivid memories rich in sensory 
detail (Coluccia et al., 2006). Autobiographical memories of events are typically 
rich in cues to their external perceptual origin, containing content high in colours, 
perceptual clarity and vividness (sensory properties), and contextual information 
such as relative spatial location and temporal order (Conway, 1990). Second, 
there appears to be evidence that personal importance of a memory is influenced 
by negative mood by raising the potential that negative memories about events 
have greater personal significance (Williams et al., 2008). Third, negative mood 
seems to increase the likelihood of emotional intensity of the autobiographical 
memory. Individuals often remember more emotional events than non-emotional 
ones when in negative mood (Tsai, Loftu & Polage 2000). Fourth, there is 
evidence to suggest that negative mood influences the potential increase in 
retrieval of similarly valenced memories. Walker, Skowronski, Gibbons, Vogl & 
Thompson (2003) suggest that the mood of the individual at the time of recall, 
rather than at the time of encoding, has a stronger effect on valence of 
autobiographical memories. Finally, there is evidence that autobiographical 
memories are recalled disproportionately for a certain lifetime period between the 
ages of 10 and 30 (Schroots, Van Dijkum & Assink, 2004). The influence of 
negative mood on autobiographical memory and its effect on recall for recent or 
past events is less certain but is a variable that has appeared in a number of 
autobiographical studies (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002; Piolino, Desranges, Benali & 
Eustache, 2002). 
 
Unresolved issues for this study appear to be what specific negative mood 
dimensions are responsible for the differences in autobiographical memory 
retrieval observed in negative mood states. The measurement of mood has 
concentrated on administered scales that measure single dimension of mood, 
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such as degree of sadness or negative effect, or two-dimensional concepts in 
which concepts such as valence and arousal are considered in the analysis. 
Valence looks at the positive versus negative (e.g. happiness, sadness) 
dimension, while arousal looks at active versus de-active (e.g. alert, sluggish) 
dimension in certain emotional states. The University of Wales Institute of 
Science and Technology Mood Adjective Checklist (the UWIST-MACL; Matthews 
et al., 1990) measures two common arousal scales: energetic arousal (EA), 
which pertains to how active or inactive the individual is in the emotion, and tense 
arousal (TA), which pertains to how tense or relaxed the individual is in that 
emotion. The UWIST-MACL has a third valence dimension, hedonic tone (HT), 
which measures contentment vs. discontentment in the emotional state. The 
UWIST-MACL does also include an additional frustration scale, which tends to be 
closely aligned with hedonic tone (Matthews et al., 1990). 
 
The UWIST-MACL (Matthews et al., 1990) three-dimensional model of mood 
enables a clear description of affective states. The dimension of HT allows focus 
on affective tone separately from EA, which is associated with psychomotor 
activities, and TA, which is associated with somatic symptoms and perceived 
distress. The ability to be able to measure separate aspects of negative mood 
state is important in the content of this research as it enables the analysis of 
precise aspects of negative mood with its effects on specific autobiographical 
variables. 
 
2.1.2 Autobiographical memory cueing technique 
The cue word technique has been used in priming studies, whereby participants 
are provided with a neutral cue word and asked to produce an associated 
memory from their past. The cued memory technique was originally used by 
Galton (Galton, 1883), and employed more recently by Williams & Broadbent 
(1986), who modified the technique for cueing autobiographical memories. Its 
strength lies in its simplicity, and the technique allows for the minimum of 
intervention and instruction from the researcher. In the literature there are a 
number of studies which have used the cue word technique to cue 
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autobiographical events (Barnard et al., 2006; Maccallum et al., 2000; McBride & 
Cappeliez,  2004; Yeung et al., 2006; Raes et al 2006b; Svaldi & Mackinger, 
2003 & 2004). Despite the large number of studies in literature purporting to its 
simplicity (Conway 1990; Conway & Rubin, 1993; Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986), the technique has not been without its critics due to 
its reliance on single words used out of context (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986). In 
real life, memory recall would be evoked by contextual content from the event or 
by an aspect of the event that was similar to the related memory. 
 
Cued autobiographical memory has emerged as an interesting measure 
(Watkins, Martin & Stern, 2000b). This technique also has the effect of reducing 
the possible bias inherent in active techniques that tend to manipulate the ‘to-be-
remembered’ memories. The technique involves cueing memories by a modified 
version of the paradigm used by Williams & Broadbent (1986), in which words 
are provided with minimal prompts as memory cues. This has remained the main 
technique for cueing autobiographical memories. Its strength lies in its implicit 
and automatic nature of the technique. Macaulay, Ryan & Eich (1993) found 
mood effects to be more observable when assessed via implicit and automatic 
rather than explicit and non automatic memory measures. Implicit memory is 
‘without conscious awareness’ and automatic, thus has limited impact on working 
memory processing resources. In summary, there has been a move away from 
the use of explicit self-reporting questionnaires to assessments of more self-
referent implicit autobiographical memories (Watkins et al., 2000b).  
 
In summary, there are criticisms of a number of measures that report to measure 
autobiographical content. The terms ‘content’ and ‘appraisal’ have been used in 
the present research. The content can be defined as either external detail or an 
appraisal of the detail in the recalled memory (Bokhari, 2011). External detail 
includes time, place and person. The appraisal of the detail in the memory 
includes all internal content in terms of subjective interpretations of the external 
event such as emotionality and vividness (Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 
1988). These criticisms revolve round the sensitivity to the different hierarchical 
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levels and explicit nature of the techniques, which may be trying to measure 
implicitly that which cannot be captured by such means. It is therefore argued 
that implicit measures may capture a different dimension of cognitive events. 
There is consensus that autobiographical memories are comprised of a sense of 
self in the past and contain a high degree of sensory-perceptual details (Williams 
et al., 2008).  
 
2.1.3 Purpose of the study  
The study to an extent is exploratory, because there is some evidence on the 
effects of depressed mood, but less evidence on the effects of individual negative 
mood components on autobiographical retrieval. This study sought to understand 
the effect of negative mood on autobiographical retrieval. The aim of the present 
study is to evoke autobiographical memories by asking participants to rate each 
memory event for a number of characteristics on an analogue scale. The 
characteristics were: vividness, personal importance, emotionality, valence and 
recency. Researchers interested in autobiographical memory and associated 
retrieval typically used single items or items pools which contain single items on 
a dimension related to the construct to assess memory (Sutin & Robins, 2007). 
The construction of item pools to assess the most dominant dimensions of 
autobiographical memory has been endorsed by previous researchers (Sutin & 
Robins, 2007). The present study identified the dominant characteristics in 
autobiographical memory and constructed a single item question to assess the 
dimensions and mapped onto questionnaires assessing the phenomena (Table 
1b on the next page). 
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Table 1b: Single item dimensions and mapping with questionnaires for present 
study 
Construct Question on 
questionnaire 
Mapping to Literature 
Vividness How clearly can 
you remember the 
event? 
 
Memory Characteristic Questionnaire 
(MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & 
Raye, 1988) 
Personally important  How personally 
important was this 
event? 
 
Autobiographical Memories 
Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf & 
Greenberg, 2003) 
Emotionality How emotional 
was the event? 
 
Memory Characteristic Questionnaire 
(MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & 
Raye, 1988) 
 
Valence 
 
How positive or 
negative was this 
emotionality? 
 
Memory Experience Questionnsire 
(MEQ; Sutin & Robins, 2007) 
 
Recency 
 
Approximately how 
long ago did the 
event happen (in 
years)? 
 
Autobiographical Memories 
Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, Schrauf & 
Greenberg, 2003) 
 
For example, the single item “How clearly can you remember the event?” was 
mapped with the Memory Characteristic Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson et al., 
1988) which measures sensory dimensons. The vividness item in the present 
study refers to the visual clarity and visual intensity of the autobiographical 
memory and can be seen as sensory in that it aims to measure the visual sense 
over and above other sensory/perceptual aspects that are re-experienced during 
autobiographical retrieval (Sutin & Robins, 2007). Sensory/perceptual aspects 
were encompassed within a vividness measure (e.g., vividness of such things as 
sound, colour), while contextual information was encompassed within a recency 
measure within the present study. Contextual information category could also 
contain spatial and temporal attributes. Lastly, affective information was 
measured by utilising emotionality, personal importance and valence measures. 
These five characteristics represented three key components of autobiographical 
memory and represent the key areas in the literature (Johnson, Foly, Suengus & 
Raye, 1988; Williams et al., 2008).  
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The validity of the mood induction procedure was verified by a manipulation 
check. This was done to observe that the negative mood induction technique was 
changing the individual mood components as measured by the UWIST-MACL 
(Mathews et al., 1990). To address the general aim of how mood affects 
autobiographical retrieval, participants rated a number of characteristics, which 
the individual endorsed on an analogue scale. Secondly, the endorsements were 
observed pre and post mood induction and observed against four dimensions of 
negative mood as measured by the UWIST-MACL (Matthews et al., 1990). The 
general aim was propagated in response to the lack of research investigating 
how mood affects the sensory and affective information held within 
autobiographical memories. 
 
As attested by the studies within this chapter, the dimensions of vividness, 
personal importance, emotionality, valence and recency seem important 
attributes of autobiographical memories, yet there appears to be little research 
available to demonstrate how these variables are influenced by negative mood. A 
key question for this study is what specific negative mood dimension could be 
responsible for the differences in autobiographical memory retrieval observed in 
negative mood states. The present research project focuses on the effect of 
mood change and the resultant changes in the content in autobiographical 
memories. This was achieved by looking at sensory and affective information 
attached to memories rather than the cognitive content of memories per se.  
 
The present study employed a non-clinical sample to examine the effects of 
negative mood on autobiographical memory irrespective of any psychopathology. 
A sample of students underwent autobiographical memory tests focusing on the 
memory appraisal prior to and following a negative mood induction procedure. 
The mood induction procedure is intended to induce a negative mood, which in 
some individuals could generate increased general level retrieval (i.e. an 
overgeneral memory) according to the literature (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 
2004). This may paradoxically reduce the information retrievable from memory 
because of the effects of mood on memory. The sensory and affective 
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information held within the event memory is likely to be limited due to the 
reduced recall of ‘event-specific memories’ where there is likely to be higher 
sensory and effective information (Williams et al., 2007).  
 
The literature discussed in this chapter indicated that negative mood has an 
effect on autobiographical memory which appears to be generally consistent with 
the predictions for the five characteristics; increase in negative mood could show 
a change in vividness and personal importance, recency, emotionality and 
valence. Interestingly, because of the paradoxical effect of negative mood on 
increasing overgeneral memories, it is possible that all outcome autobiographical 
sensory and affective measures may be positively associated with mood. 
However, the exact dimensions of mood have gone unspecified and unreported. 
Accordingly, the present research investigates the effect of the different 
dimensions of mood, as measured by the UWIST-MACL, on both content-based 
attributes and memory changes on the free recall of autobiographical memories. 
 
In summary, there are a number of possible influences of negative mood state on 
recall; it is thought that vividness, emotionality and personal importance are 
influenced by mood state; recalling positive or negatively valenced personal 
experiences can maintain undesirable moods or alter sensory and emotional 
memories. The characteristics of autobiographical memory highlighted have 
emerged from research and opened up further questions on the effects of 
negative mood on sensory and emotional endorsements when recalling 
autobiographical content.  
 
H 1.1 Research suggests that negative mood causes a change in vividness for 
similarly affected autobiographical events (Coluccia et al., 2006). It was 
hypothesised that negative mood would cause a change from pre to post mood 
induction on endorsements of vividness in the cued autobiographical event. A 
change in vividness, with its sensory and perceptual aspects, could possibly 
suggest a change in access to event-specific memories.  
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H 1.2 Research suggests that negative mood causes a change in personal 
importance because negative memories about events have greater personal 
significance (Dalgleish, Spinks, Yiend & Kuyken, 2001; Isen et al., 1978; 
Teasdale, Taylor & Fogarty, 1980; Williams et al., 2008). It was hypothesised that 
negative mood would cause a change from pre to post mood induction on 
endorsements of personal importance in the cued autobiographical event. The 
possible change in personal importance, with its emotional aspects, could 
suggest a change in access to event-specific memories. 
 
H 1.3 Recent research suggests that negative mood causes a change in 
emotional intensity of an event other than its positivity or negativity (Tsai et al., 
2000). The change in emotional intensity as an emotional aspect could possibly 
suggest a change in access to event-specific memories. It was hypothesised that 
negative mood would cause a change from pre to post mood induction on 
endorsements of emotionality in the cued autobiographical event.  
 
H 1.4 Research suggests that negative mood causes a change in positivity or 
negativity of autobiographical recall (Williams et al., 2008). It was hypothesised 
that negative mood would cause a change from pre to post mood induction on 
endorsements of positivity or negativity in the cued autobiographical event.  
 
H 1.5 It was hypothesised that negative mood would cause a change from pre to 
post mood induction on endorsements in how recent an event occurred in  
memory (Schroots et al., 2004).  
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Forty-four students from the University of Chester’s Faculty of Health and Social 
Care participated in the study. The mean age of the sample was 29.52 years, 
standard deviation 9.05 with a range of 19-49 years. The sample consisted of 36 
female (81.82%) and 8 male (18.18%) participants. 4 participants were excluded 
for their own protection on the basis of their high BDI-2 score (see section 2.2.3 
for ethical procedure and support offered to all participants). A power calculation 
was conducted on GPOWER, a general power analysis program (Erdfelder, Faul 
& Buchner, 1996).  A sample size of 44, with alpha level set at p = 0.05, and a 
large effect size (r = 0.5), gives 98% power to detect real differences due to 
treatment effects, rather than chance. Informed written consent was obtained 
from all participants. All participants were treated within code of ethics and 
conduct guidelines by the British Psychological Society (BPS; 2009). The 
consent form, information sheets and research approval form constitute 
Appendices 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
2.2.2 Materials and measures 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) – Version 2 (Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) 
was used to measure participants’ level of depressive symptoms on a 0-3 Likert 
scale, with higher numbers corresponding to more severe symptoms (Appendix 
4). The 21- item, self-reported questionnaire assesses symptoms present within 
the past two weeks. Scores range from 0 to 63. The BDI is a widely used self-
report inventory of depressive symptoms with good internal consistency and test 
retest reliability (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988). It has been shown to correlate 
highly with psychiatric ratings of depression (Bumberry, Oliver & McClure, 1978).  
 
The University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology Mood Adjective 
Checklist (UWIST-MACL) was used to measure participants’ level of mood 
(Matthews et al., 1990). The measure consists of a 29-adjective checklist 
containing four factorial scales of hedonic tone (HT), tense arousal (TA), 
energetic arousal (EA), and anger/frustration (AF). Scores on the hedonic tone 
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and energetic arousal scale are negatively related to the level of negative mood 
(low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas higher values 
reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and anger/frustration scales 
(Appendix 5). The psychometric properties were identified for the UWIST-MACL 
and shown to have good internal reliability and validity for non-clinical mood 
variations (Matthews et al., 1990). 
 
The autobiographical memory cuing technique as used by Williams & Broadbent 
(1986) was modified to assess autobiographical content on presentation of words 
as memory cues. The modified version of the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) has been widely used to assess 
autobiographical content and has been found to have good reliability (Williams et 
al., 2007). Participants were asked to rate each of the four memories triggered by 
the four natural cue words on a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 7). The 
participants rated their cued memories on vividness, recency, personal 
importance, emotionality and valence (see Table 2 and Appendix 6). 
 
Table 2: List of predictor and outcome variables 
 
Independent/Predictor/Explanatory 
Variable (s) 
Dependent/Outcome  
Variable (s) 
 
 
The University of Wales Institute of 
Science and Technology Mood 
Adjective Checklist (UWIST-MACL) 
 
Energetic Arousal (EA) 
Tense Arousal (TA) 
Hedonic Tone (HT) 
Anger/frustration (AF) 
 
Cued Autobiographical Memories (CAMQ) 
 
Vividness 
Personally important  
Emotionality 
Valence 
Recency 
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2.2.3 Procedure 
Following written informed consent (see Appendix 1), participants completed the 
BDI-2 (Beck et al., 1996), which was used as a screening questionnaire to 
assess the level of depressive symptoms and screen out moderate to severely 
depressed students for their protection. Participants scoring 13 or above on the 
BDI were excluded from the study for their protection, while those who scored  
1-12 were asked to participate in the procedure. The procedure allowed for 
confidentiality as well as disclosure of the risks and benefits. The participant 
information sheet indicated that “Some questions you will answer are about signs 
of depression. If your answers show you may be helped by an evaluation for 
depression, we will let you know and suggest that you talk with your health care 
provider about an evaluation” (see Appendix 2 for Participant Information Sheet). 
The present procedure was adapted from Clark, Deaton & Dunbar (2003) and 
Stanton & New (1988) ethical procedures when using screening measures for 
depressive symptoms. The BDI–2 (Beck et al., 1996) was scored by the 
researcher following the consent and before the invitation for the research 
procedure was provided. The students were given the invitation following the 
break and given a time during the same day. This procedure ensured 
confidentiality and ensured that other students could not identify those students 
that had been excluded compared to those who did not consent or those that had 
just been offered a different time. The protocol identified and screened for 
positive responses to the suicidal and pessimism items and high scorers on the 
BDI-2 psychometric measure. An academic member of staff and a health 
professional advised on further evaluation as appropriate. The researcher offered 
and provided a debriefing session. The debriefing session allowed participants to 
ask questions and provided written information on how they may contact the 
student Counsellor due to any remaining concerns about depression.  
 
At time point 1, the participants were then asked to complete the Mood Adjective 
Checklist psychometric measure (the UWIST-MACL; Matthews et al., 1990). The 
mood measure provided the baseline mood scores for the study and was used 
as a mood predictor variable. The subjects were then given the following 
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instructions, according to the instructions for the administration of the UWIST-
MACL (Matthews et al., 1990). The experimenter read out the following passage 
which was written on each questionnaire for the participants: "You will be given a 
list of words which describe the moods or feelings which people have. To 
complete the checklist, you should indicate how well the word describes how you 
feel at the moment (and not just how you usually feel). You must choose one of 
four possible replies – ‘definitely’, ‘slightly’, ‘slightly not’, and ‘definitely not’. 
These choices are numbered from 1 (‘definitely’) to 4 (‘definitely not’) 
respectively. Simply circle the number which corresponds to the reply that best 
describes your present mood.” 
 
Following completion of psychometric measures, participants were administered 
the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. Participants were instructed 
to report the first specific personal memory triggered by each stimulus word and 
write down as much detail as necessary (see Appendix 6 for instructions). The 
four cue words from list A were ‘bike’, ‘tree’, ‘shed’ and ‘supermarket’ and list B 
were ‘car’, ‘flower’, ‘garage’, ‘shop’ (see Appendix 8a for cue words and 
instructions). The experimenter read each word as it was displayed on the 
PowerPoint projector. Following the four cue words, the participants were given a 
scoring sheet to rate certain characteristics of each memory on a 7-point Likert 
scale. Participants rated a number of characteristics of memory such as: how 
recent, how emotional, how personally important and how vivid. 
 
Between time points 1 and 2 was the intervention phase, which involved the 
group undergoing the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten, 1968). This 
procedure involves participants reading a list of 60 graduated depressogenic self-
referent statements (Appendix 7a). The participants were asked to read each 
word, which is shown for approximately 10 seconds by a PowerPoint projector 
viewed on a white screen. The current research project administered the Velten 
technique to small groups of approximately 20-30 participants. There has been a 
number of studies reporting group Velten procedures (Baker & Guttfreund, 1993; 
Bates et al., 1999; Sinclair et al., 1994). The findings suggest a number of 
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advantages to group administration. For instance, it is more homogenous than 
individual administration and has the benefit of collecting a large amount of data 
in the minimum time period (Bates et al., 1999). 
 
At time point 2, the same participant group was administered the Mood Adjective 
Checklist measure, the cued autobiographical memory task (word lists A & B 
were used in rotation with each group; see Appendix 8a & b). The reverse Velten 
Mood Induction Procedure (Appendix 7b) was used to raise the mood of 
participants before leaving the experiment and prior to questions and answers. 
This was followed by a debriefing session (BPS, 2009). 
 
2.2.4 Design and analysis strategies 
The experiment had a within-subjects design. The predictor or independent 
variable was mood induction procedure with its effect on individual’s mood, which 
was measured by the mood adjective checklist and its four sub-scales: energetic 
arousal (EA), tense arousal (TA), hedonic tone (HT) and anger/frustration (A/F) 
(Matthews et al., 1990). The within-subjects design enabled an assumption of 
equivalence with respect to individual difference since the participants were the 
same in each condition. The dependent measure was the autobiographical 
output which was measured by the Cued Autobiographical Memory 
Questionnaire (CAMQ) and its five endorsements. For the purpose of the present 
research, the researcher will refer to the independent measures as the predictors 
and the dependent variables as the outcome measures. The Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences was used for the analysis. The predictor and outcome 
variables were defined and are listed in Table 2 (see p.40). 
 
The hypotheses concerning mood effects on autobiographical memory retrieval 
formulated in section 2.13 were tested by evaluation of change scores from pre 
to post mood induction (i.e. comparison of change score means).Change score 
analysis, rather than a factorial ANOVA (analysis of variance), was chosen for 
two main reasons. First, change scores have a certain logic and intuitive appeal 
when measuring change in individuals and identifying factors which predict or 
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explain change (Locker, 1998; Shahar, 2009; Singer & Willett, 2003). This has 
been used most notably in clinical pre and post health and behavioural status 
measures (Gawrysiak, Nicholas & Hopko, 2009; Karcher, 2005; Miranda, Fontes 
& Marroquin, 2008). Second, the use of mean change scores reduced the 
number of independent statistical tests and thus limited type I errors (Shahar, 
2009; Singer & Willett, 2003). A five factorial ANOVA could have increased the 
number of independent statistical tests to 20, increasing the possibility of type I 
errors.  
 
Therefore, analysis of change scores was considered advantageous. The 
present research used simple change scores because individual response to 
mood manipulation can be variable, with mood components and numbers 
responding to individual mood components changing from pre-test to post-test, 
making the use of residuals as a measure of change less accurate (Karcher, 
2005). Analysis of change scores (post-test – pre-test) assists in analysing the 
change of two or more outcome variables over a particular treatment or 
manipulation (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Shahar, 2009; Westaby, Saatvedt, 
White, Katsumata, van Oeveren & Halligan, 2001). The difference between two 
scores allows for an investigation of the relationships in outcome variables 
between two time points (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Rogosa, Brandt & Zimowski, 
1982; Shahar, 2009; Westaby et al., 2001). In the present research, mood 
change was calculated by subtracting pre-test scores from post-test scores for all 
participants. The characteristic of cognitive change (post-test – pre-test) can then 
be correlated with the precise aspect of mood change (post-test – pre-test) as 
measured by the UWIST-MACL.  
 
The first stage of analysis involved the completion of the pre and post scores on 
the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ. The recorded participant number allowed 
matching for pre and post scores for each participant. The students t-test was 
performed on the mean scores to test for statistical significance. Normality was 
determined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The second stage of analysis 
involved the mean and standard deviations being calculated for each cued 
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autobiographical memory measure at pre and post mood induction. The 
relationships of interest is change scores between time 1 and time 2 (pre and 
post mood induction), so the differences between measurements was used for 
the analysis. Similarly, test scores at baseline (cued autobiographical memory 
measures 1) and test scores after mood induction (cued autobiographical 
memory measures 2) were completed. Secondly, change scores were calculated 
as change within treatments (post minus pre mean scores). The change in mood 
(post mood 2 minus pre mood 1) and the changes in test scores (cued 
autobiographical memory measures 2 minus cued autobiographical memory 
autobiographical measures 1) were compared using two-tailed bivariate 
correlations. A p-value < 0.05 was considered statistically significant. 
 
The individual variability of mood induction could increase the existence of small 
changes being recorded, and therefore could result in limited detection of 
relationships being observed. Probability values and effect sizes were used to 
combat individual differences involved in mood induction and limited range on the 
UWIST-MACL measure. For example, p-value < 0.05 would indicate statistical 
significance, and effect sizes were completed and used in the analysis of the 
results to combat error. Significant tests were two-tailed rather than one-tailed, as 
the present research was interested in the relationship between mood and effect 
on cued autobiographical memory measures. The effect of negative mood on 
autobiographical content has been reported but the effect of individual mood 
components on autobiographical memory is less evident in the literature. It is 
noted that a two tailed test might give less power but the uncertainty about the 
direction of the relationship, exploratory nature and considering the 
consequences of missing an effect in the other direction, a two tailed test was 
considered necessary. Therefore, the present research hypotheses did not 
predict the exact directional relationship but rather that a relationship does exist.  
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2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (CAMQ; modified version AMT by 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was used to obtain means on vividness, personal 
importance, emotionality and recency of memories. Table 3 presents the mean 
and standard deviation scores on the five outcome measures. 
 
Table 3: Mean and standard deviation scores on the five outcome measures within 
the Cued Autobiographical Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
   
Pre mood induction 
Vividness  5.21 1.35 
Personal importance  3.86 1.33 
Emotionality  3.71 1.33 
Valence  0.96 2.71 
Recency  3.56 0.41 
 
Post mood induction 
Vividness  5.52 1.24 
Personal importance  4.12 1.54 
Emotionality  3.80 1.46 
Valence  0.45 2.19 
Recency  3.35 0.60 
 
The minimum score was 1 and the maximum score was 7 on vividness, personal 
importance and emotionality. Table 3 on the preceding page represents the 
mean score over the four cued memories. Therefore, the minimum score is 1.00 
and the maximum score is 7.00 for each participant. Vividness scores range from 
1.50 to 7.00, personal importance ranges from 1.25 to 7.00, emotionality from 
1.00 to 6.67. Valence has a score that was rated on a minimum score -7 and 
maximum score +7. The valence scores observed range from -5.50 to 6.50. 
Recency is the mean score of the number of days over the four cued memories 
and is represented as log10. Log10 scores range from 0.70 to 4.50. Therefore, 
there is a good range demonstrated on all the self-rated measures obtained from 
the participants on the autobiographical questionnaire. 
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The minimum and maximum for the University of Wales Institute of Science and 
Technology Mood Adjective Checklist (the UWIST-MACL; Matthews et al., 1990) 
sub-scales are 8 to 32 for energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone. 
The minimum score for anger sub-scale is 5 and the maximum is 20. The results 
from the present study show a minimum score of 8 to a maximum score of 32 on 
the three main bipolar and 5 minimum and 20 maximum on the monopolar scale. 
The UWIST-MACL was used for subjective evaluation in this study, both as a 
general indicator of mood state and, more specifically, to evaluate changes in 
energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration. Scores on 
the hedonic tone and energetic arousal scale are negatively related to the level of 
negative mood (low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood) whereas 
higher values reflect a significant negative mood on tense arousal and 
anger/frustration scales. Lowered energetic arousal equals less active and alert. 
Increased tense arousal is consistent with being more anxious and nervous. 
Lowered hedonic tone equals loss of interest and diminished pleasure response. 
Increased anger/frustration is consistent with more emotional feelings of anger 
and frustration.  
 
2.3.2 Inferential analysis 
2.3.2.1 Manipulation check 
The paired sample t-tests were used to test the difference between pre and post 
mood induction scores for each sub-scale on the UWIST-MACL. The effect of 
negative mood induction on overall mood has been reported but the effect on 
individual mood components is less evident in the literature. Again, it is noted 
that a two tailed test might give less power but the uncertainty about the exact 
effect of negative mood induction on the individual mood components, somewhat 
individualistic response to mood induction and considering the consequences of 
missing an effect in the other direction, a two tailed test was considered 
necessary. Therefore, the researcher was predicting some relationship (e.g. 
mood induction will affect four sub-scales on the UWIST-MACL) but not 
predicting exactly what the directional relationship was in each mood dimension, 
i.e. that there will be a significant difference between pre and post mood 
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dimensions. Table 4 presents the t-tests for the UWIST-MACL. Statistical 
significance was set at p < 0.05 and all tests were two-tailed. 
 
 
Table 4: Paired sample t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL 
 
Pre mood 
induction                                                              
 
   Post mood  
induction 
 
Mean 
 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
  t (df) 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
 
Energetic arousal 22.85     4.08              20.39         4.40  3.83 (40)     .001***  
  
Tense arousal      14.02     4.06              13.40         4.83  0.80 (41)     .430 
   
Hedonic tone        26.39     4.01              23.56         5.05  4.50 (40)     .001*** 
 
Anger/frustration   7.09     2.60              8.02         3.32         -2.13 (43)    .039* 
 
*** significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).        
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).        
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
As predicted, there was a significant difference between pre-manipulation and 
post-manipulation mood ratings on the UWIST-MACL. The results show that 
energetic arousal showed a significant increase in negative mood (t (40) = 3.83,  
p < 0.001). Hedonic tone and anger/frustration showed a significant increase in 
negative mood (t (40) = 4.50, p < 0.001) and (t (43) = -2.13, p < 0.05). These 
results show a difference in post mood dimensions and have resulted in 
increased negative mood as measured by a decrease in hedonic tone and 
energetic arousal and an increase in anger/frustration. There was a non 
significant decrease in negative mood (t (41) = .080, p = .430, n.s.). The 
decrease in tense arousal may be due to the test-retest effect, i.e. tense arousal 
measures anxiety which may reduce with retest due to it being a more familiar 
task.  
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2.3.2.2 Intercorrelation of change scores on the UWIST-MACL and the Cued 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (CAMQ) 
To determine the relationship between changes in mood and evaluative 
judgement of autobiographical memory, change scores for the UWIST-MACL 
and CAMQ were calculated by subtracting participants’ scores for the UWIST-
MACL and participants’ mean scores for CAMQ at pre mood induction from post 
mood induction. Two-tailed rather than one-tailed tests were used, as the 
researcher was predicting some relationship (e.g. mood induction will affect the 
cued autobiographical memories on CAMQ) but not predicting exactly what the 
directional relationship would be in each case, i.e. that there will be a significant 
difference between pre and post cued autobiographical memories on each 
measure. A p value < 0.05 was considered statistically significant. 
 
Intercorrelations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL and vividness, 
personal importance, emotionality and recency of memories were conducted to 
examine the relationship between change scores. Table 5a (on the next page) 
presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between change scores for the 
UWIST-MACL and cued five outcome measures on the autobiographical memory 
questionnaire (CAMQ). 
 
5
1
T
a
b
le
 5
a
: 
In
te
rc
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 s
c
o
re
s
 o
n
 t
h
e
 U
W
IS
T
-M
A
C
L
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 C
u
e
d
 A
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l 
M
e
m
o
ry
 Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
 
(C
A
M
Q
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
E
A
 
E
n
e
rg
e
ti
c
 
A
ro
u
s
a
l 
T
A
 
T
e
n
s
e
 
A
ro
u
s
a
l 
H
T
 
H
e
d
o
n
ic
 
T
o
n
e
 
A
F
 
A
n
g
e
r/
 
F
ru
s
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
V
-V
 
V
iv
id
- 
n
e
s
s
 
P
-I
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 
E
-E
 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
- 
a
lit
y
 
V
-A
 
V
a
le
n
c
e
 
 
E
A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 T
A
 
-0
.1
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 H
T
 
  
  
 0
.7
0
**
* 
  
-0
.4
2
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A
F
 
-0
.2
8
 
 0
.2
8
 
-0
.3
4
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 V
-V
 
 0
.1
5
 
-0
.2
1
 
 0
.1
0
 
-0
.2
3
 
 
 
 
 
 P
-I
 
-0
.2
7
 
-0
.0
2
 
-0
.2
6
 
 0
.0
1
 
 0
.1
8
 
 
 
 
 E
-E
 
-0
.3
5
* 
 0
.0
7
 
-0
.3
1
* 
 0
.2
5
 
 0
.1
7
 
  
  
0
.7
0
**
* 
 
 
 V
-A
 
 0
.0
4
 
-0
.1
0
 
-0
.0
2
 
  
  
  
0
.0
4
 
-0
.0
5
 
 0
.0
9
 
-0
.0
8
 
 
 R
 l
o
g
1
0
 
 0
.0
3
 
 0
.1
2
 
 0
.0
6
 
-0
.1
5
 
-0
.2
8
 
-0
.1
7
 
-0
.1
7
 
-0
.0
9
 
 K
e
y
: 
E
A
 =
 E
n
e
rg
e
ti
c
 A
ro
u
s
a
l,
 T
A
 =
 T
e
n
s
e
 A
ro
u
s
a
l,
 H
T
=
 H
e
d
o
n
ic
 T
o
n
e
, 
A
F
 =
 A
n
g
e
r/
F
ru
s
tr
a
ti
o
n
, 
V
-V
 =
 V
iv
id
n
e
s
s
, 
P
-I
 =
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
Im
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
, 
E
-E
 =
 E
m
o
ti
o
n
a
lit
y
, 
V
-A
 =
 V
a
le
n
c
e
, 
R
 l
o
g
1
0
 =
 R
e
c
e
n
c
y
 
**
* 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t 
th
e
 0
.0
0
1
 l
e
v
e
l 
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
  
  
 
**
 
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t 
th
e
 0
.0
1
 l
e
v
e
l 
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
  
  
 
* 
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t 
th
e
 0
.0
5
 l
e
v
e
l 
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
 
 
 52 
UWIST-MACL change score correlations 
The correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL suggest 
appropriate directional relationships considering that scales on hedonic tone and 
energetic arousal are negatively related to the level of negative mood (low-scaled 
scores represent greater negative mood), whereas higher values reflect a greater 
negative mood on tense arousal and anger/frustration scales. 
 
UWIST-MACL and CAMQ change score correlations 
The correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ 
appear at the bottom left of Table 5a. With regard to Hypothesis 1.3, there was a 
significant negative correlation between energetic arousal and emotionality of the 
autobiographical event (r = -0.35, p < 0.05 see Graph 1). This suggests that, as a 
person’s negative mood increased, the emotionality of the autobiographical event 
increased. A further significant negative correlation was found between hedonic 
tone and emotionality (r = -0.31, p < 0.05 see Graph 2 on the next page).  
 
Graph 1: Scatter plot for change scores between energetic arousal and 
emotionality 
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Graph 2: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and emotionality 
 
 
 
This supports the previous finding that as a person’s negative mood increased, 
the emotionality of the autobiographical event increased. The change score 
correlations in vividness, personal importance, valence and recency were non-
significant. However, the scatter plot for appraisals of vividness and personal 
importance (Appendix 12) demonstrated that appraisals for vividness became 
less vivid (Hypothesis 1.1) and appraisals for personal importance became more 
personally important (Hypothesis 1.2) as mood becomes more negative i.e. 
sadder. The non-significance indicates that the researcher cannot exclude that 
the observed scatter plots have occurred by chance alone and considerable 
caution is taken and no causation is inferred. 
 
CAMQ change score correlations 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ indicated that key 
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it indicates the direction of the relationship between the variables. There was a 
significant relationship between emotionality and personal importance (r = 0.70, p 
< 0.001). This means that, as a person’s emotionality increased, the personal 
importance of the autobiographical event increased. 
 
Because hedonic tone and emotional arousal appeared to affect the emotionality 
of the retrieved autobiographical memory significantly, the researcher further 
probed the nature of the interrelations between these variables. Examinations of 
hedonic tone and emotional arousal revealed that the two predictors were 
strongly related (r = 0.70, p < 0.001). Given the strong relationship, it is possible 
that both mood variables appear to be predictors because of their shared 
variance. To examine this possibility an analysis of covariance was undertaken 
and emotionality was accounted for by energetic arousal and hedonic tone. 
 
 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Negative mood significantly affects emotionality 
The results and their interpretation are tentative in the light of the exploratory 
nature and the lack of correction for multiple testing. The main finding from this 
study was that negative mood, as measured by hedonic tone and energetic 
arousal, may be influencing the emotionality of the cue memory. This supports 
Hypothesis 1.3 that there would be a significant difference. The evaluative 
judgement of emotionality showed significant negative correlations with energetic 
arousal and hedonic tone. This suggests that negative mood may be influencing 
the evaluative judgements of cued autobiographical memory retrieval and 
supports previous findings that suggest autobiographical retrieval is mood-
dependent (Williams & Scott, 1988). The current experiment used neutral cue 
words in pre and post mood induction procedure, but rather than measuring 
response latencies, it measured evaluative judgements of memory retrieval in 
normal and negative mood states. 
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Before examining the specific relationship between mood and retrieval of 
autobiographical memory, the researcher assessed whether the mood 
manipulation was successful in inducing the desired negative affective state in 
participants. The UWIST-MACL showed significant change on three of its four 
sub-scales post mood induction. The three significant changes were hedonic 
tone, energetic arousal and anger/frustration. This confirms that the mood 
induction technique was effective in producing significant negative mood change 
in individuals. 
 
The key finding was that emotionality was significantly correlated with two 
separate mood dimensions, one measuring arousal and other measuring valence 
aspects. Emotionality was significantly correlated with energetic arousal, 
indicating increased endorsements for de-active arousal state. McBride & 
Cappeliez (2004) found an association between arousal and potential availability 
of events in memory, with arousal component of mood being associated with 
overgeneral memories. Secondly, emotionality was significantly correlated with 
hedonic tone, indicating increased endorsements for discontentment. Tsai et al. 
(2000) found an association between emotionality and potential availability of 
events in memory, with negative mood being associated with increased 
emotional memories. The present findings are congruent with McBride & 
Cappeliez (2004) & Tsai et al. (2000). The results suggest that the increase in 
emotionality was due to the mood effects rather than increased access to 
affective information held with event-specific memory. The latter seems less 
likely, as sensory information (measured by vividness) demonstrated no 
significant change. 
 
The mood predictor measure showed a significant change in the right direction 
on three of its four sub-scales, although the overall mood change was modest. 
The observed change in cued autobiographical memory correlations 
demonstrated a consistent directional pattern, although modest, which is not 
atypical for individual difference research. The statistical significant changes in 
mood predictor variables might explain the correlations between mood and 
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evaluative judgement of cued autobiographical events, which were modest but in 
an understandable direction.  
 
2.4.2 Scatter plots for vividness and personal importance 
Regarding Hypothesis 1.1, the scatter plots on the change score correlations 
demonstrated that vividness showed a non-significant decrease as mood 
became more negative in each of the four the UWIST-MACL mood sub –scales 
(see appendix 12). The non-significance indicates that the researcher cannot 
exclude that the observed scatter plots have occurred by chance alone and 
considerable caution is taken and no causation is inferred. This is congruent with 
previous research which showed that a decrease in vividness was affected by 
arousal and valence components of mood (Coluccia et al., 2006). Vividness is 
associated with how readily a participant is able to recall specific detail of place, 
time and context of the event. This is similar to Conway’s (1990) description of 
autobiographical memories, which represents memories for specific experiences 
within a particular point in our lives. The present findings support previous 
findings that negative mood may result in more overgeneral memories (Yeung et 
al., 2006 and Barnard et al., 2006). This finding could indicate that memory 
retrieval is being abandoned earlier in its general retrieval stage and failing to 
move on to specific memory retrieval, supporting Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s 
(2000) hierarchal model of autobiographical memory.  
 
Hypothesis 1.2, the scatter plots for the change scores correlations for personal 
importance on the UWIST-MACL for hedonic tone and energetic arousal 
indicates a non-significant increase as mood became more negative (Appendix 
12). The non-significance indicates that the researcher cannot exclude that the 
observed scatter plots have occurred by chance alone and considerable caution 
is taken and no causation is inferred. The effect of mood on personal importance 
is supported by Dalgleish et al. (2001). Talarico & Rubin (2003) investigated the 
salient characteristics of emotion and concluded that personal significance would 
appear to be a component of accessing event-specific memories. This is further 
supported by the increased personal importance of the memory and the 
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increased emotionality observed in memory retrieval. The interpretation could 
suggest that emotional aspects, such as personal importance, rather than 
sensory aspects, such as vividness, could be showing emotional reactivity to 
negative mood. Emotional reactivity has been defined as the relative ease with 
which emotional responses are triggered by mood (Chentsova-Dutton, Chu, Tsai, 
Rottenberg, Gross & Gotlib, 2007). 
 
2.4.3 Conclusion 
The mood manipulation did result in mood effects on emotionality which 
demonstrated a significant increase with decrease in energetic arousal and 
hedonic tone. Vividness change score correlations were non significant but the 
scatter plots for four mood sub scales indicated modest directional change on 
appraisals of vividness, which become less vivid with increase in negative mood. 
Personal importance change score correlations were non significant but the 
scatter plots for energetic arousal and hedonic tone indicated modest directional 
change on appraisals of personal importance, which become more personally 
important with decrease in energetic arousal and hedonic tone. The scatter plots 
and modest changes observed are understandable, as autobiographical content 
is reliant on memory schema that is less open to mood effects (Young, 1999; 
Young, Klosko & Weishaar, 2006). Overall mood induction had a significant 
impact on mood in three out of four mood sub-scales on the UWIST-MACL, and 
is taken to be a useful way to reduce mood in an incremental way in a group 
procedure. Autobiographical technique showed that mood induction could cue 
more emotional memories, less vivid and more personally important, but these 
were modest and, in light of previous research findings, individual differences are 
not atypical in mood induction (Westermann et al., 1996).  
 
It is noted that this study looked at the sensory and affective information attached 
to memories rather than the cognitive content of memories. Sensory detail refers 
to the extent that sensory detail such as sounds, smell and tastes are re-
experienced during autobiographical retrieval (Sutin & Robins, 2007). The 
vividness measure in the present study refers to the visual clarity and visual 
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intensity of the autobiographical memory and can be seen as sensory in that it 
aims to measure the visual sense over and above other sensory information 
(Sutin & Robins, 2007). The single nature of the vividness item does mainly focus 
on vividness as a visual sense but may encapsulate other sensory dimensions to 
a lesser extent. However, utilising multiple items or a questionnaire to cover all 
sensory dimensions would have been problematic due to the multiple 
independent and dependent measures already involved in the present study.  
 
It is also recognised and noted that overarching models such as Bower’s  
associative network (Bower, 1981) and Teasdale & Barnard’s (1993) interactive 
sub systems framework suggest that accessibility is likely to be improved and 
therefore observed in research when measuring cognitive content rather than 
sensory or emotional content. This is by virtue that cognitions are more stable 
and reactive than the more ephemeral sensory and affective appraisals which are 
deeper in the event-specific memory (Oatley, Keltner & Jenkins, 2006). This 
might explain why the resultant correlations were modest but generally in an 
understandable direction.  
 
The findings from the present study suggest that sensory information, specifically 
vividness, becomes less available for appraisal in negative mood states, which 
might be due to the lack of accessibility to event-specific memories. It is not 
known if this is a direct consequence of negative mood or the result of a previous 
history of depression or any other third variable. Affective and contextual 
attributes showed a moderate increase in availability for appraisal in negative 
mood state. Joorman & Gotlib (2008) suggest that negative mood activates 
corresponding emotional content in memories. This is consistent with top down 
hierarchical search from semantic, categorical to specific memories. Negative 
mood is proposed to result in a truncated search, in which individuals 
prematurely abandon their search at a higher, less specific stage but still 
containing the emotional but not sensory aspects (Williams, Chan, Crane, 
Barnhofer, Eade & Healy, 2006b). Theoretically, the hierarchical framework of 
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autobiographical memory has been a useful model to explain patterns of recall of 
sensory and affective information from autobiographical memory.  
 
The second empirical limitation of the present study is the restricted range on the 
autobiographical sensory and affective content scores. The restricted range on 
the markers may have been a reason for the non-detection of significant 
association between mood and autobiographical memory. The relatively small 
changes observed in the shift of autobiographical markers may reduce the 
likelihood of detecting any associations. Given the evidence from this study and 
limitations, it may prove fruitful to examine more specific cognitive content within 
the retrieved autobiographical memories. This may be particularly beneficial as 
there are a number of content changes that can be tapped by using implicit 
measures of autobiographical memory. It can be predicted that cognitive content 
might be more readily available to appraisals due to its availability near the start 
stage of the autobiographical search hierarchy. This is consequently addressed 
in the next study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STUDY 2: Autobiographical memory responsiveness to an induced 
negative mood state: Cognitive appraisals in symptomatic and  
non-symptomatic students. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Study 1 found evidence that negative mood may be influencing the emotional 
aspects of cued autobiographical memory retrieval. There was a suggestion that 
sensory information, specifically vividness, becomes less available for appraisal 
in negative mood states, which might be due to the lack of accessibility to event-
specific memories. These findings generally support previous studies that 
suggest that some aspects of autobiographical retrieval are reactive to mood 
(Jallais & Gilet, 2010; Williams & Scott, 1988). This present study builds on this 
initial evidence for low mood affecting autobiographical memory by further 
examining whether the cognitive products following a negative mood induction 
procedure are sensitive to change.  
 
3.1.1 Theoretical background 
Information processing theories are an important theoretical framework to 
discuss in relation to mood and cognitive change, Bower’s associative network 
theory (Bower, 1981 & 1987) and Beck’s Schema theory (Beck, 1976 and Beck, 
Emery & Greenberg, 1986) being two dominant frameworks. First, Bower’s 
associative network theory (Bower, 1981 & 1987) has given rise to the Ingram 
(1984) & Teasdale (1988) information processing models of cognition and 
memory. The Ingram (1984) & Teasdale (1988) accounts suggest that negative 
mood may be involved in the activation of negative cognitive structures. The 
suggestion that depressive mood acts as a primer of depressogenetic cognitive 
structures is central to such a mood state hypothesis. Secondly, Beck’s Schema 
theory (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1986) additionally suggests that trait attributes 
such as depressive symptomatology would have little effect in the absence of a 
temporary negative mood state. Depressive symptomatology includes symptoms 
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such as pessimism, self-dislike, self-criticalness, suicidal thoughts or wishes, and 
worthlessness and somatic symptoms including loss of energy, change in sleep 
patterns and irritability. Schema theory (Beck, 1976) suggests that individuals 
develop negative assumptions about the world through early developmental 
experiences that develop into self schemata. These schemata are stable across 
situations and mood states but are dormant during non-negative mood states. 
When activated, the schemas will influence the individual self-compensatory 
coping strategies (Wang, Brennen & Holte, 2005). Studies such as Wang et al. 
(2005) and Clark et al. (1999) demonstrate that individuals showing current 
depressive symptomatology report more dysfunctional cognitive structures than 
those not currently showing symptomatology. Additionally, prospective studies 
suggest that the pre-existence of depressive symptomatology is a key indicator of 
non-specificity of autobiographical memories (Brittlebank et al., 1993; Kuyken & 
Dalgleish, 1995). Non-specificity phenomenon refers to a tendency in some 
people to retrieve past experiences in an overgeneral way that lacks factual 
information in the form of actors, actions, locations, and also lacks context-
specific sensory and perceptual attributes (Raes et al., 2007). 
 
Consistent with information processing models and trait attributes, there is 
growing support in the literature for the argument that the vulnerability to changes 
in autobiographical content may be activated by mood state and the presence of 
moderating factors (Fresco, Heimberg, Abramowitz & Bertram, 2006). A 
moderator is a variable that influences the strength of a relationship between two 
other variables, and a mediator variable is one that explains the relationship 
between the two other variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Depressive 
symptomology was operationally defined as a moderator variable as it might be 
helpful in explaining the strength of the relationship that exists between mood 
and cued autobiographical memory. To date, however, little research has 
investigated the effects of mood state and moderating factors on cued 
autobiographical content. Therefore, the present study turns its attention to 
depressive symptomatology, a trait factor that might be implicated in mood state 
effects on autobiographical recall. Figure 4 (on the next page) shows the 
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potential for depressive symptomatology acting as a moderator on mood state 
affecting autobiographical recall. 
 
Figure 4: Depressive symptomatology as a moderator 
Negative Mood Autobiographical recall
Depressive 
symptomology
Empirical studies within clinical and subclinical populations have provided 
important insights into how mood effects may change certain sensory and 
cognitive variables in autobiographical memory (Coluccia et al., 2006; Gemar et 
al., 2001; Wenze, Gunthert & Forand 2007; van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). 
Mood induction experiments with clinical populations have also shown cognitive 
reactivity to be sensitive to mood states (Gemar et al., 2001; Wenze et al., 2007). 
Cognitive reactivity has been defined as the relative ease with which maladaptive 
cognitions or cognitive styles are triggered by mild mood fluctuations (Segal et 
al., 1999). Those with a history of a depressive illness are also observed to show 
increased cognitive reactivity compared with those with no previous depressive 
history (Miranda et al., 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1998). In the present study the 
researcher sought to add to the literature by looking at autobiographical content, 
specifically cognitive aspects, to determine the effects of negative mood on 
autobiographical retrieved content. 
 
 63 
The effects of mood state are also seen in autobiographical memory within non-
clinical populations in the phenomena of overgeneral memories (Barnard et al., 
2006; Raes et al., 2007; Yeung et al., 2006). Support for Information processing 
accounts has predominately come from laboratory experiments using mood 
induction procedures (Bowers, 1981; Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1988). These 
studies indicated that when participants were in a negative mood state they 
recalled significantly more negative autobiographical events from their past, but 
when in a happy mood induced state they recalled more happy autobiographical 
memories. Further investigation suggested that the empirical data was not as 
symmetrical as the information processing theories might suggest (Power & 
Dalgleish, 1997). The participants with the negative induced mood seemed to 
show decreased accessibility to positive memories more than increased access 
to negative ones (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). There have been a number of 
suggestions put forward to account for the non-symmetrical data, such as 
relevancy of stimuli to participants and whether difference cognitive processes in 
individuals are differently affected by mood state, such as working memory, 
executive function and cognitive control (Harvey, Le Bastard, Pochon, Levy, 
Allilaire, Dubois & Fossati 2004; Marvel & Paradiso, 2004). 
 
Studies suggesting that negative mood seems to influence the retrieved content 
of autobiographical memories and specific aspects of cognitive content are 
presented next. Firstly, memories that are high in perceptual origin will give rise 
to increased typicalness appraisals because memories with high perceptual and 
sensory detail increase the likelihood of the memory search accessing such 
memories and rehearsing the same memories more frequently (Johnson et al., 
1988). There is evidence that negative mood may decrease one’s ability to recall 
memories rich in sensory detail (Coluccia et al., 2006). Memories rich in sensory 
detail and perceptual origin are seen as specific event memories rather than 
overgeneral memories (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). Secondly, rumination is 
considered to be a repetitive focus on present causes of current low mood 
(Williams, Barnhofer, Crane & Duggun, 2006a). Negative mood and ruminative 
response and overgeneral autobiographical memory seem to be interconnected. 
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Williams et al. (2006a) suggest that ruminative style is encouraged by negative 
mood, which takes up memory resources and results in output of overgeneral 
memories.  
 
Thirdly, mood change is strongly linked to social interaction (Watson & Clark, 
1994). Negative mood is thought to propagate negative evaluation of other 
people and be important to feelings of social inclusion (Ryan & Deci, 2000; 
Seidner, 1991; Watson & Clark, 1994). Fourthly, mood seems to affect record of 
past experience, which in turn affects future ability to imagine future scenarios 
(Williams et al., 2006a). Negative mood is thought to interfere with an individual’s 
ability to conceptualize and judge the likelihood of future events (Williams et al., 
2006a). There is also evidence that personal importance of a memory is 
influenced by negative mood by raising the potential that negative memories 
about events have greater personal significance (Williams et al., 2008). 
 
The last two characteristics, desirability and valence, seem similar but are distinct 
conceptual phenomena (Barrett, 1996). The emotion can have a positive or 
negative valence (Remmington, Fabrigar & Visser, 2000), whereas desirability of 
an emotional state is defined by the context and is separate from valence 
(Barrett, 1996). Negative mood seems to lower individual engagement with 
environment and ratings of social context, which in turn affects desirability (Ryan 
& Deci, 2000). However, valence is seen as a continuum indicating how positive 
or negative an event is, which can be seen as the degree of displeasure or 
contentment (Remmington et al., 2000). Negative mood has also been seen to 
increase the retrieval of negatively valenced autobiographical memories (Walker 
et al., 2003). 
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3.1.2 Trait and state issues in cognitive reactivity 
Unresolved issues for this study appear to be what mood dimensions are 
important in cued autobiographical content and whether depressive 
symptomatology influences cognitive reactivity. Firstly, the findings from a 
number of these studies suggest that the cognitive products are only detectable 
when in negative mood in those showing depressive symptomatology or with a 
previous history of depression (Miranda & Persons, 1998; Wang et al., 2005). 
This implies that cognitive products could be state dependant.  
 
Secondly, it is clear that there are different taxonomies which exist when 
describing cognitive styles. Schemas and dysfunctional attitudes have been 
called ‘cognitive structures’, whereas automatic thoughts have been described as 
‘cognitive products’ (Brewin, Reynolds & Tata 1999). It is these cognitive 
structures and products in autobiographical appraisal that are of interest in the 
present research, and which are activated in autonoetic consciousness when 
recalling past personal memories (Conway, 2005). The majority of studies 
looking at cognitive styles have used self-reported measures that rely on 
conscious and explicit cognitive processes to assess cognitive styles rather than 
automatic and implicit processes as in the present research. The non-
symmetrical data may be due to the type of cognitive content that is being 
measured and the conditions at the time of measurement (Raes et al., 2007). In 
summary, very little is known about mood effects on cognitive appraisal in 
autobiographical memory retrieval in non-clinical populations.  
 
3.1.3 Purpose of the study 
The study to an extent is exploratory, because there is some evidence on the 
effects of depressed mood, but less evidence on the effects of individual negative 
mood components on autobiographical retrieval. This study sought to understand 
the effect of negative mood on cognitive content in autobiographical retrieval in 
those with and without depressive symptomatology, as previous work reported 
that the change in depressive symptomatology in a non-clinical population 
significantly predicted memory overgenerality (Mackinger, Loschin & Leibetseder, 
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2000). Mood induction experiments with non-clinical participants support the 
observation of reduced autobiographical memory specificity when in negative 
mood states (Barnard et al., 2006; Raes et al., 2007; Yeung et al., 2006) but not 
cognitive content, which has predominately been seen in depressed population 
or those with a history of depression (Gemar et al., 2001; Wenze et al., 2007).  
 
Accordingly, the present research investigated the association between negative 
mood and its effects on cognitive content and memory changes on the free recall 
of autobiographical memories in relation to depressive symptomatology. Although 
the current sample was unlikely to be clinically depressed due to selection from 
the non-clinical population and active screening out of depression, the variable of 
depressive symptomatology was nevertheless thought important because of the 
empirical evidence of depressive disorders affecting autobiographical memories 
(van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). The researcher has therefore used the term 
depressive symptomatology rather than depression to refer to the variable of 
interest, as has also been done in previous research (Wenze, Gunthert & Forand, 
2010).  
 
The idea of the present study was to evoke event-specific memories by asking 
participants to rate the memory event on a number of characteristics. The 
characteristics as identified in section 3.1.1 were: typicalness, rumination, 
importance of other people, expectancy, personal importance, desirability and 
valence of the event retrieved. Researchers interested in autobiographical 
memory and associated retrieval typically used single items or items pools which 
contain single items on a dimension related to the construct to assess memory 
(Sutin & Robins, 2007). The construction of item pools to assess the most 
dominant dimensions of autobiographical memory has been endorsed by 
previous researchers (Sutin & Robins, 2007). The present study identified the 
dominant characteristics in autobiographical memory and constructed a single 
item question to assess the dimensions and mapped onto questionnaires 
assessing the phenomena (Table 5b on the next page).  
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Table 5b: Single item dimensions and mapping with questionnaires for the 
phenomena in Studies 2 - 3 
Construct Question on 
questionnaire 
Mapping to Literature 
Typicalness How typical is 
the event in 
your life? 
Memory Characteristic 
Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, 
Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988). 
Memories that are high in 
perceptual origin will give rise to 
increased typicalness appraisals 
(Johnson et al., 1988). 
 
Rumination 
 
How often do 
you think 
about it? 
 
Response Style Questionnaire 
(RSQ) measures rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). For 
each item the respondents indicate 
“how often” they experience the 
event. 
 
Importance of other people 
 
How 
important 
were other 
people in the 
event?  
 
 
Memory Experience Questionnsire 
(MEQ; Sutin & Robins, 2007) 
 
Expectancy Was the 
event 
expected?
  
Impact of Future Events Scale 
(IFES; Deeprose & Holmes, 2010) 
Importance of the event for self How 
important was 
the event for 
you?  
Autobiographical Memories 
Questionnaire (AMQ; Rubin, 
Schrauf & Greenberg, 2003) 
 
Desirability  
 
How desirable 
was the 
event? 
 
Impact of Future Events Scale 
(IFES; Deeprose & Holmes, 2010) 
 
Valence 
 
How did you 
feel about the 
event at the 
time? 
 
Memory Characteristic 
Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, 
Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988) 
 
For example, the single item “How often you think about it” was mapped with the 
Response Style Questionnaire (RSQ) which measures ruminative style and 
content (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). This measure asks respondents to 
indicate how often they engage in ruminative thoughts or behaviours. For each 
item the respondents indicate “how often” they experience the event on a Likert 
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Scale. The single item was taken as a “proxy” for rumination rather than salience 
because of the item pools in Response Style Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991).  
 
To address the general aim of how mood affects autobiographical retrieval, 
participants rated a number of characteristics, and endorsed them on an 
analogue scale. The endorsements were observed pre and post mood induction 
and observed against four dimensions of negative mood as measured by the 
UWIST-MACL (Matthews et al., 1990). The general aim was propagated in 
response to the lack of research investigating how mood affects the recalled 
content retrieved in autobiographical memories. Furthermore, by examining the 
influence of pre-standing depressive symptomatology and its effects on the 
accessibility of the cognitive products pre and post mood stress, the aim was to 
elucidate the importance of trait depressive symptomatology in the presence of 
temporary mood induction. 
 
As attested by the studies within this chapter, the dimensions of typicalness, 
rumination, importance of other people, expectancy, personal importance, 
desirability and valence of the event retrieved seem to be important attributes of 
autobiographical memories affected by mood state, yet there appears to be little 
research available to demonstrate how these variables are influenced by current 
negative mood and trait depressive symptomatology. Theoretical and empirical 
data have focused in somewhat different units of analysis, but have emphasised 
the critical content in autobiographical memory that might be state-dependent. 
These cognitive attributes have been suggested to guide appraisal and interact 
with current mood to influence memory search and attention (Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod & Mathews, 1997). 
 
The present study employed a non-clinical sample to examine change score 
correlations between mood components and autobiographical content whilst 
examining the influence of pre-standing depressive symptomatology. A sample of 
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students underwent autobiographical memory tests focusing on memory 
appraisal prior to and following a negative mood induction procedure. The mood 
induction procedure is intended to induce a negative mood, which in some 
individuals could increase cognitive reactivity resulting in autobiographical 
content being negatively correlated with negative mood state. However, the 
mood induction could also generate increased general level retrieval resulting in 
autobiographical content being positively correlated with negative mood state. 
The content held within autobiographical content may be influenced by such 
processes in negative mood state. Interestingly, there appears to be a lack of 
research investigating not only how mood influences cognitive reactivity within 
autobiographical memory, but also how mood might also influence overgeneral 
memories. 
 
In summary, the influence of negative mood on autobiographical memory 
appears to be generally consistent with the prediction of change in the seven 
characteristics in negative mood state; negative mood may show a correlation 
with typicalness, desirability, rumination, importance of other people, expectancy 
and negatively valent events. These characteristics may be more pronounced in 
those showing depressive symptomatology or may show a difference in the 
direction of the correlation. The present research investigated the correlations 
between mood components as measured by the UWIST-MACL and the effects 
on both content-based attributes and memory changes on the free recall of 
autobiographical memories in those with and without depressive 
symptomatology. The characteristics of autobiographical memory highlighted 
have emerged from research and opened up further questions on the effects of 
negative mood on secondary appraisal or recollective experience when recalling 
autobiographical content. 
 
The present study was designed to address two areas of uncertainty concerning 
mood effects on autobiographical retrieval: 
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(a) Is autobiographical content a characteristic of current mood state or a 
characteristic of depressive symptomatology as measured by the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI)? 
 
(b) How are the seven autobiographical content characteristics related to four 
components of negative mood as measured by the UWIST-MACL (Matthews et 
al., 1990)? 
 
From these general aims a number of specific hypotheses were developed to 
investigate the effects of mood on autobiographical retrieval. It was hypothesised 
that negative mood would predict a change from pre to post mood induction in 
the endorsements on the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that negative mood would predict a change in 
endorsements of: 
 
i) typicalness in cued autobiographical recall (Coluccia et al., 2006) 
ii) ruminative response in cued recall (Williams et al., 2006a) 
iii) negative evaluation of the importance of other people (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
iv) the ability to conceptualize and judge the likelihood of future events 
(Williams et al., 2006a) 
v) personal importance of cued memory recall (Williams et al., 2008) 
vi) desirability in cued memory recall (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
vii) valence in cued memory recall (Walker et al., 2003). 
 
H 2.1 It was hypothesised that there would be a change from pre to post mood 
induction on the cued autobiographical memory characteristics i-vii above 
 
H 2.2 It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between the 
symptomatic and non-symptomatic endorsements for characteristics i- vii above. 
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H 2.3 It was hypothesised that there would be a change from pre to post mood 
induction in negative automatic thoughts as measure by the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire. 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Seventy-three students from the University of Chester’s Faculty of Health and 
Social Care participated in the study. Students in the present study had not 
participated in the previous study. The mean age of the sample was 33.50 years, 
standard deviation 9.40 with a range of 18-49 years. The sample consisted of 70 
female and 3 male participants. 7 participants were excluded for their own 
protection on the basis of their high BDI-2 score (see section 2.2.3 for ethical 
procedure and support offered to all participants). A power calculation was 
conducted on GPOWER, a general power analysis program (Erdfelder et al., 
1996). A sample size of 73, with alpha level set at p = 0.05, a large effect size (r 
= 0.5), gives 99% power to detect real difference due to treatment effect rather 
than chance.  
 
Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Departmental Ethics Committee 
prior to data collection, and ethical approval for access to students was granted 
by the Faculty of Health and Social Care Ethics Committee prior to recruitment of 
participants. Written informed consent was sought from each participant. 
Participants were advised that the information they provided would be used in the 
present research. The study’s purpose was stated and technical terms explained. 
The participants were told the type of information that would be obtained and the 
nature of the commitment. Potential risks or costs were discussed. A 
confidentiality pledge was made and assured through the procedures described 
below. The researcher clearly indicated that participation was strictly voluntary 
and no penalties or loss would be incurred by non-participation. The researcher 
asked each participant to sign a written consent form. 
 
 72 
The participant’s name was not on any materials other than the consent form. 
Instead of using names to keep track of individual data, the researcher assigned 
random identification numbers. These numbers remain the only information that 
linked the student responses. Once the student left the research project, the 
consent form was completely separated from other materials so that no one 
could identify a particular student’s responses. 
 
3.2.2 Materials & measures 
The following four psychometric materials and measures were utilised in this 
study, along with the mood induction procedure. 
 
Depressive Symptomatology 
The Beck Depression inventory – Version 2 (Beck et al., 1996) was utilised as in 
Study 1 to assess the level of depression and screen out moderate and severely 
depressed students for their protection. The BDI II has demonstrated good 
internal reliability and validity (alpha = .82, test-retest reliability between .65 and 
.72; Vazquez & Sanz, 1991). Following the example of Dickson & MacLeod 
(2006) and Goddard, Dritschel & Burton (1997), the present study classified non-
symptomatic as ≤ 7 on BDI II. Mildly symptomatic was categorised as ≥ 8 on BDI 
II the categorisation of Levine, Litwins & Frye (2006) categorisation. Several 
studies reported strong psychometric properties in student populations (Sprinkle, 
Lurie, Insko, Atkinson, Jones, Logan & Bissada, 2002; Storch, Roberti and Roth, 
2004; Whisman, Perez & Ramel, 2000). 
 
Mood State 
The University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology Mood Adjective 
Checklist (the UWIST-MACL; Matthews et al., 1990) was utilised as in Study 1. 
The psychometric properties were identified for the UWIST-MACL and shown to 
have good internal reliability and validity for non-clinical mood variations 
(Matthews et al., 1990). 
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Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (CAMQ) 
The first outcome measure is the adapted Cued Autobiographical Memory 
Questionnaire focusing on cognitive appraisals (modified version AMT; Williams 
& Broadbent, 1986). The cognitive events focused on typicalness, rumination, 
valence, involvement with other people, expectancy, desirability and personal 
importance. The modified version of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986) has been widely used to assess autobiographical 
content and has been found to have good reliability (Williams et al., 2007). 
Participants were asked to rate each of the four memories on a 7-point Likert 
scale (ranging from -3 to +3). The two sets of four neutral words were presented 
on a PowerPoint projector and displayed for 30 seconds. The four words from list 
A were bike, tree, shed and supermarket, and on list B car, flower, garage and 
shop. Set A and set B were alternated for pre and post mood induction procedure 
within the different groups. 
 
Cognitive products 
The inclusion of a second outcome measure was the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) which was utilised as a new 
assessment for the present study to assess cognitive products (Appendix 9). The 
measure assesses the frequency of automatic thoughts associated with 
depression. Participants rated 30 questions on a 5-point Likert scale indicating 
frequency of rumination (1 = not at all,  5 = all the time). Scores could range from 
30 to 150, with a high score indicating frequent occurrence of negative automatic 
thoughts. The ATQ has the ability to differentiate between the depressed and 
non-depressed with a high internal consistency, alpha = .96 (Hollen & Kendall, 
1980). Satisfactory psychometrics have been identified recently on the ATQ 
(Chioqueta & Stiles, 2004). The ATQ contains four sub-scales of personal 
maladjustment and desire for change, negative self-concept and negative 
expectations, low self-esteem and giving up/helplessness. 
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Mood Induction 
The intervention phase utilised the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten, 
1968) as in Study 1. The Velten Procedure has been found to mimic the affective 
disturbance and behavioural attributes of depressive states (Bates et al., 1999). 
 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Following the same procedure as in Study 1, the Beck’s Depression Inventory 
BDI II (Beck & Steer, 1993; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, 1961) was 
used as a screening questionnaire to assess the level of depression and screen 
out moderate to severely depressed students for their protection. Participants 
scoring 13 and above were not permitted to continue on to the mood induction 
procedure for their own safety as such scores indicated ‘moderate’ or ‘severe’ 
depression. Groups of twenty to thirty participants at a time were asked to 
complete the Mood Adjective Checklist psychometric measure (the UWIST-
MACL; Matthews et al., 1990). The mood measure provided the baseline mood 
scores for the study and was used as the predictor variable.  
 
The inclusion of the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 
1980) was administered with the instruction and was utilised to assess cognitive 
products. The surface-level cognitions assessed by the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire may be more readily accessible in negative mood state than those 
non-surface-level cognitions assessed by the Cued Autobiographical Memory 
Questionnaire (CAMQ). The adapted CAMQ was administered next, and 
assessed cognitive content as opposed to the evaluative characteristics of 
feelings and emotions explored in Study 1. Participants were instructed to report 
the first specific personal memory triggered by each stimulus word and write 
down as much detail as necessary. The experimenter read each word aloud as it 
was displayed on the PowerPoint projector. After the four cue words, the 
participants were given a scoring sheet to rate certain characteristics of each 
memory, and were asked to rate each of the four memories on a 7-point Likert 
scale (ranging from -3 to +3).  
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The same procedure was followed as detailed in Study 1 for the mood induction 
technique. At time point 2, the same participant group were administered the 
Mood Adjective Checklist measure, Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and the 
cued autobiographical memory task (Word list A & B were used in rotation with 
each group). As with Study 1, the researcher provided debriefing and contact 
details for the student counselling service. 
 
3.2.4 Design and analysis strategies 
This experiment had a repeated measures design. The experimental variable 
was mood as measured by The Mood Adjective Checklist (the UWIST-MACL) 
with four sub-scales. The experimental outcome measures were the Cued 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire having seven response variables, and 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) having four response variables. 
The predictor and outcome variables were defined and are listed in Table 6 
below. 
 
Table 6: List of predictor and outcome variables 
 
Independent/predictor/ 
explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Dependent/outcome  
Variable(s) 
 
 
The University of Wales Institute 
of Science and Technology Mood 
Adjective Checklist (UWIST-
MACL) 
 
Energetic Arousal (EA) 
Tense Arousal (TA) 
Hedonic Tone (HT) 
Anger/frustration (AF) 
 
Cued Autobiographical Memories Questionnaire  
(CAMQ) 
Typicalness, Rumination, Importance of other 
people, Expectancy, Importance of the event for 
self, Desirability and Valence 
 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) 
Personal Maladjustment & Desire for Change 
Negative Self-Concept & Expectations 
Low Self-Esteem and Giving Up/Helplessness 
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The first outcome variables were obtained from the Cued Autobiographical 
Memory test. Participants rated a number of cognitive characteristics, such as: 
how typical, rumination, valence, how important other people were expectancy, 
desirability and importance for self. The second outcome variables were obtained 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ). The measure was used to 
assess the amount and type of negative automatic thoughts. The questionnaire 
has four sub-scales: personal maladjustment and desire for change; negative 
self-concept and expectations; low self-esteem; and giving up/helplessness.  
 
The first stage of analysis involved the completion of the pre and post scores on 
the UWIST-MACL, CAMQ and ATQ. The recorded participant number allowed 
matching for pre and post scores for each participant.  This stage also involved 
dividing up the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) scores into non-symptomatic 
and symptomatic. The scores were divided following the categorisation of 
Dickson & MacLeod (2006) and Goddard et al. (1997) as non-symptomatic ≤ 7 
on BDI II. Symptomatic was categorised as ≥ 8 on BDI II, following the 
categorisation of Levine et al. (2006).   
 
The students t-test was performed on the UWIST-MACL, CAMQ and ATQ pre 
and post mood induction mean scores to test for statistical significance. Normality 
was determined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  The relationship of interest 
was the change scores between time 1 and time 2 (pre and post mood 
induction), so the differences between measurements were used for the analysis. 
The change scores were calculated and intercorrelations were preformed 
between the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ as detailed in Study 1 (section 2.2.4 on 
design and analysis strategies). The intercorrelations were organised into non-
symptomatic and symptomatic grouping were based on the BDI-II scores. The 
Intercorrelations on the change score were also preformed on the UWIST-MACL 
and Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ). Significant tests were two-tailed 
rather than one-tailed, as the present research was interested in the relationship 
between mood and effect on cued autobiographical memory measures. The 
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present research did not predict the exact directional relationship but rather that a 
relationship does exist.  
 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The minimum and maximum for the UWIST-MACL sub-scales are 8 to 32 for 
energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone. The minimum score for anger 
sub-scale is 5 and the maximum is 20. The results from the present study show a 
minimum score of 8 to a maximum score of 32 on the three main bipolar, and 5 
minimum and 20 maximum on the monopolar scale. Table 7 presents the means 
and standard deviations for scores on the UWIST-MACL sub-scales for BDI 
scores 0–7 and 8 & above. The first two columns show the mean scores and 
standard deviation on each of the four sub-scales of the UWIST-MACL for 
participants with BDI scores between 0–7. Scores on the hedonic tone and 
energetic arousal scale are negatively related to the level of negative mood (low-
scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas higher values reflect a 
greater negative mood on tense arousal and anger/frustration scales. The post 
mood induction scores showed increased negative mood on each of the four sub-
scales of the UWIST-MACL.  
 
Table 7: Mean and standard deviation for scores on the UWIST-MACL sub-scales 
pre and post mood induction for BDI scores 0–7 and BDI 8 & above 
 
    BDI 0-7    BDI 8 & above 
    Mean  Std.     Mean  Std. 
      Deviation    Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
Energetic arousal  19.48  2.19  20.17  2.77 
Tense arousal   19.35  2.71  19.42  3.52 
Hedonic tone   21.39  2.04  20.95  2.12 
Anger / frustration  6.58  1.94  8.75  3.39 
 
Post mood induction   
Energetic arousal  20.50  2.48  19.37  4.03 
Tense arousal   19.47  2.81  20.32  4.55 
Hedonic tone   21.04  2.42  19.05  3.91 
Anger / frustration  8.27  3.65  11.60  4.57 
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Table 7 also presents the mean and standard deviation for scores on the UWIST-
MACL sub-scales for BDI scores 8 and above in last two columns. The post 
mood induction scores for BDI scores 8 and above show increased negative 
mood on each of the four sub-scales of the UWIST-MACL. Energetic Arousal 
mood component demonstrates an increase in negative mood for BDI 8 and 
above, but a decrease in energetic arousal for BDI between 0 and 7. It is 
important when looking at the UWIST-MACL values to remember that energetic 
arousal and hedonic tone are negatively related to the level of negative mood i.e. 
as hedonic tone scores go down, the level of negative mood goes up. However, 
tense arousal and anger/frustration are positively related to the level of negative 
mood i.e. as anger/frustration goes up, the level of negative mood goes up. Table 
8 presents means and standard deviations for scores on the cued 
autobiographical questionnaire sub-scales for BDI scores 0–7 and 8 & above. 
 
Table 8: Mean and standard deviation scores on the seven outcome measures 
within the Cued Autobiographical Questionnaire for BDI scores 0–7 and 8 & above 
 
    BDI 0-7    BDI 8 & above 
           Mean    Std.               Mean   Std. 
     Deviation   Deviation 
Pre mood induction 
Typical    4.17  1.73  3.63   1.42 
Rumination   3.47  1.20  3.91  1.15 
Valence   5.10  1.19  4.79  1.32 
Other people   5.67  1.29  5.74  0.91 
Expected   4.44  1.15  4.54  1.13 
Desirable   4.53  1.29  4.62  1.50 
Personal importance  5.22  1.26  5.26  1.13 
 
Post mood induction 
Typical    3.92  1.53  4.16  1.64 
Rumination   3.81  1.26  4.36  1.33 
Valence   4.95  1.23  4.62  1.60 
Other people   5.49  1.26  5.92  0.83 
Expected   4.46  1.31  4.82  1.55 
Desirable   4.76  1.52  4.69  1.56 
Personal importance  5.41  1.22  5.50  1.16 
 
 
The minimum score was 1 and the maximum score was 7 on each of these self-
rating Likert scales. The first two columns represents the mean score over the 
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four cued memories on each of the seven outcome variables for participant with 
BDI score 0–7. The minimum score is 1.00 and the maximum score is 7.00. 
Typical scores range from 1.00 to 7.00, rumination ranges from 1.00 to 6.50, 
valence from 2.50 to 7.00, other people from 2.00 to 7.00, expected from 1.00 to 
6.75, desirable from 1.00 to 7.00 and personal importance from 1.00 to 7.00. 
 
Table 8 also presents the mean score over the four cued memories on each of 
the seven outcome variables for participants with BDI score 8 and above in the 
last two columns. The minimum score is 1.00 and the maximum score is 7.00. 
Typical scores range from 1.00 to 6.75, rumination ranges from 1.00 to 6.50, 
valence from 1.50 to 7.00, other people from 3.50 to 7.00, expected from 1.25 to 
6.50, desirable from 2.00 to 7.00 and personal importance from 2.25 to 7.00. 
There is a good range demonstrated on all the self-rated measures obtained from 
the participants on the autobiographical questionnaire.  
 
 
3.3.1.1 Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) and its four sub-scales 
Scores on the ATQ can range from 30 to 150. A high score indicates frequent 
occurrence of negative automatic thoughts. The ATQ contains four sub-scales of 
personal maladjustment (scores can range from 4 to 20) and desire for change 
(scores can range from 7 to 35), negative self-concept and negative expectations 
(scores can range from 2 to 10), low self-esteem and giving up/helplessness 
(scores can range from 2 to 10). Table 9 (on the next page) presents mean and 
standard deviations for scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and its 
four sub-scales in the symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups. The first two 
columns represent the range and mean scores for symptomatic participants. The 
total ATQ scores range from 30.00 to 73.00. Personal maladjustment and desire 
for change scores range from 5.00 to 14.00, negative self-concept and negative 
expectations from 7.00 to 19.00, low self-esteem from 2.00 to 4.00, giving 
up/helplessness from 2.00 to 6.00. 
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Table 9: Mean and standard deviation scores on Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire and its four sub-scales in the symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
groups 
 
             Symptomatic   Non-Symptomatic 
 
      Mean Std.   Mean Std. 
       Deviation    Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
Automatic thoughts (total score)  48.05 8.74  39.58 6.88 
Personal maladjustment  
and desire for change    8.85 2.03  7.54 2.02 
Negative self-concept  
and negative expectations   10.60 2.76  8.65 1.74 
Low self-esteem    2.25 0.64  2.21 0.54 
Giving up/helplessness   3.20 1.11  2.31 0.61 
 
Post mood induction 
Automatic thoughts (total score)  47.10 10.48  40.40 8.21 
Personal maladjustment  
and desire for change    8.84 2.27  7.52 2.21 
Negative self-concept  
and negative expectations   10.47 2.65  8.79 1.93 
Low self-esteem    2.32 0.58  2.13 0.40 
Giving up/helplessness   3.21 1.03  2.54 0.80 
 
     
Table 9 also presents the range and means for non-symptomatic participants in 
the last two columns. The total ATQ scores range from 30.00 to 61.00. Personal 
maladjustment and desire for change scores range from 5.00 to 14.00, negative 
self-concept and negative expectations from 7.00 to 16.00, low self-esteem from 
2.00 to 4.00, giving up/helplessness from 2.00 to 5.00. There is a good range 
demonstrated on all the self-rated measures obtained from the participants on 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
 
3.3.2 Inferential analysis 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used for the analysis. The 
completed pre- and post-tests included the participating number which allowed 
for matching individual pre- and post-tests. Once matched and recorded, a test of 
difference was performed on the data to determine if the participant responses 
changed from pre to post in a statistically significant manner. The paired sample 
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t-test was appropriately used if the data did not differ significantly from a normal 
distribution. Normality was determined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 
normality and the Shapiro-Wilk test. If the data did differ significantly from the 
normal distribution, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used. A power 
calculation was conducted on GPOWER, a general power analysis program 
(Erdfelder et al., 1996). A non symptomatic sample size of 52 and a symptomatic 
sample size of 21, with alpha level set at p = 0.05, a large effect size (r = 0.5), 
gives 99% and 82% power respectively to detect real difference due to treatment 
effect rather than chance.  
 
3.3.3 Mood state manipulation check 
The UWIST-MACL was used for subjective evaluation in this study, both as a 
general indicator of mood state and, more specifically, to evaluate changes in 
energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration. Lowered 
energetic arousal equals less active and alert. Increased tense arousal is 
consistent with being more anxious and nervous. Lowered hedonic tone equals 
loss of interest and diminished pleasure response. Increased anger/frustration is 
consistent with more emotional feelings of anger and frustration. Table 10 reports 
‘mood manipulation check’ for mood induction procedure for each of the four 
predictor variables and as so only reports the effect of mood manipulation for 
overall sample. The separate analysis is reserved for explanatory variables 
between predictor mood component variables and their effects on each outcome 
variable on the cue autobiographical memories. Table 10 (on the next page) 
presents paired t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL and sub-
scales. 
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Table 10: Paired sample t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL 
                                   Pre mood induction  Post mood induction 
  
   Mean Std.   Mean Std.              t (df)           Sig. 
    Deviation   Deviation        (2-tailed) 
  
Energetic arousal 19.68 2.34  20.17 2.97          -1.24 (67)         0.22 
 
Tense arousal      19.41 2.92  19.77 3.39          -0.04 (66)         0.97 
 
Hedonic tone        21.25 2.05  20.46 3.00           1.96 (67)         0.05* 
 
Anger/frustration   7.29 2.74  9.22 4.15          -25.21 (72)       0.001*** 
*** significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).        
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).        
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
The paired sample t-tests were also used to test the difference between pre and 
post mood induction scores for each sub-scale on the UWIST-MACL. There was 
a significant difference between pre manipulation and post manipulation mood 
ratings on the UWIST-MACL. The results show that hedonic tone showed a 
significant increase in negative mood (t (67) = 1.96, p < 0.05). This was in the 
expected direction. Tense arousal showed a non-significant increase in negative 
mood (t (66) = -.04, p = .97, n.s.). This was in the expected direction but was 
non-significant. The results show anger/frustration showed significant increase in 
negative mood (t (72) = -25.21, p < 0.001). Energetic arousal showed a non-
significant reduction in negative mood (t (67) = -1.24, p = .22, n.s.). Explanation 
for the result observed with energetic arousal may be due to the demand placed 
upon participants in the procedure to complete the task within the required time 
parameters during the extended procedure in Study 2 compared with Study 1; i.e. 
energetic arousal measures activity and alertness, which may have increased 
slightly due to the demand place upon participants in the experimental procedure. 
In summary, the mood induction technique significantly increases negative mood 
among participants, resulting in participants being more anxious and nervous, 
and experiencing diminished pleasure and increased feelings of anger and 
frustration.  
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3.3.4 Paired sample t-tests on non-symptomatic and symptomatic between pre 
and post mood manipulation 
Table 11 presents paired t-tests in the predictor variables on the cued 
autobiographical questionnaire and sub-scales for non-symptomatic and 
symptomatic groups. Hypothesis 2.2 (ii): there was a significant decrease in 
rumination in the non-symptomatic group following the mood induction 
procedure. The results demonstrate that rumination showed significant decrease 
in the non-symptomatic group (t (43) = -2.11, p < 0.05). The remaining t-test 
yielded non-significant results. 
 
Table 11: Paired sample t-test on non-symptomatic and symptomatic  
between pre and post mood manipulation 
Paired mean differences 
(Pre and post mood 
induction) 
          t 
 
 
                   df 
 
 
 
                       Sig.  
                 
 
    
Non-symptomatic 
Typical 0.96 43 0.34      
Rumination -2.11 43      0.04* 
Valence 0.61 45 0.54  
Other people 0.82 45 0.42  
Expected -0.56 44 0.58  
Desirable -1.09 45 0.28  
Personal importance -0.83 45 0.41  
 
Symptomatic 
Typical -1.42 18 0.17  
Rumination -1.25 18 0.23  
Valence 0.35 18 0.73  
Other people -0.71 18 0.49  
Expected -0.86 18 0.40  
Desirable -0.15 18 0.88  
Personal importance -0.61 18 0.55  
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
The second stage of analysis involved the mean and standard deviations being 
calculated for each cued autobiographical memory measure at pre and post 
mood induction. The relationship of interest in the present study is change scores 
between time 1 and time 2 (pre and post mood induction), so the difference 
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between measurements was used for the analysis. The analysis of change 
scores was considered important as outcome variables can be investigated over 
a particular treatment or manipulation (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Shahar, 2009; 
Westaby et al., 2001). The cross correlations on the change scores were 
completed for the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ, and categorised into non-
symptomatic and symptomatic in section 3.3.5. 
 
3.3.5. Intercorrelation of change scores in specificity of appraised content in non-
symptomatic and symptomatic groups 
To determine the relationship between changes in mood and evaluative 
judgement of autobiographical memory, change scores for the UWIST-MACL and 
Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire were calculated by subtracting 
participants’ scores for the UWIST-MACL and participants’ mean scores for Cued 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire at pre mood induction from post mood 
induction. Table 12 (on page 86) presents the Pearson correlation coefficients 
between change scores for the UWIST-MACL and Cued Autobiographical 
Memory Questionnaire for non-symptomatic and symptomatic.  
 
Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05 and all tests were two-tailed. 
Prior to the analysis, the data set was partitioned according to the participants’ 
BDI scores. The BDI was used to classify participants as potentially symptomatic 
(score 8 or greater) or non-symptomatic (score 1–7). Mood state change scores 
(post-test minus pre-test) were calculated for each of the CAMQ sub-scales. 
Pearson correlation coefficients between these change scores were then 
conducted. 
 
UWIST-MACL change score correlations 
As expected, the correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL 
suggest appropriate directional relationships, considering that scales on hedonic 
tone and energetic arousal are negatively related to the level of negative mood 
(low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas higher values 
reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and anger/frustration scales. 
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The exception was anger/frustration in the non-symptomatic, which showed an 
unexpected directional relationship. The scores on the correlation matrix indicate 
that anger/frustration for the non-symptomatic correlates positively with energetic 
arousal and hedonic tone. This suggests that anger/frustration decreases with 
increases in unpleasant and deactivated energetic arousal and unpleasant 
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hedonic tone. Anger/frustration correlated negatively with tense arousal, 
suggesting that anger/frustration decreases with increases in activated and 
unpleasant tense arousal. These unexpected and interesting correlations might 
suggest an interesting mood shift in anger/frustration amongst the non-
symptomatic group when confronted by unpleasant and uncomfortable mood 
shifts. 
 
UWIST-MACL and CAMQ change score correlations 
The correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ for 
non-symptomatic are presented in the first row then alternate rows in Table 12.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1 (ii): There was a significant positive correlation between hedonic 
tone and rumination (r = .56, p < 0.001 see Graph 3). This means that as a 
person’s negative mood increased, the amount of rumination about the 
autobiographical event decreased i.e. the event was thought about less often.  
 
Graph 3: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and rumination 
 
4.003.002.001.000.00-1.00-2.00-3.00
Rumination
5.00
2.50
0.00
-2.50
-5.00
H
e
d
o
n
ic
T
o
n
e
R Sq Linear = 0.251
 
 
 
 88 
Hypothesis 2.1(iv): There was a significant positive correlation between hedonic 
tone and expectancy (r = .34, p < 0.05 see Graph 4). This means that as a 
person’s negative mood increased, the expectancy of the cued autobiographical 
event decreased i.e. the event was less expected. It is noted that the t-test for 
expectancy was non-significant. Nevertheless the present analysis reports the 
inter-correlation between an individual mood component and expectancy as a 
separate explanatory change score inter-correlation, between an individual 
predictor variable and outcome variable. 
 
Graph 4: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and expectancy 
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Hypothesis 2.1 (v): There was a significant positive correlation between hedonic 
tone and personal importance (r = .32, p < 0.05 see Graph 5 on the next page). 
This means that as a person’s negative mood increased, the personal 
importance of the event decreased i.e. the event became less important. It is 
noted that the t-test for personal importance was non-significant. Nevertheless 
the present analysis reports the inter-correlation between an individual mood 
component and personal importance as a separate explanatory change score 
inter-correlation, between an individual predictor variable and outcome variable. 
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Graph 5: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and personal 
importance 
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Hypothesis 2.1 (vii): A significant negative correlation was found between 
hedonic tone and valence (r = -.32, p < 0.05 see Graph 6 on the next page). This 
means that as a person’s negative mood increased, the valence of the cued 
autobiographical event increased i.e. the more positive the event. It is noted that 
the t-test for valence was non-significant. Nevertheless the present analysis 
reports the inter-correlation between an individual mood component and valence 
as a separate explanatory change score inter-correlation, between an individual 
predictor variable and outcome variable. 
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Graph 6: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and valence 
2.500.00-2.50
Valence
5.00
2.50
0.00
-2.50
-5.00
H
e
d
o
n
ic
T
o
n
e
R Sq Linear = 0.065
 
The correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ for 
symptomatic participants are presented in the second row and then alternate 
rows in Table 12.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1 (ii): There was a significant negative correlation between 
energetic arousal and rumination reported on the autobiographical event (r = -
0.8, p < 0.001 see Graph 7on the next page). The change score correlation is 
significant for these two variables suggesting a correlation exists and is 
supported by the scatter plot in Graph 7. This means that, as a person’s 
energetic arousal decreased with negative mood (i.e. reverse scoring on the 
UWIST-MACL), the amount of rumination increased significantly. It is noted that 
the ‘mood manipulation check’ for mood induction procedure for energetic 
arousal was non-significant. Nevertheless the present analysis reports the inter-
correlation between energetic arousal and rumination as a separate explanatory 
change score inter-correlational analysis, between a predictor variable and 
outcome variable. This finding supports results obtained in Study 1.  
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Graph 7: Scatter plot for change scores between energetic arousal and rumination 
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The significant correlations between hedonic tone and cognitive sequelae on 
CAMQ were not found in the symptomatic group (Hypotheses 2.2 ii, iv, v and vii). 
Interestingly the results indicated that the correlation on cognitive sequelae 
amongst the symptomatic group were in the opposite direction, although these 
were non-significant. The symptomatic group appeared to demonstrate a lack of 
response on cognitive sequelae to the temporary mood change, as measured by 
hedonic tone, compared to agonistic shift in cognitive sequelae in the non-
symptomatic group. 
 
CAMQ change score correlations 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ for the non-symptomatic 
indicated that key cognitive sequelae such as valence and rumination are 
affected by temporary mood change. Valence demonstrated consistent negative 
correlations with expectancy (r = -0.59, p < 0.01), desirability (r = -0.89, p < 
0.001) and personal importance of the event (r = -0.68, p < 0.01). These indicate 
that as valence became more negative, there was a corresponding correlational 
increase in expectancy, desirability and personal importance. The counterintuitive 
finding of increase in desirability was unexpected, but may represent an attempt 
to cope with unpleasant mood shift by focusing on desirable content to protect 
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against negative mood shift. Rumination demonstrated significant negative 
correlation with valence (r = -0.30, p < 0.05), suggesting that rumination 
increases as valence becomes more negative. Rumination correlates significantly 
with personal importance (r = 0.55, p < 0.001). This means that, as a person’s 
emotionality increases, the personal importance of the autobiographical event 
increases.  
 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ for the symptomatic 
group indicated that key features such as valence demonstrate consistent 
negative correlations with expectancy (r = -0.59, p < 0.01), desirability (r = -0.89, 
p < 0.001) and personal importance (r = -0.68, p < 0.01). The results indicate that 
as valence became more negative, cognitive sequelae such as expectancy, 
desirability and personal importance of the event increased. The counterintuitive 
finding of increase in desirability was demonstrated again amongst the 
symptomatic group. This unexpected finding may represent an attempt to cope 
with unpleasant mood shift amongst both groups by focusing on desirable 
content to protect against negative mood shift.  
 
The significant result between hedonic tone and CAMQ were not found in the 
symptomatic group. Interestingly, the results indicated that the correlation on 
typicalness, rumination, importance of other people and desirability was in the 
opposite direction. The symptomatic group appeared to be responding 
antagonistically to the temporary mood changes as measured by hedonic tone 
compared to agonistic response in the non-symptomatic group. 
 
3.3.6.1 Post hoc examination of rumination between non-symptomatic and 
symptomatic groups (hedonic tone component) 
The researcher was interested in the relationship between rumination as a 
cognitive sequelae and its correlations with the non-symptomatic and 
symptomatic groups. The symptomatology as measured by the BDI was 
significantly different between the two groups. The Pearson's correlation for 
rumination between these two measures was 0.56 for the non-symptomatic 
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group and 0.35 for the symptomatic group for Hedonic Tone. The procedure for 
computing a confidence interval on the difference between two independent 
correlations involves the construction of a Z value. The value of Z can be applied 
to assess the significance of the difference between two correlation coefficients. 
The Z values with corresponding correlations and a p-value are produced in 
Table 13a. 
 
Table 13a: Difference between non-symptomatic and symptomatic Pearson’s r 
correlations on rumination (hedonic tone component) 
 
R1  N1   R2  N2  Zf1  Zf2        Z           p 
Pearson’s r (non-    Pearson’s r (sympto   (non-  (sympto 
(non-   sympto    (sympo   -matic)  symptom -matic) 
symptomatic) -matic)   -matic)     -matic)   
 
0.56    43   -0.35  17  0.63  -0.36       3.20      0.001 
 
Z = 3.20 p < 0.001 
 
Hypothesis 2.2 (ii): there was a significant difference on rumination between 
non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups (Z = 3.20 p < 0.001), with the non-
symptomatic group showing a significant decrease in rumination and the 
symptomatic group showing a non-significant increase in rumination. 
 
3.3.6.2 Post hoc examination of rumination between non-symptomatic and 
symptomatic groups (energetic arousal component) 
The researcher was interested in the relationship between rumination as a 
cognitive sequelae and its correlations with the non-symptomatic and 
symptomatic groups. The symptomatology as measured by the BDI was 
significantly different between the two groups. The Pearson's correlation for 
rumination between these two measures was 0.21 for the non-symptomatic 
group and -0.80 for the symptomatic group for Energetic Arousal. The procedure 
for computing a confidence interval on the difference between two independent 
correlations involves the construction of a Z value. The value of Z can be applied 
to assess the significance of the difference between two correlation coefficients. 
The Z values with corresponding correlations and a p-value are produced in 
Table 13b (on the next page). 
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Table 13b: Difference between non-symptomatic and symptomatic Pearson’s r 
correlations on rumination (energetic arousal component) 
 
R1  N1   R2  N2  Zf1  Zf2        Z           p 
Pearson’s r (non-    Pearson’s r (sympto   (non-  (sympto 
(non-   sympto    (sympo   -matic)  symptom -matic) 
symptomatic) -matic)   -matic)     -matic)   
 
0.21    43   -0.80  16  0.21  -0.10      -4.09      0.001 
 
Z = -4.09 p < 0.001 
 
Hypothesis 2.2 (ii): there was a significant difference on rumination between 
non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups (Z = -4.09 p < 0.001), with the non-
symptomatic group showing a non-significant decrease in rumination and the 
symptomatic group showing a significant increase in rumination. 
 
3.3.7 Intercorrelation of change scores in the four sub-scales on the UWIST-
MACL and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and its four sub-scales 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) was used to assess frequency of 
automatic thoughts (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). It is an instrument designed to 
identify and measure the frequency of automatic thoughts associated with 
depression. Table 14 (on the next page) presents the Pearson correlation 
between the UWIST-MACL and Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and sub-
scales. Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05 and all tests were two-tailed. 
 
UWIST-MACL change score correlations 
As expected, the correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL 
suggest appropriate directional relationships, considering that scales on hedonic 
tone and energetic arousal are negatively related to the level of negative mood 
(low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas higher values 
reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and anger/frustration scales. 
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UWIST-MACL and ATQ change score correlations 
The correlations between the change scores between the UWIST-MACL and 
ATQ are shown in Table 14.  
 
Hypothesis 2.3: there were significant correlations between the UWIST-MACL 
and ATQ. Anger/frustration, which demonstrated a significant increase in 
negative mood, showed significant positive correlations with the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (r = 0.35, p < 0.01), personal maladjustment and desire 
for change (r = 0.40, p < 0.001), negative self-concept and negative expectations 
(r = 0.30, p < 0.05) and low self-esteem (r = 0.25, p < 0.05). This means that, as 
a person’s negative mood increased, the amount of automatic thoughts, personal 
maladjustment and desire for change, negative self-concept and negative 
expectations and negative self-esteem increased. 
 
There was a significant positive correlation between energetic arousal and ATQ 
(r = 0.31, p < 0.05) and energetic arousal and personal maladjustment and desire 
for change (r = 0.35, p < 0.01). Tense arousal demonstrated a significant 
negative correlation with personal maladjustment and desire for change (r = -
0.24, p < 0.05). All other inter-correlations between the four UWIST-MACL mood 
sub-scales and ATQ and its four sub-scales were non significant. 
 
ATQ change score intercorrelations 
The change score correlations between sub-scales on the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire indicated significant positive correlations in the expected direction 
between all sub-scales: personal maladjustment and desire for change, negative 
self-concept and negative expectations, low self-esteem and giving up/ 
helplessness. 
 
To summarise, the pair samples t-tests indicated no overall significant difference 
between pre and post mood induction. The one exception was rumination in the 
non-symptomatic group, which showed a significant decrease. The main 
relationship of interest in the present study was the change scores between time 
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1 and time 2, which yield a greater number of significant results. With the 
exception of rumination and energetic arousal, the change score correlations 
showed an overall responsiveness of cognitive reactivity in the non-symptomatic 
group compared with the overall non-reactivity in the symptomatic group. This 
suggests that negative mood may be influencing the evaluative appraisals of 
cued autobiographical memory retrieval. A decrease in energetic arousal is 
where adjectives such as ‘passive’, ‘sluggish’, ‘unenterprising’ and ‘tired’ are 
being endorsed, while ‘energetic’, ‘alert’, ‘vigorous’ and ‘active’ are not being 
endorsed. There was a significant negative correlation between energetic arousal 
and rumination which indicates a significant increase in rumination (remembering 
the directional relationship that exists between the mood component and the 
cognitive characteristic; energetic arousal is negatively related to the level of 
negative mood). The effect of reduced hedonic tone, which provides a measure 
of overall unpleasantness of mood and associated somatic discomfort, indicates 
that the non-symptomatic react to the unpleasant mood shift. This pattern was 
non-significant in the symptomatic group. Finally, the automatic thought 
questionnaire and personal maladjustment and desire for change both 
demonstrated significant positive correlations between energetic arousal and 
anger / frustration sub-scales. Negative self-concept and negative expectations 
and low self-esteem demonstrated correlation with anger / frustration. Also 
personal maladjustment and desire for change and tense arousal sub-scale 
demonstrated a negative correlation. It is noted that reporting significant 
correlations between individual mood component and automatic thoughts 
questionnaire and it sub scales may increase type 1 error. Nevertheless 
appropriate caution is taken and consideration of the non-significant correlations 
that existed between the four UWIST-MACL mood sub-scales and ATQ and its 
four sub-scales. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The results and their interpretation are tentative in the light of the exploratory 
nature and the lack of correction for multiple testing. The present study was 
designed to explore the effects of mood manipulation on the cognitive content of 
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cued autobiographical memories in non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups. 
The results provide collaborative evidence that supports Study 1, which suggests 
that the mood induction procedure produces mood change, with participants 
showing more anxiety and nervousness, diminished pleasure and increased 
feelings of anger and frustration.  
 
3.4.1 Intercorrelation of change scores showed non-reactivity in the  
symptomatic group 
The key finding was that autobiographical content showed non-reactivity in the 
symptomatic compared with the increase in cognitive reactivity in the non-
symptomatic group. This supports Hypothesis 2.2 that there would be a 
difference between the symptomatic and non-symptomatic. The one exception in 
the symptomatic group was the increase in rumination, which is discussed in 
section 3.4.2. This finding was not entirely unexpected due to the possible effects 
of overgeneral memory impacting negatively on autobiographical retrieval. The 
increase in rumination is highly related to increase in overgeneral memory 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins, Teasdale & Williams, 2000a). This could be 
a possible explanation for the lack of reactivity in the symptomatic group due to 
the increase in overgeneral memory style negatively impacting on cognitive 
reactivity. By contrast, the non-symptomatic group was unaffected by an increase 
in rumination and subsequent negative effects on cognitive reactivity. This 
supports Hypothesis 2.1 that there would be a change in cognitive 
characteristics. 
 
The findings support previous research on overgenerality in depressive 
symptomatology (Mackinger et al., 2000) but are in contrast to previous cognitive 
reactivity research which generally found an association between mood and 
cognitive content reactivity in clinically depressed groups (Timbremont & Braet, 
2004). Timbremont & Braet (2004) found cognitive reactivity in those with current 
depression showed increased reactivity for negative self-statement words. The 
study criteria utilised a diagnosis of depression rather than depressive 
symptomatology, which may account for the discrepant findings.  
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There may also be some good theoretical reasons that support the present 
findings. The schema based cognitive theories and hierarchical search model 
may provide some answers. First, schema based theories (Beck, 1987; Kovacs & 
Beck, 1978) suggest that depressive symptomatology exerts increased cognitive 
load which, when combined with temporary low negative mood, increases the 
cognitive processing demands which may act to block autobiographical content 
(Williams et al., 1997). Autobiographical retrieval of past experiences requires 
elaborative processing and requires event-specific schema to recall event-
specific information, but this is blocked due to the high demand placed upon 
memory and cognitive systems (Wenzlaff, Rude & West, 2002).  
 
Second, the concept of a top-down hierarchical memory search (Williams et al., 
2007) could be important to understanding the present finding. The relationship 
between autobiographical retrieval and symptomatic groups is thought to result in 
a truncated search in those with depressive symptomatology (Kleim & Ehlers, 
2008). Williams et al. (2006b) argue that a truncated search occurs in those 
showing signs of depressive symptoms, which prevents those individuals 
accessing event-specific memories. This may account for the temporary negative 
mood shift being non-predictive in autobiographical retrieval which requires 
elaborative processing of information. 
 
3.4.2 Rumination as a cognitive style was reactive to temporary negative  
mood state 
The second key finding was that rumination showed a significant difference 
between non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups (Z = 3.20, p < 0.001), with 
the non-symptomatic group showing a significant decrease in rumination. This 
supports Hypothesis 2.1 ii that there would be a change in this characteristic. The 
findings from the present research are in line with previous research which shows 
that there is a higher level of rumination in the symptomatic group than the non-
symptomatic group under mood stress (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). It 
also supports Hypothesis 2.2 that there would be a difference between the 
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symptomatic and non-symptomatic. Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) used a 
sad mood induction procedure before monitoring ruminative response and found 
higher levels of rumination in the symptomatic individuals than the non-
symptomatic. Mackinger et al. (2000) suggested that patients with depressed 
symptomatology have a tendency to be ‘overgeneral’ in recalling 
autobiographical events, which results in repetitive focus on present causes of 
current low mood.  
 
Rumination is thought to contribute to overgeneral memory (Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001; Watkins et al., 2000a) by taking up scarce processing resources (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and therefore stopping memory search at a lower level 
and preventing access to event-specific memories. The resulting effect would 
have important implications for cognitive aspects because overgeneral memories 
do not contain context-specific information relevant to the individual personal 
experience (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Individuals affected are unable to 
access a record of past specific experiences that would help with current mood 
state and instigate appropriate cognitive strategies to address the mood state 
(Williams et al., 2006b). Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Herman, Raes, Watkins & 
Dagleish (2007) called this ‘mnemonic interlock’, whereby the individual retrieval 
process remains at the general level and locks the individual into successive 
unsuccessful attempts at gaining access to specific memories. 
 
The present study considered depressive symptomatology that was present prior 
to the negative mood induction. The finding suggested that participants with 
current symptomatology prior to the mood induction had increased ruminative 
style post negative mood induction. This is in keeping with previous research 
which suggests that the effect of mood state on memory recall is linked to 
dispositional attributes such as depressive symptomatology, but additionally 
necessitates temporary shift in negative mood (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1986), 
making it consistent with the prediction that temporary mood shifts would have 
little effect in the absence of stable depressive symptomatology (Beck et al, 
1979). 
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3.4.3 Intercorrelation of change scores showed reactivity in the  
non-symptomatology group 
An important finding from this study suggests that negative mood, as measured 
by hedonic tone, may be acting as a significant predictor of autobiographical 
content in the non-symptomatic group. The key significant changes were in 
autobiographical appraisals of rumination, expectancy and personal importance, 
which all showed significant positive correlations with hedonic tone, suggesting a 
reduction in all three characteristics. This supports Hypotheses 2.1 ii, iv and v 
that there would be a change in these characteristics. This finding concurs with 
the empirical finding of Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell & Berg (1999), which 
suggested that non-symptomatic individuals rated their ruminative thoughts as 
significantly more positive, optimistic and less personally related.  
 
Valence showed a negative correlation, demonstrating an increase in positive 
memories with increased hedonic tone. This supports Hypothesis 2.1 vii that 
there would be a change in this characteristic. The present finding is similar to 
Wisco & Nolen Hoeksema (2009) which demonstrated a difference in valence of 
memories between symptomatic and non-symptomatic individuals under mood 
stress. The non-symptomatic individuals reported less negatively valenced 
memories than the symptomatic. This supports theoretical and empirical data that 
non-symptomatic individuals have greater access to positive memories than 
symptomatic individuals (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco & Lyubomirsky, 2008). The 
results are consistent and could provide support for the Bower’s associative 
network theory, which indicates that negative shifts in mood would result in shifts 
in cognitive appraisals (Bower, 1981). 
 
The results are consistent with theory of a hierarchical search that results in 
access to specific event memories being more likely in non-symptomatic 
individuals (Williams et al., 2006b). It is suggested that positively valenced 
memories, which are high in sensory and perceptual detail, are being accessed 
over negatively valenced memories by the non-symptomatic. This supports 
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hypotheses 2.1 vii and 2.2 that there would be a difference between the 
symptomatic and the non-symptomatic. The evidence suggests that healthy 
individuals will tend to select memories that are pleasurable and select against 
those that are unpleasurable (Westen, Mudserrisoglu, Fowler, Shedler & Koren, 
1997). Furthermore, it is because of the frequency of rehearsal of pleasant 
memories compared to negatively valenced memories in non-symptomatic 
individuals that the former positively valenced memories are likely to be recalled 
(Williams et al., 2007). Overall, the findings in this section suggest that, in the 
non-symptomatic group, temporary mood state could be showing helpful 
cognitive reactivity or be unaffected by the negative impact of increased 
rumination and resultant effects of overgeneral style of retrieval which have been 
observed in the symptomatic group. 
 
3.4.4 Intercorrelation of change scores showed that automatic negative thoughts 
were reactive to temporary negative mood state 
The present research also supports the notion of cognitive reactivity within the 
automatic thoughts level of cognition. The results from this study provide support 
that negative mood is possibly a good predictor of negative automatic thoughts 
as measured by the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 
1980). This supports Hypothesis 2.3 that there would be a change in automatic 
thoughts. The ATQ is based on Beck’s cognitive model, which suggests that 
negative thinking is a central to negative mood. This was consistent with the 
present results, which demonstrated that with increased negative mood, as 
measured by the UWIST-MACL, a greater frequency of negative automatic 
thoughts were reported by participants. Beck (1967) defined automatic thoughts 
as depressive self-statements that reflect distorted thinking patterns. Automatic 
thoughts are relatively accessible units for research and relatively automatic 
cognitive products, which are suggestive of the ways in which individuals 
perceive and construct their appraisals (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005).  
 
It was observed that anger/frustration on the UWIST-MACL was the strongest 
predictor of negative automatic thoughts. Anger/frustration correlated with 
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personal maladjustment and desire for change, negative self concept and 
negative expectations, low self esteem and giving up/helplessness. Anger 
includes affective state, and cognitive and behavioural manifestations. Buss & 
Perry (1992) suggest that anger is more akin to an affective state where hostility 
has a more cognitive component. Although focusing on a somewhat different unit 
of analysis, the results suggest that cognitive content is sensitive to negative 
mood change.  
 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
The current study represents the first measurement of a temporary shift in 
negative mood in relation to depressive symptomatology and its effects on 
autobiographical retrieval. The present study suggests that autobiographical 
retrieval shows non-reactivity within the depressive symptomatology group but 
reactivity in the non-symptomatic group. This supports Hypothesis 2.2 that there 
would be a difference between the symptomatic and non-symptomatic. Increased 
rumination is shown in the symptomatic group and automatic thoughts show 
significant reactivity to mood state. The content within autobiographical memory, 
which may be less automatic and implicit than a measure of automatic thoughts, 
could indicate that autobiographical memory retrieval is a more effortful and more 
multi-faceted phenomenon. Taken together, the findings suggest that depressive 
symptomatology and negative shifts in mood state are two factors involved in 
autobiographical content retrieval. Furthermore, results suggest that some 
aspects of autobiographical retrieval seem to be related to temporary mood state 
and some to depressive symptomatology. 
 
The affective prime did result in changes on endorsements of autobiographical 
cognitive content. Autobiographical technique showed that mood induction could 
cue significant changes in autobiographical appraisals of rumination, expectancy 
and personal importance, which all showed significant positive correlations with 
hedonic tone in the non-symptomatic group (supporting Hypothesis 2.1 ii, iv, v 
and vii). Valence showed a negative correlation, demonstrating an increase in 
positive memories with increased hedonic tone. This supports theoretical and 
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empirical data that non-symptomatic individuals have greater access to positive 
memories than symptomatic individuals (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). The 
present study supports Bower’s (Bower, 1981) associative network model and 
the Teasdale & Barnard (1993) Interactive sub-systems framework, which 
suggest that accessibility to cognitive content is more reactive to mood changes 
than the more ephemeral sensory and affective appraisals that were observed in 
Study 1. This might explain why the resultant correlations were more frequent 
and robust in the present study.  
 
The findings from the present study suggest that rumination showed a significant 
change score intercorrelation with energetic arousal, indicating an increase in 
rumination within the symptomatic group. This supports hypotheses 2.1 ii and 2.2 
that there would be a difference between the symptomatic and non-symptomatic. 
The findings are in line with previous research which shows there is a higher 
level of rumination in the symptomatic group than the non-symptomatic group 
under mood stress (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). The results are 
necessarily tentative due to the smaller sample size in the symptomatic group. 
The comparison of correlation coefficients between symptomatic and non 
symptomatic did provide evidence that rumination scores were statistically 
significant on rumination and provided sufficient statistical power to detect a 
difference. The present study considered depressive symptomatology that was 
dispositionally present, which was linked to ruminative style when in temporary 
negative mood state. This is in keeping with previous research which suggests 
that the effects of overgenerality of memory recall are linked to dispositional 
attributes such as depressive symptomatology, but necessitate a temporary shift 
in negative mood to instigate latent cognitive styles (Beck et al., 1986).  
 
The present study supports hypotheses 2.1 ii, iv, v and vii that a temporary 
negative mood state in the non-symptomatic group showed significant cognitive 
reactivity resulting in a change in rumination (i.e. decrease), expectancy (i.e. 
decrease) and personal importance (i.e. decrease), and a change in valence (i.e. 
increase) with increased hedonic tone. It is not known if this is a direct 
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consequence of negative mood or represents a lack of the presence of 
depression symptomatology or any other third variable. This is consistent with 
top-down hierarchical search from semantic, categorical to specific memories. 
Negative mood is proposed to result in a truncated search, in which individuals 
prematurely abandon their search at a higher, less specific stage containing 
overgeneral memory and ruminative style (Williams et al., 2006b). This seems to 
explain the finding within the symptomatic group, which showed increased 
overgenerality and increased rumination when change correlation was paired 
with energetic arousal. By contrast, the non-symptomatic group showed 
decreased rumination and increased cognitive reactivity by virtue of event-
specific memory being accessed rather than latent cognitive styles being 
activated by negative mood. 
 
In summary, the evidence from this study and its limitations suggested that it 
could prove fruitful to examine cognitive content within the retrieved 
autobiographical memories in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable to explore 
whether the findings are antecedent or scar of a previous episode of depression 
or temporary negative mood state. It can be expected that cognitive content 
might be more readily available in those with a previous episode of depression 
than those without, due to the longitudinal propagation of latent cognitive styles. 
This is consequently addressed in the next study.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
STUDY 3: Autobiographical memory responsiveness to an induced 
negative mood state: Cognitive appraisals in vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
students. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Study 2 found that autobiographical retrieval showed an overall diffuse and non-
reactive response to negative mood state in those showing some depressive 
symptomatology. The overall autobiographical content in the symptomatic group 
was more diffuse (i.e. undifferentiated) in negative mood state than the non-
symptomatic group which may indicate an overgeneral retrieval style. There was 
one notable cognitive style that did show cognitive reactivity, rumination, which 
showed an increase in the symptomatic group when looking at energetic arousal 
and rumination (see Table 12). The change score correlation is significant for 
these two variables suggesting a correlation exists and is supported by the 
scatter plot for the symptomatic (see Graph 7). The analysis reports the inter-
correlation between energetic arousal and rumination as a separate explanatory 
change score inter-correlational analysis, between a predictor variable and 
outcome variable. Interestingly cognitive reactivity to mood state was shown in 
the non-symptomatic group, indicating a non-diffuse response. These key 
findings suggest that depressive symptomatology and negative shifts in mood 
state are two factors involved in autobiographical content retrieval.  
 
Consequently, the present study builds on this initial evidence for low mood 
affecting autobiographical retrieval by further examining whether the cognitive 
products following a negative mood induction procedure are sensitive to mood 
change in those with and without a previous history of a depressive illness. This 
is important, as current depressive symptomatology was seen to affect 
autobiographical memory in Study 2 and depressive history is a known relapse 
marker (Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) and studies suggest autobiographical 
memory is affected in those with a history (Miranda et al., 1998; Miranda & 
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Persons, 1998). Those with a history of a depressive illness show limited access 
to event-specific memories and may show some specific cognitive reactivity 
compared with those with no previous depressive history (Miranda et al., 1998; 
Miranda & Persons, 1998).  
 
The literature indicates that depressive history is a known relapse marker (Segal 
et al., 2002) and might represent a possible moderating factor in mood state 
effects on autobiographical recall (Miranda et al., 1998). The literature suggests 
that moderating factors might be activated by temporary mood state (Miranda et 
al., 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1998). Previous history was operationally defined 
as a moderator variable as it might be helpful in explaining the strength of the 
relationship that exists between mood and cued autobiographical memory. To 
date, however, little research has investigated the effects of mood state and 
moderating factors on cued autobiographical content. Therefore, the present 
study turns its attention to depressive vulnerability, a trait factor that might be 
implicated in mood state effects on autobiographical recall. Figure 5 shows the 
potential for depressive vulnerability acting as a moderator on mood state 
affecting autobiographical recall. 
 
Figure 5: Previous history of depressive illness as a moderator  
Negative Mood Autobiographical recall
Previous history of 
a depressive illness
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The distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable by virtue of a previous 
history was also investigated by looking at autobiographical memories at the time 
of the event and looking back on the event to further elucidate the effect a 
previous history of depression might have on autobiographical memory. Previous 
studies suggest that a history of depression affects present and past evaluations 
of autobiographical memories (Yang & Rehm, 1993). In the present study the 
researcher sought to add to the literature by looking at the effects of a history of 
depression and negative mood.  
 
4.1.1 Theoretical background 
There is some evidence which indicates that vulnerability to depression is 
sufficient for bias cognitive styles to be visible, while other findings suggest that, 
in addition to vulnerability, low mood is a necessary condition to trigger certain 
cognitive styles (Miranda et al., 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1998). Kuyken & 
Dalgleish (1995) looked at those who were vulnerable to depression by virtue of 
previous episodes and those individuals with no previous episodes. Their findings 
suggested that there were no differences in overgeneral memory between the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups. The Kuyken & Dalgleish (1995) study was 
in the absence of current induced negative mood, which could possibly account 
for absence of difference between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable. 
 
Beck’s (Beck, 1976; Beck et al., 1986) cognitive model suggests that schemas 
are trait-like and play a role in instigating future depressive episodes. The 
Beckian model suggests that the presence of cognitive bias should be apparent 
in people who later go on to develop depression (Beck, 1976). It also suggests 
that certain cognitive characteristics are not only displayed when depressed but 
remain even when the depressive symptoms are in remission (Lewinsohn, 
Steinmetz, Larson & Franklin, 1981). This vulnerability theory suggests that 
previous episodes of depression predispose a person to developing future 
episodes. The argument suggests that negative thoughts that have developed 
through previous episodes can lead to future depressed mood, which increases 
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the activation of negative schema, which in turn leads to more negative automatic 
thoughts and greater negative mood (Beck, 1976).  
 
However, the longitudinal study of 998 people by Lewinsohn et al. (1981) 
suggested that people who were depressed showed negative cognitive bias, but 
people who went on to become depressed did not show negative cognitive bias 
prior to a depressive episode. The research by Lewinsohn et al. (1981) poses a 
problem for the Beckian model by showing there is an absence of predisposing 
negative schema prior to depressed mood. Teasdale’s (Teasdale & Dent, 1987; 
Dent & Teasdale, 1988) differential activation hypothesis circumvents this 
problem by suggesting that negative schemata are activated by negative mood 
and not necessarily by depressed mood.  
 
Depression and negative moods are closely linked but are not necessarily the 
same. Negative mood is dominated by high tense arousal with other components 
of mood such as anger / frustration being raised and corresponding low levels of 
energetic arousal and hedonic tone and is predominantly seen as a short-lived 
response to everyday stressors. Whereas depressed mood is predominantly 
seen as longer in duration and dominated by low hedonic tone and associated 
with low levels of energetic arousal and combined with high levels of tense 
arousal and anger/frustration (Matthews & Southall, 1991). Depressed mood can 
be seen as more stable and has greater global impact on the individuals mood 
(Baas, Dreu & Nijstand, 2008). The induction of a sad mood seems to facilitate or 
primes negative cognitive styles. Dent & Teasdale (1988) studied previously 
depressed and never depressed individuals and induced dysphoric and neutral 
mood, and found that the previously depressed individuals demonstrated 
stronger activation of negative self schema. The observation by Dent & Teasdale 
(1988) suggests that mood primes or facilitates certain cognitive styles in the 
previously depressed but doesn’t seem to work for the never depressed 
individuals, which supports the ‘differential activation’ hypothesis.  
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Vulnerability effects can be demonstrated in a negative mood state (Dent & 
Teasdale, 1988; Miranda and Persons, 1988; Teasdale and Dent, 1987). Studies 
such as Miranda & Persons (1988) & Roberts & Kassel (1996) suggest that 
cognitive style is related to mood in vulnerable individuals but not in the non-
vulnerable groups. These findings are further supported by the fact that 
dysfunctional attitudes can predict future depression when measured following a 
negative mood induction (Segal et al., 1999). However, the interpretation of these 
findings is somewhat difficult because they could indicate either that low mood 
triggers negative cognitive styles, or that negative cognitive styles trigger low 
mood. Miranda & Persons (1998) did test the hypothesis that latent negative 
cognitions are present in vulnerable individuals but need low mood to activate 
these cognitive styles, and found evidence to support the hypothesis.  
 
4.1.2 Self-regulatory cognitive styles 
There is another explanation that regulates cognitive content, not by mood state 
activating certain cognitive styles or increasing overgeneral memory retrieval, but 
activating self-regulatory coping styles. Study 2 highlights the possible interaction 
between the effects of overgeneral memory and its negative impact on cognitive 
reactivity. It was found that the mood induction possibly increased overgeneral 
retrieval in the depressive symptoms group. It was also tentatively suggested that 
the non-symptomatic group showed some helpful cognitive reactivity such as 
decrease rumination that could have been a self-regulatory strategy to combat 
negative mood state. Therefore a brief review of the literature pertaining to self-
regulatory cognitive styles is briefly discussed. 
 
The self-regulatory theory derives from cognitive models that focus on the way 
individuals deal with dysphoric mood and has been named self-regulatory coping 
strategies (Ingram, Miranda & Segal, 1998; Segal et al., 2002). Self-regulatory 
coping strategies research has focused more on the cognitive operations and 
individual ways that people deal with low mood. Cognitive operations focus on 
shifts in attention, rumination, self evaluation and future predictions (Hollon & 
Garber, 1988).  For example, Wenzlaff et al. (2002) emphasize how self-
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regulatory and mental control strategies may exacerbate low mood state via the 
‘ironic’ processing hypotheses. They suggest that mental control strategies such 
as thought suppression, which is thought to be an adaptive response to halt 
descent into lower mood, inadvertently exacerbates the problem by triggering the 
automatic processing system to be especially alert to the negative content 
(Wenzlaff et al., 2002). Furthermore, Papageorgiou & Wells (2003) elaborate and 
suggest rumination as a coping strategy which can exacerbate low mood state by 
replaying negative events. 
 
It has also been suggested by several commentators on self-regulatory coping 
strategies that there might be individual differences in the cognitive processes 
and focus of attention. Cognitive processes focus on how information is encoded, 
altered, combined and stored in memory (Hollon & Garber, 1988). Williams et al. 
(1997) argue that depression is characterised by elaborative processes that 
concentrate on negative self-referent information by enhancing the recall of 
negative material from previous past events. In contrast, Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg (1987) suggest that there might be a shift in attention to evaluate the 
current situation. To date, very little is known about the effect of mood on 
activating self-regulatory versus dysfunctional cognitive styles in autobiographical 
memory under mood stress.  
 
4.1.3 Purpose of the study 
The study to an extent is exploratory, because there is some evidence on the 
effects of depressed mood, but less evidence on the effects of individual negative 
mood components on autobiographical retrieval. This study sought to understand 
the effect of negative mood on cognitive content within autobiographical retrieval 
in those with and without a history of depressive illness. A single item question 
was used as a vulnerability screen (Appendix 11). This single item was used by 
Miranda et al., (1988) as a “proxy” for depressive vulnerability. It assumes that 
participants who have had a past episode of depression, have an enduring trait 
that is stable and empirically detectable. The limit to this was identifying 
vulnerability that could result as a consequence of a previous episode of 
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depression rather than possible separate vulnerability factors that may contribute 
to first episode depression. To assess the likelihood of a previous episode of 
depression, participants were asked (1) Have you been prescribed treatment for 
depression in the past or present? The single item was chosen because the item 
may increase the detection of a diagnosed depression that has been clinically 
assessed and subsequently been referred for treatment as opposed to a brief 
situational dysphoric mood. One item proxy screening for depressive vulnerability 
have been endorsed by previous researchers (McChargue & Cook, 2007).  
 
The idea of the present study is to evoke event-specific memories by asking 
participants to rate the memory for present and past events on a number of 
characteristics. The characteristics were: typicalness, rumination, importance of 
other people, expectancy, personal importance, desirability and valence of the 
event retrieved. These characteristics represent key components of 
autobiographical memory in the literature, which have been introduced in section 
3.1.1. These cognitive attributes have been suggested to guide appraisal and 
interact with current mood to influence memory search and attention (Williams et 
al., 1997). 
 
To address the general aim of how mood affects autobiographical retrieval, 
participants rated a number of characteristics, which the individual endorsed on 
an analogue scale. The endorsements were then observed pre and post mood 
induction and observed against four dimensions of negative mood as measured 
by the UWIST-MACL (Matthews et al., 1990). The general aim was propagated in 
response to the lack of research investigating how mood affects the recalled 
content retrieved in autobiographical memories. 
 
Furthermore, by examining the influence of vulnerability and its effects on 
accessibility of the cognitive products, both at the time of the event and looking 
back on the event, it is hoped to elucidate the importance of a history in the 
presence of temporary mood induction. As attested by the studies within the 
literature reviewed in section 3.1.1, the dimensions of typicalness, rumination, 
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importance of other people, expectancy, personal importance, desirability and 
valence of the event retrieved seem to be important attributes of autobiographical 
memories, yet there appears to be little research available to demonstrate how 
these variables are influenced by current negative mood and vulnerability by 
virtue of a history of depression.  
 
The present study employed a non-clinical sample to examine change score 
intercorrelations between mood and autobiographical memory whilst examining 
the influence of vulnerability by virtue of a history of depression. A sample of 
students underwent autobiographical memory tests focusing on the memory 
appraisal prior to and following a negative mood induction procedure. The 
content held within autobiographical memory may be affected by such negative 
mood shifts. Interestingly, there appears to be a lack of research investigating 
how mood not only affects overgeneral memory, but influences the cognitive 
characteristics held within autobiographical memories both at the time of the 
event and looking back on the event. 
 
In summary, the influence of negative mood on autobiographical memory 
appears to be generally consistent with the predictions for the seven 
characteristics in section 3.2.3; negative mood may be correlated with a change 
in typicalness, desirability and rumination, importance of other people, 
expectancy and negatively valence events. These characteristics may be more 
pronounced in individuals with vulnerability by virtue of a veridical history of 
depression. The present research investigated the correlations between 
dimensions of mood as measured by the UWIST-MACL and effects on both 
content-based attributes and memory changes on the free recall of 
autobiographical memories in those with and without a history of depression. The 
characteristics of autobiographical memory highlighted have emerged from 
research and opened up further questions on the effects of negative mood on 
autobiographical content. 
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The present study was designed to address two areas of uncertainty concerning 
mood effects on autobiographical retrieval: 
 
(a) Is autobiographical content more reactive in those with a history of depressive 
illness? 
(b) Is there a difference in endorsements on autobiographical memories for 
present and past appraisals? 
 
From these general aims a number of specific hypotheses were developed 
concerning the effects of mood on autobiographical retrieval. It was hypothesised 
that negative mood would predict a change from pre to post mood induction in 
the endorsements on the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. 
Specifically it was hypothesized that negative mood would predict a change in 
endorsements of:- 
 
i) typicalness in cued autobiographical recall (Coluccia et al., 2006) 
ii) ruminative response in cued recall (Williams et al., 2006a) 
iii) negative evaluation of the importance of other people (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
iv)  the ability to conceptualize and judge the likelihood of future events 
(Williams et al., 2006a)  
v) personal importance of cued memory recall (Williams et al., 2008) 
vi) desirability in cued memory recall (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
vii) valence in cued memory recall (Walker et al., 2003). 
 
H 3.1 It was hypothesised that there would be a change from pre to post mood 
induction in the endorsements on the cued autobiographical memory and that 
there would be a difference in endorsements at the time the event occurred and 
looking back on the event in the past for characteristics i-vii above. 
 
H 3.2 It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between the vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable endorsements for characteristics i-vii above. 
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H 3.3 It was hypothesised that there would be a change from pre to post mood 
induction in the endorsement of negative automatic thoughts as measure by the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
One hundred and four students from the University of Chester’s Faculty of Health 
and Social Care participated in the study. Students in the present study had not 
participated in the previous studies. The mean age of the sample was 26.84 
years, standard deviation 8.41 with a range of 18-50 years. The sample 
consisted of 92 female and 12 male participants. 12 participants were excluded 
for their own protection on the basis of their high BDI-2 score (see section 2.2.3 
for ethical procedure and support offered to all participants). 27 participants self-
reported a vulnerability and 77 participants reported no vulnerability to 
depression. A power calculation was conducted on GPOWER, a general power 
analysis program (Erdfelder et al., 1996). A sample size of 104, with alpha level 
set at p = 0.05, a large effect size (r = 0.5), gives 99% power to detect real 
difference due to treatment effect rather than chance.  
 
Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Departmental Ethics Committee 
prior to data collection, and ethical approval for access to students was granted 
from the Faculty of Health and Social Care Ethics Committee prior to recruitment 
of participants. The ethical guidelines and consent process was followed as in 
Study 2 section 3.2.1. 
 
4.2.2 Materials & measures 
Along with the mood induction procedure, the following five psychometric 
materials and measures were utilised in this study: 
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Vulnerability to Depression 
The Vulnerability to Depression questionnaire (Persons & Miranda, 1992) was 
used as a proxy to assess vulnerability for depression. Participants were asked to 
self-report whether they had previously been prescribed treatment for depression 
symptoms, and then asked to select one or more treatments, including 
pharmacology, cognitive behavioural therapy and counselling. Those who had 
received previous treatment were considered vulnerable, and those who had not 
and were without a current history were classified as non-vulnerable. 
 
Depressive Symptomatology 
The Beck Depression inventory – Version 2 (Beck et al., 1996) was utilised as in 
Study 2. Several studies reported strong psychometric properties in student 
populations (Sprinkle et al., 2002; Storch et al., 2004; Whisman et al., 2000). The 
BDI-II has demonstrated good internal reliability, reliability and validity (alpha = 
.82, test-retest reliability between .65 and .72; Vazquez & Sanz, 1991). 
 
Mood State 
The University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology Mood Adjective 
Checklist (the UWIST-MACL; Matthews et al., 1990) was utilised as in Studies 1 
& 2. The psychometric properties were identified for the UWIST-MACL and 
shown to have good internal reliability and validity for non clinical mood variations 
(Matthews et al., 1990). 
 
Cognitive products 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) was 
utilised as in Study 2. The ATQ has the ability to differentiate between the 
depressed and non-depressed with a high internal consistency, alpha = .96 
(Hollen & Kendall, 1980). Satisfactory psychometrics have been identified 
recently on the ATQ (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2004). 
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Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (CAMQ) 
The Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (modified version AMT; 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986) had the inclusion of ‘now’ and ‘then’ appraisals for 
each of the sub-scales. The same seven retrieval prompts on the cued 
autobiographical questionnaire and the same four neutral cue words lists were 
used as in Study 2. The modified version of the Autobiographical Memory Test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) has been widely used to assess 
autobiographical content and has been found to have good reliability (Williams et 
al., 2007).  
 
Mood Induction 
The intervention phase utilised the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten, 
1968) as in Studies 1 & 2. The Velten Procedure has been found to mimic the 
affective disturbance and behavioural attributes of depressive states (Bates et al., 
1999). 
 
 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Following the same procedure as Study 2, the Beck’s Depression Inventory BDI-
II (Beck & Steer, 1993; Beck et al., 1961) was used as a screening questionnaire 
to assess the level of depression and screen out moderate to severely depressed 
students for their protection. The first addition to the procedure compared with 
Study 2 was that each participant was asked to self-report whether they had 
previously been prescribed treatment for depression symptoms as done 
previously by Persons & Miranda (1992). Those who had a previous treatment 
were considered vulnerable and those without a previous or current history non-
vulnerable. 
 
As with Study 2, groups of twenty to thirty participants at a time were asked to 
complete the Mood Adjective Checklist psychometric measure (the UWIST-
MACL; Matthews et al., 1990). The mood measure provided the baseline mood 
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scores for the study and was the predictor variable. The second addition to the 
procedure was the adapted Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire, which 
asked for appraisals at the time the event occurred (i.e. then) and looking back 
on the event (i.e. now). The cued autobiographical memory task was a modified 
version of the paradigm used by Williams & Broadbent (1986), in which words 
were provided as memory cues. Participants were asked to rate each of the four 
memories on a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from –3 to +3).  
 
The same procedure was followed as detailed in Study 1 for the mood induction 
technique. At time point 2, the same participant group were administered the 
Mood Adjective Checklist measure, Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and the 
cued autobiographical memory task (Word list A & B were used in rotation with 
each group). As with Study 1, the researcher provided debriefing and contact 
details for the student counselling service. 
 
4.2.4 Design and analysis strategy 
The experiment had a within subjects design. The predictor or independent 
variable was mood induction procedure with its effect on mood, which was 
measured by the mood adjective checklist and its four sub-scales (Matthews et 
al., 1990). The outcome variable was the autobiographical content which was 
measured by the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire and its variables. 
This study tested the accessibility of cognitive characteristics of the cued 
autobiographical events in vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals. The 
characteristics of the event were rated at the time the event occurred (i.e. then) 
and looking back on the event (now). The predictor and outcome variables were 
defined and are listed in Table 15 (on the next page).  
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Table 15: List of predictor and outcome variables 
 
Independent/predictor/ 
explanatory 
Variable (s) 
Dependent/outcome  
Variable (s) 
 
 
The University of Wales Institute 
of Science and Technology Mood 
Adjective Checklist (UWIST-
MACL) 
 
Energetic Arousal (EA) 
Tense Arousal (TA) 
Hedonic Tone (HT) 
Anger/frustration (AF) 
 
Cued Autobiographical Memories Questionnaire 
(CAMQ) 
Typicalness, Rumination, Importance of other 
people, Expectancy, Importance of the event for 
self (“Now” and “Then” ratings), Desirability and 
Valence 
 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) 
Personal Maladjustment & Desire for Change 
Negative Self-Concept & Expectations 
Low Self-Esteem and Giving Up/Helplessness 
 
The first outcome variables were obtained from the Cued Autobiographical 
Memory test. Participants rated a number of cognitive characteristics such as: 
how typical, rumination, valence, how important were other people, expectancy, 
desirability and importance for self. The appraisals were rated at the time the 
event occurred (i.e. then) and looking back on the event (i.e. now). The second 
outcome variables were obtained from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
(ATQ). The measure was used to assess the amount and type of negative 
automatic thoughts. The questionnaire had four sub-scales: personal 
maladjustment & desire for change, negative self-concept & expectations, low 
self-esteem and giving up/helplessness.  
 
The same stages in the analysis strategy were followed as detailed in study 2 
section 3.2.4. The two alternations to the analysis strategy involved stage two of 
the analysis strategy. The present study divided participants into vulnerable and 
non-vulnerable rather than symptomatic and non-symptomatic as done in Study 
2. The vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups were categorised as done 
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previously by Persons & Miranda (1992). The second alteration involved the 
inclusion of ‘now’ and ‘then’ appraisals as used by Yang & Rehm (1993) vis-à-vis 
‘present’ and ‘past’ appraisals enabled present and past memories to be 
examined in vulnerable and non-vulnerable recall. The change score inter-
correlations were calculated as detailed in Study 1 in section 2.2.5. Finally, the 
researcher did not predict the exact directional relationship but rather that a 
relationship did exist between mood components and cognitive content in 
negative mood as done in Studies 1 & 2. 
 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The minimum and maximum for the UWIST-MACL sub-scales are 8 to 32 for 
energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone. The minimum score for anger 
sub-scale is 5 and the maximum is 20. The results from the present study show a 
minimum score of 8 to a maximum score of 32 on the three main bipolar and 5 
minimum and 20 maximum on the monopolar scale. Table 16 (on the next page) 
presents the means and standard deviations for scores on the UWIST-MACL 
sub-scales for the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups.  
 
The mean and standard deviation scores for vulnerable participants are in the 
first two columns. Scores on the hedonic tone and energetic arousal scale are 
negatively related to the level of negative mood (low-scaled scores represent 
greater negative mood), whereas higher values reflect a greater negative mood 
on tense arousal and anger/frustration scales. The post mood induction scores 
show increased negative mood on each of the four sub-scales of the UWIST-
MACL.  
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Table 16: Means and standard deviation scores on the UWIST-MACL sub-scales 
pre and post mood induction for vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
 
 
             Vulnerable         Non-vulnerable 
                 Std.             Std. 
              Mean            Deviation         Mean               Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
Energetic arousal  22.15  3.35  22.68  3.65 
Tense arousal   15.52  4.35  14.04  3.81 
Hedonic tone   26.40  3.66  27.82  3.43 
Anger/frustration    8.22  2.72    7.79  3.36 
 
Post mood induction 
Energetic arousal  18.67  4.85  20.27  4.13 
Tense arousal   17.30  4.37  14.35  4.29 
Hedonic tone   23.27  4.66  24.93  4.81 
Anger/frustration  10.04  4.28    9.23  4.02 
 
Table 16 also shows the mean scores for non-vulnerable participants in the last 
two columns. The post mood induction scores show increased negative mood on 
each of the four sub-scales of the UWIST-MACL. Furthermore, the mean the 
UWIST-MACL scores for vulnerable participants show higher values for both pre 
and post mood induction compared with non-vulnerable participants. It is 
important when looking at the UWIST-MACL values to remember that energetic 
arousal and hedonic tone are negatively related to the level of negative mood i.e. 
as hedonic tone scores go down, the level of negative mood goes up. However, 
tense arousal and anger/frustration are positively related to the level of negative 
mood i.e. as anger/frustration goes up, the level of negative mood goes up.  
 
The next table presents the means and standard deviations for the Cued 
Autobiographical Questionnaire for ‘past’ and ‘present’ appraisals in the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups (Table 17 on the next page). The minimum 
score was 1 and the maximum score was 7 on each of these self-rating Likert 
scales. The third column, starting in the first row and then alternate rows, 
represents the mean score over the four cued memories on each of the seven 
outcome variables for vulnerable participants’ ‘past’ appraisals.  
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Table 17: Mean and standard deviation scores on the seven outcome measures 
within the Cued Autobiographical Questionnaire for ‘past’ and ‘present’ appraisals 
in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
 
      Past  appraisals Present appraisals 
 
       Std.    Std. 
Characteristic  Vulnerability  Mean  Deviation  Mean Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
 
Typical   Vunerable  4.23 1.31  2.56 1.13 
   Non-vulnerable 4.39 1.61  3.09 1.53 
Rumination  Vunerable  4.22 1.45  3.21 1.06 
   Non-vulnerable 4.93 1.34  3.47 1.40 
Valence  Vunerable  4.93 1.12  4.95 1.19 
   Non-vulnerable 5.18 1.32  5.07 1.28 
Other people  Vunerable  5.58 1.02  5.07 1.27 
   Non-vulnerable 5.50 1.37  5.31 1.42 
Expected  Vunerable  4.38 1.41  4.40 1.35 
   Non-vulnerable 4.32 1.64  4.34 1.64 
Desirable  Vunerable  5.02 1.34  4.81 1.36 
   Non-vulnerable 4.69 1.35  4.46 1.43 
Personal importance Vunerable  5.14 1.20  4.74 1.37 
   Non-vulnerable 5.04 1.38  5.03 1.41 
 
Post mood induction 
 
Typical   Vunerable  4.49 1.48  3.19 1.64 
   Non-vulnerable 4.16 1.46  3.55 1.54 
Rumination  Vunerable  4.80 1.52  3.20 1.44 
   Non-vulnerable 4.81 1.30  3.77 1.50 
Valence  Vunerable  4.94 1.51  5.02 1.26 
   Non-vulnerable 4.75 1.53  4.87 1.44 
Other people  Vunerable  5.56 1.02  5.28 1.61 
   Non-vulnerable 5.46 1.52  5.37 1.52 
Expected  Vunerable  4.19 1.72  4.39 1.57 
   Non-vulnerable 4.38 1.53  4.46 1.62 
Desirable  Vunerable  4.82 1.62  4.79 1.56 
   Non-vulnerable 4.55 1.71  4.46 1.60 
Personal importance Vunerable  5.55 1.09  5.16 1.20 
   Non-vulnerable 4.98 1.61  5.05 1.46 
 
 
The minimum score is 1.00 and the maximum score is 7.00. Typical scores range 
from 1.00 to 7.00, rumination ranges from 1.00 to 7.00, valence from 1.00 to 
7.00, other people from 3.00 to 7.00, expected from 1.00 to 7.00, desirable from 
1.00 to 7.00 and personal importance from 2.33 to 7.00. The mean score over 
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the four cued memories on each of the seven outcome variables for vulnerable 
participants’ ‘present’ appraisals in column five. Typical scores range from 1.00 to 
6.67, rumination ranges from 1.00 to 5.67, valence from 2.50 to 7.00, other 
people from 1.00 to 7.00, expected from 1.00 to 7.00, desirable from 1.00 to 7.00 
and personal importance from 1.67 to 7.00. There was a good range 
demonstrated on all the self rated measured obtained from the participants on 
the autobiographical questionnaire. 
 
The means and standard deviations for the Cued Autobiographical Questionnaire 
for ‘past’ and ‘present’ appraisals in the non-vulnerable group are also present in 
columns three and five. The third column, starting in the second row and then 
alternate rows, represents the mean score over the four cued memories on each 
of the seven outcome variables for non-vulnerable participants’ ‘past’ appraisals. 
The minimum score is 1.00 and the maximum score was 7.00 for each 
participant. Typical scores range from 1.00 to 7.00, rumination ranges from 1.00 
to 7.00, valence from 1.00 to 7.00, other people from 1.00 to 7.00, expected from 
1.00 to 7.00, desirable from 1.00 to 7.00 and personal importance from 1.00 to 
7.00. The fifth column presents the mean score over the four cued memories on 
each of the seven outcome variables for non-vulnerable participants’ ‘present’ 
appraisals. The minimum score is 1.00 and the maximum score is 7.00 for each 
participant. Typical scores range from 1.00 to 7.00, rumination ranges from 1.00 
to 7.00, valence from 1.00 to 7.00, other people from 1.00 to 7.00, expected from 
1.00 to 7.00, desirable from 1.00 to 7.00 and personal importance from 1.00 to 
7.00. Therefore, there is a good range demonstrated on all the self-rated 
measures obtained from the participants on the autobiographical questionnaire. 
 
4.3.1.1 Mean and standard deviation scores on Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ) in the vulnerable 
Scores on the ATQ can range from 30 to 150.  A high score indicates frequent 
occurrence of negative automatic thoughts. The ATQ contains four sub-scales of 
personal maladjustment (scores can range from 4 to 20) and desire for change 
(scores can range from 7 to 35), negative self-concept and negative expectations 
 124 
(scores can range from 2 to 10), low self-esteem and giving up/helplessness 
(scores can range from 2 to 10). Table 18 presents means and standard 
deviations for scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and its four sub-
scales in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups. 
 
Table 18: Mean and standard deviation scores on the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire and its four sub-scales in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
 
      Vulnerable   Non- vulnerable  
 
      Mean Std.   Mean Std. 
       Deviation    Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
Automatic thoughts (total score)  46.56 11.36  40.49 9.50 
Personal maladjustment  
and desire for change    8.89 2.21  7.20 2.28 
Negative self-concept  
and negative expectations   10.48 3.19  9.35 2.60 
Low self-esteem    2.30 0.67  2.26 0.60 
Giving up/helplessness   2.74 0.90  2.54 0.88 
 
Post mood induction 
Automatic thoughts (total score)  45.42 13.62  41.03 10.85 
Personal maladjustment 
and desire for change    8.50 2.75  7.49 2.43 
Negative self-concept  
and negative expectations   9.96 3.34  9.21 2.96 
Low self-esteem    2.35 0.98  2.32 0.76 
Giving up/helplessness   2.85 1.08  2.59 1.01 
 
The first two columns represent the mean and standard deviation scores for 
vulnerable participants. The total ATQ scores range from 31.00 to 87.00. 
Personal maladjustment and desire for change scores range from 5.00 to 17.00, 
negative self-concept and negative expectations from 7.00 to 22.00, low self-
esteem from 2.00 to 5.00, giving up/helplessness from 2.00 to 6.00. The last two 
columns present the mean and standard deviation scores for non-vulnerable 
participants. The total ATQ scores range from 30.00 to 78.00. Personal 
maladjustment and desire for change scores range from 5.00 to 17.00, negative 
self-concept and negative expectations from 7.00 to 19.00, low self-esteem from 
2.00 to 5.00, giving up/helplessness from 2.00 to 6.00. Therefore, there is a good 
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range demonstrated on all the self-rated measures obtained from the participants 
on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
 
4.3.2 Inferential analysis 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used for the analysis. The 
paired samples t-test was used to test the difference between pre and post mood 
induction scores for each sub-scale on the UWIST-MACL. A power calculation 
was conducted on GPOWER, a general power analysis program (Erdfelder et al., 
1996). A non vulnerable sample size of 72 and a Vulnerable sample size of 27, 
with alpha level set at p = 0.05, a large effect size (r = 0.5), gives 99% and 82% 
power respectively to detect real difference due to treatment effect rather than 
chance.  
 
4.3.3.1 Manipulation check 
The UWIST-MACL was used for subjective evaluation in this study, both as a 
general indicator of mood state and, more specifically, to evaluate changes in 
energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration. Lowered 
energetic arousal equals less active and alert. Increased tense arousal is 
consistent with being more anxious and nervous. Lowered hedonic tone equals 
loss of interest and diminished pleasure response. Increased anger/frustration is 
consistent with more emotional feelings of anger and frustration. Table 19 reports 
‘mood manipulation check’ for mood induction procedure for each of the four 
predictor variables and as so only reports the effect of mood manipulation for the 
overall sample. The separate analysis is reserved for explanatory variables 
between predictor mood component variables and their effects on each outcome 
variable on the cue autobiographical memories. Table 19 (on the next page) 
presents paired t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL and sub-
scales. 
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Table 19: Paired sample t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL 
                                   Pre mood induction  Post mood induction 
  
   Mean Std.   Mean Std.     t (df)              Sig. 
    Deviation   Deviation           (2-tailed) 
 
Energetic arousal  22.53 3.56  19.76 4.31             6.09 (99)        .001***  
 
Tense arousal       14.66 3.97  15.01 4.51            -0.99 (95)     .326  
 
Hedonic tone        27.39 3.57  24.66 4.69  5.66 (89)        .001*** 
 
Anger/frustration 7.78 3.00  9.44 4.08            -4.26 (101)      .001*** 
***  significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).     
**  significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
As expected, there was a significant difference between pre manipulation and 
post manipulation mood ratings on the UWIST-MACL. The results indicated that 
energetic arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration showed a significant 
increase in negative mood (t (99) = 6.09, p < 0.001), (t (89) = 5.66, p < 0.001) 
and  (t (101) = -4.26, p < 0.001) respectively. Tense arousal showed a non-
significant increase in negative mood (t (95) = -.99, p = .326, n.s.). This was in 
the expected direction but was non-significant. Explanation for the result 
observed with tense arousal may be due to the test-retest effect i.e. tense 
arousal measures anxiety which may increase less than expected with retest due 
to it being a more familiar task and counteracting the effects of the increase in 
anxiety due to the effects from the mood induction procedure.  
 
 
4.3.3.2 Paired sample t-tests on the non-vulnerable and vulnerable between pre 
and post mood manipulation 
Table 20 (on the next page) presents paired t- tests on the non-vulnerable and 
vulnerable for ‘past’ and ‘present’ memories in the predictor variables on the cued 
autobiographical questionnaire and sub-scales. 
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Hypothesis 3.1(vii): there was a significant increase in valence for past 
memories in the non-vulnerable following the mood induction procedure. The 
results demonstrated that valence for past memories showed a significant 
increase in the non-vulnerable group (t (73) = 2.27, p < 0.05). Table 20 also 
presents paired t- tests on the non-vulnerable and vulnerable for ‘present’ 
memories in the predictor variables on the cued autobiographical questionnaire 
and sub-scales.  
 
Hypothesis 3.1(i): there was a significant decrease in typicalness in both the 
non-vulnerable and vulnerable groups following the mood induction procedure. 
The results demonstrated that typicalness showed a significant decrease in the 
non-vulnerable (t (74) = -1.97, p < 0.05) and vulnerable (t (25) = -2.29, p < 0.05). 
 
 
Table 20: Paired sample t-tests on the non-vulnerable and vulnerable for ‘past’ and 
‘present’ memories between pre and post mood manipulation 
 
 
 
Paired mean 
differences 
(Pre and post mood 
induction) 
     Past 
 
 
t (df) 
 
Sig. 
 
           Present 
 
 
t (df) 
 
Sig. 
 
     
Non-vulnerable 
Typical  1.00 (74) 0.32 -1.97 (74)  0.05* 
Rumination  0.71 (74) 0.48 -1.57 (73) 0.12 
Valence  2.27 (73)  0.03*  0.97 (74) 0.34 
Other people  0.23 (74) 0.82 -0.16 (74) 0.87 
Expected -0.39 (74) 0.70 -0.64 (74) 0.53 
Desirable  0.57 (74) 0.57 -0.19 (74) 0.85 
Personal importance  0.39 (74) 0.70 -0.08 (74) 0.94 
 
Vulnerable 
Typical 
 
 
-0.70 (25) 
 
 
0.49 -2.29 (25)  0.03* 
Rumination -1.66 (25) 0.11  0.01 (25) 0.99 
Valence -0.05 (25) 0.96 -0.29 (25) 0.77 
Other people  0.06 (25) 0.95 -0.48 (25) 0.63 
Expected  0.56 (25) 0.58 -0.02 (25) 0.98 
Desirable  0.42 (25) 0.68  0.04 (25) 0.97 
Personal importance -1.73 (25) 0.10 -1.36 (25) 0.19 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
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To summarise, the pair samples t-tests indicated no overall significant difference 
between pre and post mood induction procedures. The one exception was 
valence in the non-vulnerable group, which showed a significant increase. The 
second stage of analysis involved the mean and standard deviations being 
calculated for each cued autobiographical memory measure at pre and post 
mood induction. The relationship of interest in the present study was change 
scores between time 1 and time 2 (pre and post mood induction), so the 
differences between measurements was used for the analysis. The change score 
intercorrelations were completed for the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ and 
categorised into past and present memories for the vulnerable and non-
vulnerable in section 4.3.3.3. 
 
4.3.3.3 Intercorrelation of change scores in the UWIST-MACL and the Cued 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (CAMQ) for ‘present’ and ‘past’ 
memories in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups. 
Table 21 (on the next page) presents the Pearson correlation coefficients 
between change scores for the UWIST-MACL and the Cued Autobiographical 
Memory Questionnaire for ‘present’ and ‘past’ memories in the vulnerable and 
non-vulnerable groups. Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05 and all tests 
were two-tailed. 
 
UWIST-MACL change score correlations: Vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
As expected, the significant correlations between the change scores on the 
UWIST-MACL suggested appropriate directional relationships considering that 
scales on hedonic tone and energetic arousal are negatively related to the level 
of negative mood (low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas 
higher values reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and anger/ 
frustration scales. 
 
UWIST-MACL and CAMQ change score intercorrelations: Vulnerable 
The correlations for ‘present’ memories in the vulnerable are represented in 
Table 21 (on the next page).  
T
a
b
le
 2
1
: 
In
te
rc
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 s
c
o
re
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 U
W
IS
T
-M
A
C
L
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 C
u
e
d
 A
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l 
M
e
m
o
ry
 Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
 f
o
r 
‘p
re
s
e
n
t’
 a
n
d
 ‘
p
a
s
t’
 m
e
m
o
ri
e
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 v
u
ln
e
ra
b
le
 a
n
d
 n
o
n
-v
u
ln
e
ra
b
le
 g
ro
u
p
s
 
E
A
T
A
H
T
A
F
T
-A
R
-R
V
-A
O
-P
E
-X
D
-D
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
P
re
se
nt
pa
st
T
A
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
-0
.3
8
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
-0
.1
8
H
T
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
   
0
.7
7*
**
 -
0.
56
**
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
   
0
.6
6*
**
 -
0.
38
**
F
A
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
-0
.2
4
0.
19
0.
00
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
-0
.1
9
 0
.2
8*
  -
0
.4
4*
**
T
-A
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
0.
21
0.
26
-0
.1
1
-0
.2
0
0.
36
0.
35
0.
43
*
-0
.2
4
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
0.
23
0.
14
0.
07
0.
02
0.
12
0.
23
-0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
R
-R
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
-0
.3
8
-0
.0
6
0.
09
-0
.1
6
-0
.2
1
-0
.0
1
0.
31
0.
32
-0
.2
0
0.
24
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
0.
05
0.
03
-0
.2
3
-0
.0
2
0.
24
0.
09
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
2
0.
01
   
0.
44
**
*
V
-A
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
0.
09
-0
.1
5
-0
.3
5
-0
.4
3*
0.
32
0.
22
0.
08
0.
21
-0
.0
8
0.
07
0.
35
 0
.5
3*
*
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
0.
24
*
0.
15
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
6*
0.
05
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
8
0.
16
0.
29
*
0.
15
0.
25
*
O
-P
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
0.
14
0.
16
-0
.5
1*
-0
.4
7*
0.
41
0.
43
0.
00
0.
05
-0
.1
0
0.
07
0.
31
 0
.5
8*
*
  0
.7
5
**
*
  0
.5
9*
*
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
0.
14
0.
11
-0
.2
0
-0
.2
4*
0.
22
0.
09
0.
08
0.
00
0.
13
-0
.0
2
0.
29
*
0.
17
0.
05
0.
01
E
-X
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
0.
29
0.
22
-0
.3
4
-0
.3
8
  
 0
.5
5*
*
0.
51
*
0.
11
0.
04
  
0.
6
3*
**
0.
07
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
6
0.
31
0.
19
0.
33
0.
29
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
0.
19
0.
23
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
1
0.
10
0.
05
-0
.0
1
0.
05
  
0.
4
8*
**
0.
10
0.
08
0.
00
0.
19
 0
.2
4*
0.
20
0.
23
*
D
-D
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
-0
.0
6
0.
13
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
0
0.
19
0.
31
0.
17
0.
17
-0
.0
7
-0
.1
9
0.
18
0.
29
  0
.8
6
**
*
  0
.5
8*
*
  
 0
.6
6
**
*
0.
59
**
0.
33
0.
38
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
-0
.0
4
0.
11
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
8
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
0.
09
0.
05
0.
25
*
0.
13
0.
09
0.
22
  0
.6
4
**
*
   
0.
45
**
*
-0
.0
3
0.
07
  0
.4
0*
**
  0
.3
0*
*
I-
P
V
ul
ne
ra
bl
e
-0
.1
9
0.
14
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
7
0.
01
0.
30
-0
.2
4
0.
03
-0
.2
1
0.
06
0.
42
*
0.
45
*
  0
.5
5*
*
  0
.5
0*
*
0.
42
*
0.
56
**
0.
22
0.
18
0.
43
*
0.
49
*
N
on
-V
u
ln
er
ab
le
0.
03
0.
17
-0
.0
8
-0
.1
7
0.
15
0.
24
0.
05
0.
01
0.
00
0.
33
**
0.
25
*
   
0.
53
**
*
  0
.4
2
**
*
  0
.2
5*
0.
22
0.
22
0.
21
0.
18
  
0.
4
0*
**
  0
.3
8*
**
 
N
o
te
: 
T
-A
 =
T
y
p
ic
a
ln
e
s
s
, 
R
-R
 =
 R
u
m
in
a
ti
o
n
, 
V
-A
 =
 V
a
le
n
c
e
, 
O
-P
 =
 O
th
e
r 
P
e
o
p
le
, 
  
E
-X
 =
 E
x
p
e
c
ta
n
c
y
, 
D
-D
 =
 D
e
s
ir
a
b
ili
ty
, 
I-
P
 =
 I
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 
**
* 
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t 
th
e
 0
.0
0
1
 l
e
v
e
l 
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
  
  
 
**
 
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t 
th
e
 0
.0
1
 l
e
v
e
l 
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
  
  
 
* 
 
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 i
s
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t 
th
e
 0
.0
5
 l
e
v
e
l 
(2
-t
a
ile
d
).
 130 
Hypothesis 3.2 (vii): there was a significant negative correlation between tense 
arousal and valence (r = -0.43, p < 0.05 see Graph 8). This means that, as a 
person’s negative mood increased, the events were more negatively toned.  
 
Graph 8: Scatter plot for change scores between tense arousal and valence for 
present memories 
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Hypothesis 3.2 (iii): there was a second significant negative correlation between 
tense arousal and the importance of other people (r = -0.47, p < 0.05 see Graph 
9 on the next page). This means that, as a person’s negative mood increased, 
the importance of other people in the event decreased.  
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Graph 9: Scatter plot for change scores between tense arousal and importance of 
other people for present memories 
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Hypothesis 3.2 (iv): there was a significant positive correlation found between 
hedonic tone and expectancy (r = 0.51, p < 0.05 see Graph 10). This means that 
as a person’s negative mood increased, the expectancy of the event decreased. 
 
Graph 10: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and expectancy 
for present memories 
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The correlations for ‘past’ memories in the vulnerable start in the fourth column 
and then alternate columns.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2 (iii): there was a significant negative correlation between tense 
arousal and the importance of other people (r = -0.51, p < 0.05 see Graph 11). 
This means that, as a person’s negative mood increased, the importance of other 
people decreased.  
 
Graph 11: Scatter plot for change scores between tense arousal and importance of 
other people for past memories 
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Hypothesis 3.2 (iv): there was a significant positive correlation between hedonic 
tone and expectancy of the event (r = 0.55, p < 0.01 see Graph 12 on the next 
page). This means that, as a person’s negative mood increased, the expectancy 
of the autobiographical event decreased.  
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Graph 12: Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and expectancy 
for past memories 
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Hypothesis 3.2 (i): there was significant positive correlation between anger/ 
frustration and typicalness (r = 0.43, p < 0.05 see Graph 13). This means that as 
a person’s negative mood increased, the typicalness of the autobiographical 
event increased. This means that anger/frustration memories are remembered in 
greater detail. 
 
Graph 13: Scatter plot for change scores between anger/frustration and 
typicalness for past memories 
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Non-vulnerable 
The correlations for ‘present’ memories in the non-vulnerable are also presented 
in Table 21.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2 (vii): there was a significant negative correlation between tense 
arousal and valence (r = -0.26, p < 0.05 see Graph 14). This means that as a 
person’s negative mood increased, there was an increase in negatively toned 
events being recalled.  
 
Graph 14: Scatter plot for change scores between tense arousal and valence for 
present memories 
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Hypothesis 3.2 (iii): there was a significant negative correlation between tense 
arousal and the importance of other people (r = -0.24, p < 0.05 see Graph 15 on 
the next page). This means that as a person’s negative mood increased, the 
importance of other people decreased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 135 
Graph 15: Scatter plot for change scores between tense arousal and importance of 
other people for present memories 
5.002.500.00-2.50
PersonalImportancePresent
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
-5.00
-10.00
T
e
n
s
e
A
ro
u
s
a
l
R Sq Linear = 0.034
 
The correlations for ‘past’ memories in the non-vulnerable start in the fourth 
column and then alternate columns.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2 (vii): a significant positive correlation was found between 
energetic arousal and valence (r = 0.24, p < 0.05 see Graph 16 on the next 
page). This indicates that as a person’s energetic arousal increased, there was 
an associated decrease in positive feelings.  
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Graph 16: Scatter plot for change scores between energetic arousal and valence 
for past memories 
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CAMQ change score correlations: Vulnerable 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ  for ‘present’ memories in 
the vulnerable indicated that key features such as valence demonstrated positive 
correlations with other people (r = 0.59, p < 0.01), desirability (r = 0.58, p < 0.01) 
and personal importance (r = 0.50, p < 0.01). The results indicated that as 
valence became more negative, cognitive aspects such as desirability and 
personal importance of the event decreased. Personal importance demonstrated 
positive correlations with rumination (r = 0.45, p < 0.05), valence (r = 0.50, p < 
0.01) and other people (r = 0.56, p < 0.01). The results indicated that as personal 
importance of the event increased, cognitive aspects such as rumination and 
valence increased.  
 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ  for ‘past’ memories in 
the vulnerable indicated that key features such as valence demonstrated 
consistent positive correlations with other people (r = 0.75, p < 0.001), desirability 
(r = 0.86, p < 0.001) and personal importance (r = 0.55, p < 0.01). The results 
indicated that as valence became more negative, cognitive aspects such as the 
involvement of other people, desirability and personal importance of the event 
decreased. Personal importance demonstrated consistent positive correlations 
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with rumination (r = 0.42, p < 0.01), valence (r = 0.55, p < 0.01) and other people 
(r = 0.42, p < 0.05). The results indicated that as personal importance of the 
event increased, cognitive aspects such as rumination, valence and other people 
increased.  
 
Non-vulnerable 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ for ‘present’ memories in 
the non-vulnerable indicated that key features such as valence demonstrated 
positive correlations with expectancy (r = 0.24, p < 0.05), desirability (r = 0.45, p 
< 0.001) and personal importance (r = 0.25, p < 0.05). The results indicated that 
as valence became more negative, cognitive aspects such as expectancy, 
desirability and personal importance of the event decreased. Personal 
importance demonstrated positive correlations with typicalness (r = 0.33, p < 
0.01), rumination (r = 0.53, p < 0.001) and valence (r = 0.25, p < 0.05). The 
results indicated that as personal importance of the event increased, cognitive 
aspects such as typicalness, rumination and valence increased. 
 
The change correlations between sub-scales on CAMQ for ‘past’ memories in the 
non-vulnerable indicated that key features such as valence demonstrated 
positive correlations with desirability (r = 0.64, p < 0.001) and personal 
importance (r = 0.42, p < 0.001). The results indicated that as valence became 
more negative, cognitive aspects such as desirability and personal importance of 
the event decreased. Personal importance demonstrated positive correlations 
with rumination (r = 0.25, p < 0.05) and valence (r = 0.42, p < 0.001). The results 
indicated that as personal importance of the event increased, cognitive aspects 
such as rumination and valence increased. 
 
To summarise, the change score intercorrelations showed an overall 
responsiveness of cognitive reactivity in the vulnerable group compared with the 
overall diffuse response observed in the non-vulnerable group. 
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4.3.3.4 Intercorrelation of change scores in the four sub-scales on the UWIST-
MACL and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) and its four sub-scales 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ) was used to assess frequency of 
automatic thoughts (Hollon & Kendall, 1980). It is an instrument designed to 
identify and measure the frequency of automatic thoughts associated with 
depression. Table 22 (on the next page) presents the Pearson correlation 
between the UWIST-MACL and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and sub-
scales. Statistical significance was set at p < 0.05 and all tests were two-tailed. 
 
As expected, the correlations between the change scores on the UWIST-MACL 
suggested appropriate directional relationships considering that scales on 
hedonic tone and energetic arousal are negatively related to the level of negative 
mood (low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas higher 
values reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and anger/frustration 
scales. 
 
UWIST-MACL and ATQ change score intercorrelations 
The correlations between the change scores between the UWIST-MACL and the 
ATQ are presented in Table 22 (on the next page).  
 
Hypothesis 3.3: there was a significant negative correlation between hedonic 
tone and ATQ. Hedonic tone demonstrated a significant increase in negative 
mood, which showed significant negative correlations with the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (r = -0.29, p < 0.01), personal maladjustment and desire 
for change (r = -0.31, p < 0.01), negative self-concept and negative expectations 
(r = 0.26, p < 0.05) and low self-esteem (r = 0.23, p < 0.05). This means that, as 
a person’s negative mood increased, the amount of automatic thoughts, personal 
maladjustment and desire for change, negative self-concept and negative 
expectations and self-esteem decreased. 
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ATQ change score inter-correlations 
The change correlations between sub-scales on the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire indicated significant positive correlations in the expected direction 
between all sub-scales: personal maladjustment and desire for change, negative 
self-concept and negative expectations, low self-esteem and giving up/ 
helplessness. 
 
To summarise, an overall increase in negative automatic thoughts as measured 
by the ATQ was observed with overall increase in negative mood as measured 
by the UWIST-MACL mood measures. 
 
4.3.3.5 Post hoc examination of the difference between vulnerable and non-
vulnerable correlations between anger/frustration and rumination 
The researcher was interested in whether the relationships between the 
rumination correlations in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups were 
statistically different. The Pearson's correlation for rumination on the four the 
UWIST-MACL sub-scales between vulnerable and non-vulnerable were 
analysed, with anger/frustration showing a significant difference. Anger/frustration 
correlations were -0.16 for the vulnerable group and 0.31 for the non-vulnerable 
group. The procedure for computing a confidence interval on the difference 
between two independent correlations involved the construction of Z values. The 
value of Z can be applied to assess the significance of the difference between 
two correlation coefficients. The Z values with corresponding correlations and a 
p-value are produced in Table 23.  
 
Table 23: Difference between vulnerable and non-vulnerable Pearson’s r 
correlations in rumination 
 
R1  N1   R2  N2  Zf1  Zf2        Z           p 
Pearson’s r (non-    Pearson’s r (vulnerable)  (non-  (vulner 
(non-   vulner      (vulnerable)    vulner  -able)   
vulnerable) -able)        -able)   
 
0.31   26   -0.16  73  0.32  -0.16       1.99      0.047 
 
Z = 1.99 p < 0.05 
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Hypothesis 3.2 (ii): there was a significant difference in rumination between 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups (Z = 1.99 p < 0.05) for anger/frustration, 
with the vulnerable group showing an increase in rumination and the non-
vulnerable group showing a decrease in rumination. 
 
4.3.3.6 Post hoc examination of the difference between rumination for ‘past' 
appraisals for vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups  
The computation of the value of the Mann-Whitney U test involved comparing the 
pre and post scores, ranking the absolute values of the difference scores, and 
then finding the Mean Rank for all the cases. It is a non-parametric test for 
assessing whether two samples of observations come from the same distribution. 
The null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from a single population, 
and therefore that their probability distributions are equal. The Mann-Whitney U 
test is virtually identical to performing an ordinary parametric two-sample t-test on 
the data after ranking the combined samples. Table 24 presents the mean rank 
‘past’ appraisals for rumination in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable. 
 
Table 24: Post hoc examination of the difference between Mean Rank rumination 
for pre and post ‘past’ appraisals for vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
 
 ∆  Mean rank    Mean rank 
   Pre mood induction  Post mood induction 
 
Vulnerable  41.00    52.25 
 
Non-vulnerable 56.53    50.57 
Z = -2.306, p = 0.021 
 
 
Hypothesis 3.2 (ii): there was a significant difference between pre and post 
manipulation mean rank rumination scores for ‘past’ appraisals for vulnerable and 
non-vulnerable groups (Z = -2.306, p < 0.05). The results suggested that 
vulnerable individuals ruminate more post manipulation than non-vulnerable 
individuals, who ruminate less post manipulation for ‘past’ appraisals. 
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4.3.3.7 Post hoc examination of the difference between rumination for ‘past' and 
‘present’ appraisals for vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to test the difference between vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable groups. The test involved computing the difference scores, 
ranking the absolute values of the difference scores, and then finding the Mean 
Rank for all the cases. This two-sample test may be thought of as testing the null 
hypothesis that the probability of an observation from one population exceeding 
an observation from the second population is 0.5. Table 25 presents the mean 
rank difference between ‘past’ and ‘present’ appraisals for rumination in the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable. 
 
 
Table 25: Post hoc examination of Mean Rank rumination for ‘past’ and ‘present’ 
appraisals for vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
 
 ∆  Mean rank    Mean rank 
   Rumination   Rumination 
   ‘past’    ‘present’ 
 
Vulnerable  60.54    46.42 
 
Non-vulnerable 47.69    51.93 
Z = -1.928, p = 0.054, n.s. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1 (ii): there was a non significant difference in post manipulation 
mean rank rumination scores for ‘past’  and ‘present’ appraisals between 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups (Z = -1.928, p = 0.054, n.s.). The results 
suggested that vulnerable individuals do not ruminate more about ‘past’ than 
‘present’ memories and non-vulnerable individuals do not ruminate more about 
‘present’ than ‘past’ memories due to the non significant result. 
 
To summarise the post hoc calculations, there was a significant difference 
between vulnerable and non-vulnerable correlations between anger/frustration 
and rumination. There was also an overall significant difference observed 
between vulnerable individuals that ruminate more than non-vulnerable 
individuals but only for ‘past’ appraisals post mood manipulation. The differences 
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in the rumination between vulnerable and non-vulnerable participants may 
indicate a coping strategy in non-vulnerable individuals. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
The results and their interpretation are tentative in the light of the exploratory 
nature and the lack of correction for multiple testing. The study described here 
was designed to explore the effects of mood manipulation on the cognitive 
content of cued autobiographical memories in vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
groups. Miranda et al. (1998) experimentally induced low mood in participants 
and found that vulnerable individuals reported increased cognitive structures, 
whereas non-vulnerable individuals reported decreased cognitive structures. This 
so called ‘mood-state hypothesis’ as suggested by Miranda et al. (1988) 
suggests that low mood acts as a primer to negative cognitive structures. This fits 
in well with Beck’s theory (Beck, 1967 & 1987) by suggesting that low mood acts 
to prime latent negative cognitive structures into action. Bower’s associative 
network theory (Bower, 1981 & 1987) accounts for the second observation that 
mood instigates negative cognitive structures but only in the previously 
depressed and not in the never depressed. Negative cognitive structures, once 
activated, will negatively influence the individual’s coping style and automatic and 
self-compensatory strategies (Beevers, Rohde, Stice & Holen-Hoeksema, 2007).  
 
4.4.1 Intercorrelation of change scores indicated that autobiographical retrieval 
showed reactivity in those with a previous history 
The key finding in the present study suggests that vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
individuals have different specificity of cognitive content following a mood 
induction procedure. This supports Hypothesis 3.2 that there would be a 
difference between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable. The results suggested 
that the vulnerable group showed cognitive bias under mood stress, with other 
people being seen as less important and future events being evaluated as less 
certain. This supports Hypothesis 3.1 (iii and iv) that there would be a change in 
these characteristics. This is congruent with previous empirical research by 
Beevers et al. (2007) showing that those with a previous history of depression 
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displayed a deviation in certain cognitive characteristics when compared to never 
depressed controls. The study by Beevers et al. (2007) used naturally occurring 
mood instead of a mood induction.  
 
The present findings also indicated that the valence for memories of present 
events compared to past events in the vulnerable was endorsed more negatively, 
in line with previous findings (Serrano, Latorre & Gatz, 2007; Yang & Rehm, 
1993). This supports Hypothesis 3.1 vii that there would be a difference in 
present and past appraisals. In contrast, the valence endorsements for memories 
of present and past events had equal negativity and other people were viewed as 
being more important for the non-vulnerable group. This supports Hypothesis 3.2 
vii that there would be a difference between the vulnerable and the non-
vulnerable. Overall, the vulnerable group showed a non-diffuse negative bias in 
cognitive reactivity under mood stress. 
 
4.4.2 Intercorrelation of change scores indicated that automatic negative 
thoughts were reactive to temporary negative mood state 
The results from this study provide further collaborative support that negative 
mood is possibly a good predictor of negative automatic thoughts as measured 
by the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ). The greater the negative mood 
as measured by the UWIST-MACL, the greater the frequency of negative 
automatic thoughts reported by participants. Hedonic tone was the best predictor 
of negative automatic thoughts, with it correlating with personal maladjustment 
and desire for change, negative self concept and negative expectations, low self 
esteem and giving up/helplessness. This supports Hypothesis 3.3 that there 
would be a change in automatic thoughts. Automatic thoughts are seen as 
relatively accessible content for research purposes and reflect salient schema at 
that point in time (Calvete & Connor-Smith, 2005). The present research supports 
the accessibility of automatic thoughts which seem to reflect the mood state of 
the individual. Interestingly, the cued autobiographical content seems to 
represent a second higher level of content, which showed diffuse findings 
compared to the ATQ non-diffuse results. 
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The results provide collaborative evidence that supports studies 1 & 2, which 
suggest that the mood induction procedure produces significant mood change, 
with participants showing more anxiety and nervousness, diminished pleasure 
and increased feelings of anger and frustration. The three significant changes 
were hedonic tone, energetic arousal and anger/frustration. Low levels of hedonic 
tone reported are associated with unpleasant and sad mood sates. Low levels of 
energetic arousal as reported in the present study are associated with states 
such as lethargy, tiredness and weariness. High levels of anger/frustration are 
associated with mood states that are negative in tone but activating states such 
as fear and anger. Tense arousal was in the right direction but non-significant. 
High levels of tense arousal are related to states such as nervousness and 
agitation. These results support the proposals that the mood induction technique 
results in negative mood change in individuals.  
 
4.4.3 Anger/frustration correlated with increased rumination in vulnerable 
In the current study, a post hoc examination was conducted to further interrogate 
the cognitive bias in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable (Hypothesis 3.2 ii). The 
post hoc examination was designed to examine the impact of mood on 
rumination. The effect of mood on rumination and its resultant impact on 
autobiographical memory and cognitive content is seen as pivotal in 
understanding the relationship between mood and autobiographical memory 
content. Pearson's correlation for rumination on the four the UWIST-MACL sub-
scales between vulnerable and non-vulnerable was analysed, with 
anger/frustration showing a significant difference. Anger/frustration rumination is 
similar to sadness rumination but with thinking being repeatedly about past 
experiences of anger (Sukhodolsky, Golub & Cromwell, 2001). The present 
findings support the observations by Segal et al. (2002) which emphasized that 
small changes in mood are sufficient to activate cognitive styles in cognitively 
vulnerable individuals who tend to ruminate more easily about recalled events. 
This supports Hypothesis 3.2 ii that there would be a difference between the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable. Interestingly, the non-vulnerable individuals 
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showed reduced ruminative processing when exposed to negative mood. This 
finding supports Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) research that non-vulnerable 
individuals differ from vulnerable individuals in the ability to circumvent 
rumination.  
 
4.4.4 Post hoc mean rank scores for rumination are higher in memories for past 
appraisals in the vulnerable group 
The effect of mood on rumination was more globally observed by examining the 
mean rank rumination for all scores on the UWIST-MACL for present and past 
memories. The present research suggests that vulnerable participants ruminate 
more post mood induction about ‘past’ appraisals (see Table 24). This supports 
Hypothesis 3.1 ii that there would be a difference in ruminative response in cued 
recall. This is congruent with previous empirical findings that suggest that 
rumination correlates with self-statements about inability to control past recall, 
such as: ‘It is impossible to stop thinking about past problems’ (Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2001 & 2003). The present study also showed that non-vulnerable 
participants ruminate less about ‘past’ appraisals in negative mood state. This is 
congruent with research by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) suggesting that some 
participants were more concerned with present and future originated worries 
compared with other participants whom seem to be concerned with past worries. 
It is noted that neither the Papageorgiou & Wells (2003) nor the Nolen-Hoeksema 
et al. (2008) studies explicitly check for previous history or vulnerability, but it 
does show that differences in ruminative content exist, and future and past 
origination seem to be important variables. 
 
It is interesting to note two main theoretical processes that could be operating 
upon cognitive content and may help provide a theoretical explanation for the 
findings (Williams et al., 1997). These are priming and elaboration. It is argued 
that those with a previous history of depression show elaborative processes that 
concentrate on negative self-referent information more than the never depressed. 
It is also suggested that depression affects the active strategic elements of 
memory retrieval, enhancing the recall of negative material from previous past 
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events (Williams et al., 1997). The findings from the present research tentatively 
provide some supportive data for increased ruminative content in the vulnerable, 
and some indirect data about enhancing the recall for past events.  
 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
The present study supports previous findings that negative mood may be 
instigating negative cognitive structures selectively in the vulnerable but not in the 
non-vulnerable, which is taken to support Bower’s associative network theory 
(Bower, 1981 & 1987). The results also suggest that there are differences 
between vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals in the amount they ruminate 
about the event, with vulnerable individuals showing an increased rumination 
while non-vulnerable show decreased rumination post mood induction. There 
was no direct evidence supporting Hypothesis 3.1 (i, v and vi). There is some 
evidence in the present study for differential self-referent coping strategies 
between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable, supporting the mood state 
hypothesis and hinting at a self-regulatory coping strategy that involves the 
degree to which rumination is engaged or disengaged.  
 
The affective prime did result in changes on endorsements of autobiographical 
cognitive content. The present study supports Hypothesis 3.1 (iii, iv and vii) that a 
temporary negative mood state in the vulnerable group showed significant 
cognitive reactivity resulting in a change in importance of other people (i.e. 
decrease) and a change in expectancy (i.e. decrease) with increased tense 
arousal and a change in valence of recalled memories (i.e. decrease) with 
increased hedonic tone. Autobiographical technique showed that mood induction 
could cue significant changes in autobiographical appraisals of rumination which 
showed increased rumination in vulnerable group. The present study supports 
Hypothesis 3.1 ii that there would be a change in this characteristic. The findings 
from the present research are in line with previous research which shows there is 
an increase in rumination in the previously depressed group compared to those 
without previous depressive episodes under mood stress (Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990). The present study found that rumination was higher in 
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memories for past appraisals in the vulnerable group when in temporary negative 
mood state.  
 
The findings suggest that a temporary negative mood state in the non-vulnerable 
group showed a significant decrease in rumination with increased negative mood. 
It is not known if this is a direct consequence of negative mood or represents a 
lack of the presence of previous history of depression or any other third variable. 
This is consistent with top-down hierarchical search from semantic, categorical to 
specific memories. Negative mood is proposed to result in a truncated search, in 
which individuals prematurely abandon their search at a higher, less specific 
stage containing overgeneral memory and ruminative style (Williams et al., 
2006b). This seems to explain the finding within the vulnerable group, which 
showed increased rumination, and the non-vulnerable group, which showed 
decreased rumination. 
 
However, the present research has not disentangled the vulnerability factors that 
may be the consequence of having had a previous episode of depression, and 
factors that contributed to dispositional depressive symptoms. Given the 
evidence from this study (supporting Hypotheses 3.1 ii, iii, iv and vii, 3.2 and 3.3) 
and its limitations (no evidence supporting Hypothesis 3.1 i, v and vi), it could 
prove fruitful to examine cognitive content within the retrieved autobiographical 
memories in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable and the symptomatic and non-
symptomatic in the same study. It can be predicted that cognitive content might 
be reactive to the same extent if latent cognitive styles are present in both 
groups. This is therefore addressed in the next study. 
 149 
CHAPTER 5 
 
STUDY 4: Autobiographical memory responsiveness to an induced 
negative mood state: Self-focused cognitive appraisals in those self-
reporting vulnerability or depressive symptoms. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Study 3 found that autobiographical retrieval showed some cognitive reactivity in 
those with a previous history. The findings suggested that negative mood may be 
instigating cognitive content selectively in the vulnerable but not in the non-
vulnerable. The results also suggested that there are differences between 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals in the amount they ruminate about an 
event, with vulnerable individuals showing an increased rumination while non-
vulnerable show decreased rumination. The result suggested that the vulnerable 
group showed cognitive bias, with future events being evaluated as less certain 
and other people being seen as less important. In contrast, other people were 
viewed as being more important for the non-vulnerable group. Rumination was 
another cognitive style which was higher in the vulnerable for past memories. 
Overall, the vulnerable group showed a non-diffuse negative bias in cognitive 
reactivity under mood stress. 
 
The present study builds on this initial evidence for low mood affecting 
autobiographical retrieval by further examining whether the cognitive content 
following a negative mood induction procedure is sensitive to mood change in 
vulnerable and symptomatic groups. The focus in the present study was 
observing and measuring the change in content against the entity of negative 
mood state rather than individual negative mood components, which were 
undertaken previously in Studies 1-3. Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) suggests that 
negative mood affects the way in which the vulnerable or symptomatic respond 
cognitively. The vulnerable and symptomatic responded by increasing self-
focused behavior, which seemed to increases ruminative response style (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990). Self-focused memories suggest a heightened self-awareness 
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of internally generated information rather than awareness of externally generated 
information (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Self-focused attention has been 
associated with increased cognitive reactivity and diffuse memory (Chentsova-
Dutton & Tsai, 2010). In the present study, the researcher sought to add to the 
literature by looking at self-focused autobiographical memories in vulnerable and 
symptomatic groups to determine the effects of negative mood on 
autobiographical content.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that how a person thinks about self can trigger or 
confer depressive vulnerability (Dozois & Dobson, 2001 & 2003). Self-referent 
cognitions are known to be relapse markers for depression (Segal et al., 1999), 
and therefore might represent a possible moderating factor. The literature 
suggests that moderating factors might be activated by temporary mood state 
(Miranda et al., 1998; Miranda & Persons, 1998). Self focused memories were 
operationally defined as a moderator variable as it might be helpful in explaining 
the strength of the relationship that exists between mood and cued 
autobiographical memory. To date, however, little research has investigated the 
effects of mood state on self-focused autobiographical content. Therefore the 
present study turns its attention to self-focused autobiographical content. Figure 
6 (on the next page) shows the potential for self-focused memories acting to 
moderate autobiographical recall. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
Figure 6: Self focused memories as a moderator in symptomatic and vulnerable 
groups 
Negative Mood Autobiographical recall
Self-focused 
memories
 
The cognitive content of autobiographical memory is agreed to contain self-
related knowledge that represents specific experiences from episodic memory 
(Conway, 1990 & 2001). Another defining feature of autobiographical memory is 
that it contains self-related material which can also be held at a generic and 
semantic level rather than a specific episodic event. Recent research has 
concentrated on this feature of autobiographical memory retrieval, that is, the 
level of specificity over generality of the self-related knowledge. Research 
interest in autobiographical memory suggests that negative mood can instigate 
vulnerable individuals to focus on self-related knowledge which is retrieved in a 
more overgeneral fashion and tends to be more personally focused in the 
depressed than the non-depressed (Just & Alloy, 1997; Roberts, Gilboa & Gotlib, 
1988).  
 
The autobiographical memory model proposed by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 
(2000) has suggested that retrieval of specific information on episodic memories 
is influenced by the goal structure of the ‘working self’. It is the goal structure 
which is stored in the autobiographical knowledge base that drives recall of 
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certain autobiographical memories.  An implication of this model is that 
depressed individuals selectively retrieve memories related to their dysphoric 
mood which are concerned about goal attainment being obstructed by poor self 
image, lack of instrumental support from others and a future that looks bleak 
(Williams et al., 2006a). Hence, the model suggests that because the dysphoric 
individual is concerned about these frustrated past goals, they then perceive 
themselves as obstructed individuals in the present (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). They therefore tend to selectively recall memories of negative past events 
that reinforce the perception that they are indeed obstructed in the present. This 
is then represented as a self-defining view of oneself in the ‘working self’ 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). These semantic associations are a far more 
important aspect of autobiographical content than categoric memories (Williams, 
2000). According to Conway & Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) hierarchical model, 
semantic associations are situated at a higher level in the self-memory system 
than categoric memories and represent overgeneral semantic personal 
information in the self-memory system (Raes et al., 2007).  
 
In pursuit of the content of autobiographical information that represents low mood 
during transient negative mood, it is recognised that cued autobiographical 
memory has hitherto concentrated more on the valence of memories without 
extracting personally important events that represent the ‘working self’ (Mor & 
Winquist, 2002). The following two studies will readdress this methodological 
problem by requesting participants to provide six ‘I am’ statements (Moulin, 
Rathbone & Conway, 2006, cited in Conway 2005) that will focus attention on 
self-defining memories while avoiding the specific request to focus on a specific 
memory that may direct the individuals to search the hierarchy for categoric 
rather than personally important semantic memories in the self-memory system 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). 
 
The present study focuses on self-focused memories to measure implicit 
processes in a cued recall procedure by asking participants to rate the memory 
event on a number of endorsements (e.g. typicalness, rumination etc) that are of 
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interest to researchers who are concerned with investigating and accounting for 
mental content in negative mood states. Implicit memory is ‘without conscious 
awareness’ and automatic, thus has limited impact on working memory 
processing resources (Watkins et al., 2000b) 
 
5.1.1 Purpose of the study 
This study sought to understand the effect of negative mood on cognitive content 
within self-focused autobiographical memories in those self-reporting vulnerability 
or depressive symptoms. The idea of the present study is to evoke self-focused 
memories by asking participants to rate the memory on a number of 
characteristics. The characteristics were: typicalness, rumination, importance of 
other people, expectancy and valence of the recalled event. These 
characteristics represent key components of autobiographical memory in the 
literature, which have been introduced in Chapter 3. These cognitive attributes 
have been suggested to guide appraisal and interact with mood state to influence 
memory search and attention. There appears to be limited and indirect research 
available to demonstrate how these variables are influenced by current negative 
mood in those self-reporting vulnerability or depressive symptoms in one study. 
The influence of mood on autobiographical memory appears to be generally 
consistent with the predictions for the characteristics made in Chapter 3. 
 
To address the general aim of how mood affects autobiographical retrieval, 
participants rated a number of characteristics, endorsing them on an analogue 
scale. The endorsements were then observed pre and post mood induction and 
observed against four dimensions of negative mood as measured by the UWIST-
MACL (Matthews et al., 1990). The general aim was propagated in response to 
the lack of research investigating how mood affects the recalled content in 
autobiographical memories. Furthermore, by examining the influence of 
vulnerability and its effects on accessibility of the cognitive products, it was hoped 
that the importance of previous history and depressive symptomatology in the 
presence of temporary mood state could be elucidated. 
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The present study employed a non-clinical sample to examine the mean 
difference in change scores at t1 and t2 in recalled autobiographical content 
whilst examining the influence of vulnerability and depressive symptomatology.  
A sample of students underwent autobiographical memory tests focusing on the 
memory appraisal before and after a negative mood induction procedure. The 
content held within autobiographical memory may be affected by such negative 
mood shifts. There appears to be a lack of research investigating how negative 
mood affects autobiographical memory content. 
 
In summary, the influence of negative mood on autobiographical memory 
appears to be generally consistent with the expectations for the seven 
characteristics in section 3.2.3; negative mood may result in change in 
typicalness, desirability and increased rumination, importance of other people, 
expectancy and negatively valenced events. These characteristics may be more 
pronounced in individuals with vulnerability and depressive symptomatology. The 
present research investigated the differences between dimensions of mood as 
measured by the UWIST-MACL, and effects on both cognitive content and 
memory changes on the free recall of autobiographical memories. The 
autobiographical memories were investigated in those with and without a 
previous history of depression and those with and without depressive 
symptomatology. The highlighted characteristics of autobiographical memory 
have emerged from research and opened up further questions on the effects of 
negative mood on autobiographical content.  
 
The present study was designed to address two areas of uncertainty concerning 
mood effects on autobiographical retrieval: 
 
(a) Is autobiographical retrieval more reactive to self-focused memories? 
 
(b) Is there a change in endorsements on autobiographical memories between 
those participants self-reporting vulnerability or non-vulnerability and in 
those self-reporting depressive symptoms or no depressive symptoms? 
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From these general aims, a number of specific hypotheses were developed to 
investigate the effects of mood on autobiographical retrieval. It was hypothesised 
that negative mood would predict a change from pre to post mood induction in 
the endorsements on the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire – 
specifically that negative mood would predict a change in endorsements of: 
 
i) typicalness in cued autobiographical recall (Coluccia et al., 2006) 
ii) ruminative response in cued recall (Williams et al., 2006a 
iii) negative evaluation of the importance of other people (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
iv) the ability to conceptualize and judge the likelihood of future events in 
cued recall (Williams et al., 2006a) 
v) personal importance of cued memory recall (Williams et al., 2008) 
 
vi) desirability in cued memory recall (Ryan & Deci, 2000) 
vii) valence in cued memory recall (Walker et al., 2003). 
 
H 4.1 It was hypothesised that there would be a change from pre to post mood 
induction in the endorsements on the cued autobiographical memory 
characteristics i-vii above 
 
H 4.2 It was also hypothesised that there would be a difference between the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable endorsements for characteristics i-vii above. 
 
H 4.3 It was also hypothesised that there would be a difference between the 
symptomatic and non-symptomatic endorsements for characteristics i-vii above. 
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
The participants were made up of 33 student volunteers from the University of 
Chester, providing reasonable power for statistical and correlational analysis. 
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Students in the present study had not participated in the previous studies. The 
sample was comprised of participants who were recruited from cohorts of 
students in the Faculty of Health and Social Care. Participants were recruited in 
groups of approximately sixteen, and underwent the group procedure (detailed in 
the procedures section). 11 participants were excluded for their own protection 
on the basis of their high BDI-2 score (see section 2.2.3 for ethical procedure and 
support offered to all participants). A power calculation was conducted on 
GPOWER, a general power analysis program (Erdfelder et al., 1996). Sample 
size of 33, with alpha level set at p = 0.05, a large effect size (r = 0.5), gives 94% 
power to detect real difference due to treatment effect, rather than chance.  
 
Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Departmental Ethics Committee 
prior to data collection, and ethical approval for access to students was granted 
from the Faculty of Health and Social Care Ethics Committee prior to recruitment 
of participants.  
 
5.2.2 Materials and measures 
Along with the mood induction procedure, the following five psychometric 
materials and measures were utilised in this study: 
 
Depressive Symptomatology 
The Beck Depression Inventory – Version 2 (Beck et al., 1996) was utilised as in 
Study 2. The BDI-II has demonstrated good internal reliability, reliability and 
validity (alpha = .82, test-retest reliability between .65 and .72; Vazquez & Sanz, 
1991). 
 
Vulnerability to Depression 
The vulnerability to depression questionnaire as previously used by Persons & 
Miranda (1992) was utilised as in Study 3. Participants were asked to self-report 
whether they had previously been prescribed treatment for depression 
symptoms, and the asked to select one or more treatments, including 
pharmacology, cognitive behavioural therapy and counselling. Those who had 
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received previous treatment were considered vulnerable and those had not and 
were without a current history were classified as non-vulnerable. 
 
Mood State 
The University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology Mood Adjective 
Checklist (the UWIST-MACL; Matthews et al., 1990) was utilised as in Study 1. 
The psychometric properties were identified for the UWIST-MACL and shown to 
have good internal reliability and validity for non-clinical mood variations 
(Matthews et al., 1990). 
 
Manipulation of attention ‘on the self’ 
The inclusion of six ‘I am’ prompts was an addition to previous studies and was 
used to elicit the roles/traits utilised by Moulin et al. (2006, cited in Conway 
2005). This manipulation was used to focus the participants’ attention on self-
cued autobiographical memories. The ‘I am’ statements were a variant of the 
Twenty Sentence Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954; more recent Gardner, 
Gabriel & Lee, 1999). Participants were instructed to list nine statements that 
defined themselves, each statement beginning with the words ‘I am’ followed by 
a space to complete the sentence. The modified version of the TST has been 
used to assess autobiographical content and has been found to have good 
reliability (Kuhnen & Hannover & Schubert, 2001). 
 
Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (CAMQ) 
The modified version of the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986) has been widely used to assess autobiographical content and 
has been found to have good reliability (Williams et al., 2007). The explicit 
instruction to focus on specific memories was removed, which contrasts with 
previous studies within this research project. The cueing technique was the same 
as used in Studies 1 to 3, with eleven cue words instead of four cue words 
(Appendix 8c). The four original words from list A were ‘bike’, ‘tree’, ‘shed’ and 
‘supermarket’. The additional words from list A were ‘car’, ‘flower’, ‘garage’, 
‘shop’, ‘house’, ‘road’ and ‘garden’. The additional seven cue words were 
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introduced to match the comparative procedure in Study 5, which used eleven 
sentence completion statements to assess overgeneral vs. specific content. 
These cued events were scored and rated as done in preceding studies. Eleven 
neutral cue words were provided as cues and participants rated each memory 
against the listed cognitive events.  
 
Mood manipulation 
The intervention phase utilised the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten, 
1968) as in Study 2. The Velten Procedure has been found to mimic the affective 
disturbance and behavioural attributes of depressive states (Bates et al., 1999). 
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
Study 4 followed the same procedure as Study 3, with the two procedural 
changes. The first change involved the inclusion of the manipulation on to self-
focused memories high in personal self-related knowledge. This procedure was 
implemented to increase self-focused autobiographical content.  
 
The second change was to the administration of the cued autobiographical 
memory task. The questionnaire had eleven cue words instead of the previous 
four cue words. This was so it would match as closely as possible the sentence 
completion task in Study 5, which had eleven cue word stems. The questionnaire 
was administered without the explicit instruction to focus on specific memories, in 
contrast to previous studies within this research project.  
 
5.2.4 Design & analysis strategy 
The experiment had a within subjects design. The predictor or independent 
variable was mood induction procedure with its effect on the individual’s mood, 
which was measured by the mood adjective checklist and its four sub-scales 
(Matthews et al., 1990). The outcome variable was the autobiographical content, 
which was measured by the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire and 
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its five response variables. The predictor and outcome variables were defined 
and are listed in Table 26. 
 
The first stage of the analysis involved the completion of the pre and post scores 
on the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ. The recorded participant number allowed 
matching for pre and post scores for each participant and the mean score 
calculated over eleven cue words. An appropriate test of difference on mean 
scores on the UWIST-MACL and CAMQ was performed on the data to determine 
statistical significance. The test of difference, such as a t-test, is usually 
performed if the data does not differ significantly from a normal distribution. 
Normality in this instance was determined using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
 
Table 26: List of predictor and outcome variables 
 
Independent/predictor/ 
explanatory 
variable(s) 
Dependent/outcome  
variable (s) 
 
 
The University of Wales Institute 
of Science and Technology Mood 
Adjective Checklist (UWIST-
MACL) 
 
Energetic Arousal (EA) 
Tense Arousal (TA) 
Hedonic Tone (HT) 
Anger/frustration (AF) 
 
Cued Autobiographical Memories Questionnaire  
(CAMQ) 
 
Typicalness, Rumination, Importance of other 
people, Expectancy, Importance of the event for 
self, Desirability and Valence                                     
                                            
                                                 
                                   
 
 
The second stage involved dividing up the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
scores into non-symptomatic and symptomatic, as done previously in Study 2 
section 3.2.4. Twenty-three students were categorised as non-symptomatic and 
eight students as symptomatic. Furthermore, the non-vulnerable and vulnerable 
were categorised according to Persons & Miranda (1992), as done in Study 3 
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section 4.2.4. Twenty-three students were categorised as non-vulnerable and 
eight students as vulnerable.  
 
The vulnerable and symptomatic groups were utilised respectively as comparison 
points for non-vulnerable and non-symptomatic, even though the resulting 
contrasts were not orthogonal. In accordance with the methodology used by 
Rude, Gortner & Pennebaker (2004), differences were explored using t-test 
contrasts rather than orthogonal sets of contrasts. The justification to use t test 
instead of analysis of variance were several. It was reasoned that using 
orthogonal contrasts or analysis of variance might obscure the picture, as some 
contrasts – such as previous history and current depressive symptoms – are 
relatively unknown entities in mood research and likely to be correlated and 
therefore non orthogonal. Furthermore, the chi squared test supports the prior 
assumption that depressive symptoms and vulnerability are somewhat 
associated (see section 5.3.2.1.1 Table 29b). The t-test was also used because 
of the insights gained from Studies 1-3, in which the change in individual 
cognitive content characteristic and mood components has already been 
reported using intercorrelations of change scores. The focus in the present study 
was observing and measuring the change scores against the entity of negative 
mood state rather than individual negative mood components, which were dealt 
with in Studies 1-3.   
 
It was believed that the hypothesis that a change in cognitive content is not 
dependent on mood state would gain in strength if it could be shown that there 
was no overall mean change post manipulation. If the hypothesis was to be 
rejected, then an overall mean change needed to be demonstrated, producing a 
stronger argument that cognitive content is dependent to some degree on 
transient mood state. The main downside to this analysis in relation to the 
present study is that individual affective dimensions are subsumed into overall 
change in cognitive characteristics between two different time points. This 
discrete movement in one variable with another discrete movement has been 
investigated in Studies 1-3 and demonstrated hedonic tone and tense arousal as 
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two dominate mood dimensions involved. Hence test of difference was chosen as 
the most appropriate analysis in the present study due to the interest in change 
scores against the entity of overall negative mood state.  
 
 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The minimum and maximum for the UWIST-MACL sub-scales are 8 to 32 for 
energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone. The minimum score for anger 
sub-scale is 5 and the maximum is 20. The results from the present study show a 
minimum score of 8 to a maximum score of 32 on the three main bipolar, and  
5 minimum and 20 maximum on the monopolar scale. Therefore, there is a good 
range demonstrated on all mood components as measure by the UWIST-MACL. 
Table 27 presents the means and standard deviations for scores on the UWIST-
MACL sub-scales for pre and post mood induction mood induction. 
 
Table 27: Mean and standard deviation scores on the UWIST-MACL sub-scales pre 
and post mood induction 
 
     Mean   Std. Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
 
Energetic arousal   23.39   4.57  
Tense arousal    15.21   6.09  
Hedonic tone    27.33   4.68  
Anger/frustration     7.91   3.56                        
 
Post mood induction 
 
Energetic arousal   18.94   3.85 
Tense arousal    16.39   6.60 
Hedonic tone    22.82   6.31 
Anger/frustration     8.79   3.99 
 
 
Table 27 shows the mean the UWIST-MACL scores for participants. Scores on 
the hedonic tone and energetic arousal scale are negatively related to the level of 
negative mood (low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas 
higher values reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and 
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anger/frustration scales. The post mood induction scores show increased 
negative mood on each of the four sub-scales of the UWIST-MACL.  
 
Table 28 reports pre and post manipulation means for cued autobiographical 
appraisals for each of the five outcome variables and as so only reports the effect 
of mood manipulation for overall sample. The separate analysis is reserved for 
explanatory variables between predictor mood component variables and there 
effects on each outcome variable on the cue autobiographical memory 
appraisals. Table 28 presents the means and standard deviations for the cued 
autobiographical questionnaire pre and post mood induction. The minimum score 
was 1 and the maximum score was 7 on each of these self-rating Likert scales. 
Table 28 represents the mean score over the eleven cued memories on each of 
the five outcome variables for participants’ appraisals. Therefore the minimum 
score is 1.00 and the maximum score is 7.00 for each participant. Typical scores 
range from 1.09 to 7.00, rumination ranges from 1.73 
 
Table 28: Mean and standard deviation scores on the five outcome measures 
within the Cued Autobiographical Questionnaire 
 
     Mean   Std. Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
 
Typical     4.89   1.06 
Rumination    4.39   0.79 
Valence    5.12   0.86 
Other people    5.26   0.97 
Expected    5.08   1.01 
 
Post mood induction 
 
Typical     4.62   1.23 
Rumination    4.42   0.97 
Valence    4.96   1.29 
Other people    5.69   0.83 
Expected    4.74   1.23 
 
 
to 6.18, valence from 1.73 to 6.60, other people from 2.18 to 6.89 and expected 
from 1.82 to 7.00. Therefore, there is a good range demonstrated on all the self-
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rated measures obtained from the participants on the autobiographical 
questionnaire.  
 
5.3.2 Inferential analysis 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used for the analysis. The 
paired sample t-test was used to test the difference between pre and post mood 
induction scores for each sub-scale on the UWIST-MACL. 
 
5.3.2.1 Manipulation check 
The UWIST-MACL was used for subjective evaluation in this study, both as a 
general indicator of mood state and, more specifically, to evaluate changes in 
energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration. Lowered 
energetic arousal equals less active and alert. Increased tense arousal is 
consistent with being more anxious and nervous. Lowered hedonic tone equals 
loss of interest and diminished pleasure response. Increased anger/frustration is 
consistent with more emotional feelings of anger and frustration. Table 29a 
presents paired t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL and  
sub-scales. 
 
Table 29a: Paired sample t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL 
                                   Pre mood induction  Post mood induction 
  
   Mean Std.   Mean Std.      t (df)   Sig. 
    Deviation   Deviation           (2-tailed) 
 
Energetic arousal 23.39 4.57  18.94 3.85   5.64 (32) .001*** 
 
Tense arousal      15.21 6.09  16.39 6.60  -1.16 (32) .254 
 
Hedonic tone        27.33 4.68  22.82 6.31    4.76 (32) .001*** 
 
Anger/frustration   7.91 3.56   8.79 3.99  -1.86 (32) .072 
*** significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).     
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
There was a significant difference between pre manipulation and post 
manipulation mood ratings on the UWIST-MACL. The results indicate that 
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energetic arousal and hedonic tone showed significant increase in negative mood 
(t (32) = 5.64, p < 0.001) and (t (32) = 4.76, p < 0.001) respectively. Tense 
arousal and anger/ frustration showed a non-significant increase in negative 
mood (t (32) = -1.16, p = .254, n.s.) and (t (32) = -1.86, p = .072, n.s.) 
respectively. These were both in the expected direction but non-significant. The 
explanation for the result observed with tense arousal may be due to the test-
retest effect i.e. tense arousal measures anxiety, which may increase less than 
expected with retest due to it being a more familiar task and counteracting the 
effects of the increase in anxiety due to the effects from the mood induction 
procedure.  
 
5.3.2.1.1 Chi squared to indicate whether vulnerability and being symptomatic 
were associated or independent 
The chi squared statistic was used to indicate whether vulnerability and being 
symptomatic were associated or independent. Table 29b presents chi squared 
test in 2 x 2 matrix grid indicating where each participant fell in terms of 
vulnerability and symptomatology. 
 
Table 29b: Chi squared to indicate whether vulnerability and being symptomatic 
were associated or independent  
 
 Symptomatic 
Non 
Symptomatic 
 
Total 
 
Vulnerable 
 
5 4 9 
Non 
Vulnerable 
 
4 20 24 
Total 9 
 
24 
 
33 
       x2 = 4.991, df = 1, p < 0.05 
The predetermined alpha level of significance was 0.05 and chi square statistic 
was x2 = 4.991, the df is 1 for a 2 x 2 grid. This is smaller than the conventionally 
accepted significance level of 0.05, so the null hypothesis that the two 
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distributions are the same is rejected. Therefore the researcher can reject the null 
hypothesis that depressive symptoms are independent of vulnerability (i.e. 
Depressive symptoms and vulnerability are somewhat associated). The data is 
non orthogonal as previous history and current depressive symptoms are 
correlated. 
 
5.3.2.2 Independent sample t-tests between vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
groups  
To examine the differences between vulnerable and non-vulnerable participants, 
cognitive characteristics were observed under transient negative mood baseline 
checks using independent samples tests to check for difference before mood 
manipulation was carried out. Table 30 presents independent samples t-tests 
between non-vulnerable and vulnerable participants on the cued 
autobiographical questionnaire and sub-scales. 
 
Table 30: Independent sample t-tests between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
 
  Levene's Test for Equality t  df  Sig.  
  of Variances       (2-tailed) 
 
BDI  Equal variances assumed -2.70  31  0.01** 
     
Typicalness Equal variances assumed -1.86  31  0.07  
     
Rumination Equal variances assumed -0.81  31  0.42 
     
Valence  Equal variances assumed  0.21  31  0.84 
     
Other   Equal variances assumed  1.10  31  0.28 
     
Expectancy Equal variances assumed -0.81  31  0.43 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
The observation of the data suggests that there is no significant difference 
between cognitive characteristics in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
prior to the mood manipulation. Interestingly, there was a significant difference in 
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BDI scores, with the vulnerable having significantly higher mean BDI scores (F = 
0.01, t (31) = -2.70, p < 0.01). 
 
5.3.2.3 Paired sample t-tests on vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups pre and 
post mood manipulation 
There will be a difference between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable cognitive 
content in that there will be a significant difference in the vulnerable but not the 
non-vulnerable group. Table 31 presents paired t-tests for vulnerable and non-
vulnerable participants on the cued autobiographical questionnaire and sub-
scales. 
 
Table 31: Paired sample t-tests on the vulnerable and non-vulnerable between pre 
and post mood manipulation 
 
Paired mean differences  
(pre and post mood induction)       t            df Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Non-vulnerable   
Typicalness       0.06            23 0.527 
Rumination      -0.44            23 0.665 
Valence        0.30            23 0.766 
Other       -1.26            23 0.221 
Expectancy        0.76            23 0.457 
   
Vulnerable 
Typicalness        2.37    8 0.045* 
Rumination        0.57   8 0.582 
Valence        1.02   8 0.338 
Other       -3.99     8 0.004** 
Expectancy        2.49    8 0.038* 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 (i): there was a significant difference in typicalness in the 
vulnerable group (t (8) = 2.37, p < 0.05). This indicates that there was a 
significant decrease in appraised typicalness post mood induction. This suggests 
that the events recalled under mood stress have decreased perceptual origin and 
a decreased number of associated memories that contain reduced colours, 
perceptual clarity and vividness and contextual information, such as relative 
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spatial location and temporal order. This suggests reduced specificity and 
increased over-generalness of memory under mood stress. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 (iii): there was a significant difference in involvement of other 
people in the vulnerable group (t (8) = -3.99, p < 0.01). This indicates that there 
was a significant increase in the appraised importance of other people post mood 
induction. This suggests an increase in a set of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours 
that pertain to an individual’s dependence on others. This indicates an increased 
tendency under mood stress to focus excessively on seeking approval and 
attention from others in order to sustain self-esteem. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 (iv): there was a third significant difference in expectancy in the 
vulnerable group (t (8) = 2.49, p < 0.05). This indicates that there was a 
significant decrease in expectancy post mood induction. This suggests increased 
difficulties in the ability to conceptualize and judge the likelihood of future events 
in cued recall. So under mood stress there is decreased ability to weigh up 
probabilities about the predictive certainty of the future. 
 
5.3.2.4 Independent sample t-tests for symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups 
pre and post mood manipulation  
To examine the differences in symptomatic and non-symptomatic cognitive 
characteristics on the cued autobiographical questionnaire under transient 
negative mood, baseline checks using independent samples tests to check for 
difference before mood manipulation were carried out. Following the example of 
Levine et al. (2006), participants were categorised into BDI scores of 0-7 as ‘non-
symptomatic’, and scores of 8-12 as indicative of ‘symptomatology’. Table 32 (on 
the next page) shows independent t-tests for the symptomatic and non-
symptomatic groups between pre and post mood manipulation. 
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Table 32: Independent sample t-tests for symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
groups between pre and post mood manipulation 
 
  Levene's Test for Equality t  df  Sig.  
  of Variances       (2-tailed) 
 
BDI  Equal variances assumed -9.66  31  0.01** 
     
Typicalness Equal variances assumed  0.28  31  0.78 
     
Rumination Equal variances assumed -0.12  31  0.91 
     
Valence  Equal variances assumed  1.41  31  0.17 
     
Other   Equal variances assumed -0.01  31  0.99 
     
Expectancy Equal variances assumed  0.70  31  0.49   
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
 
The observation of the data suggests that there was no significant difference 
between cognitive characteristics in the symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
groups prior to the mood manipulation. There was a significant difference in BDI 
scores, with the symptomatic having significantly higher mean scores on the BDI 
(F = 2.50, t (31) = -9.66, p < 0.01). 
 
5.3.2.5 Paired sample t-tests for symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups pre 
and post mood manipulation 
There was a significant difference in the cognitive characteristics between the 
pre-existing symptomatic group but not the non-symptomatic group. Table 33 (on 
the next page) shows paired sample t-tests for the symptomatic and non-
symptomatic groups between pre and post mood manipulation. 
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Table 33: Paired sample t-tests for symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups 
between pre and post mood manipulation 
 
Paired mean differences  
(pre and post mood induction)    t         df             Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Non-symptomatic    
 
Typicalness        0.66         23 0.52 
Rumination      -0.10         23 0.92 
Valence        0.07         23 0.94 
Other       -1.54         23 0.14 
Expectancy        0.44         23 0.66 
 
Symptomatic  
 
Typicalness      2.39           8 0.04* 
Rumination     -0.24           8 0.81 
Valence      1.88           8 0.10 
Other      -2.86           8 0.02* 
Expectancy      3.30           8 0.01** 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
Hypothesis 4.3 (i): there was a significant difference in typicalness in the 
symptomatic group (t (8) = 2.39, p < 0.05). This indicates that there was a 
significant decrease in appraised typicalness post mood induction. This suggests 
that the events recalled under mood stress have decreased perceptual origin and 
a decreased number of associated memories. This suggests that there is a 
reduced specificity and increased over-generalness of memory under mood 
stress. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3 (iii): there was a significant difference in involvement of other 
people in the symptomatic group (t (8) = -2.86, p < 0.05). This indicates that there 
was a significant increase in appraised importance of other people post mood 
induction. This suggests an increase in a set of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours 
that pertain to an individual’s dependence on others under mood stress. 
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Hypothesis 4.3 (iv): there was a significant difference in expectancy in the 
symptomatic group (t (8) = 3.30, p < 0.01). This indicates that there was a 
significant decrease in expectancy post mood induction. This suggests increased 
difficulties in the ability to conceptualize and judge the likelihood of future events 
in cued recall under mood stress. 
 
To summarise, the paired sample t-test indicated an overall significant difference 
between pre and post mood induction procedure in typicalness, other people and 
expectancy in the symptomatic and vulnerable. The present study was looking at 
overall mood change related to negative mood rather than specific negative 
mood components as in Studies 1-3. The result from this study suggests that 
these cognitive characteristics in the symptomatic and vulnerable were 
responsive to changed transient mood state. This was not the case for the same 
cognitive characteristics in non-symptomatic and non-vulnerable participants 
under transient mood state. The overall findings from this study suggest that 
differences exist between vulnerable and non-vulnerable and symptomatic and 
non-symptomatic which were only observable in primed negative mood state. 
The evidence from this study supports theory that, in addition to vulnerability or 
symptomatic mood, a current negative mood state is a necessary condition to 
measure and observe a change in cognitive content. 
 
5.4 Discussion   
The study described here was designed to explore the effects of mood 
manipulation on the cognitive content of cued autobiographical memories in 
those with vulnerability or depressive symptomatology. Segal, Williams, 
Teasdale, & Gemar (1996) & Teasdale & Barnard (1993) suggest that there is an 
increased risk of reactivation of negative cognitions with vulnerability and 
increased depressive symptoms. The differential activation hypothesis (Teasdale, 
1988) indicates that in negative mood states there will be a difference between 
vulnerable and symptomatic groups compared with non-vulnerable and non-
symptomatic groups. The hypothesis suggests that accessibility of 
autobiographical memories as a consequence of negative mood reactivates 
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associated or similar representations that have been previously associated with 
that mood state (Teasdale, 1988). The evidence from this study supports theory 
that the vulnerable or symptomatic and negative mood state is a necessary 
condition to measure and observe a change in autobiographical content. 
 
The evidence supports previous research by Miranda & Persons (1988) and 
Roberts & Kassel (1996) which suggests that cognitive content is related to mood 
in vulnerable individuals but not in the non-vulnerable group. Miranda & Persons 
(1998) did test the hypothesis that latent negative cognitions are present in the 
vulnerable and require low mood to activate the cognitive content. The 
interpretation was that induced negative mood seems to facilitate or prime 
associated cognitive content. Miranda & Persons (1998) suggest that while mood 
primes or facilitates the change in cognitive content, it does not seem to work for 
those individuals who have never been depressed.  
 
5.4.1 Vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
The key finding in the present study suggests that vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
individuals have different specificity of cognitive content following a mood 
induction procedure. This supports Hypothesis 4.2 that there would be a 
difference between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable. The results suggested 
that the vulnerable group showed cognitive bias under mood stress, with 
typicalness showing less perceptual origins, other people being seen as less 
important, and future events being evaluated as less certain. This supports 
hypotheses 4.1 & 4.2 (i, iii and iv) that there would be a change in these 
characteristics. The finding supports the differential activation hypothesis, which 
suggests that patterns of cognitive characteristics activated in negative mood 
state will determine whether that state remains transient or becomes more 
enduring in vulnerable individuals.  
 
The findings are congruent with previous empirical research (Miranda et al., 
1998; Miranda and Persons, 1988; Segal et al., 1999) which reports significant 
correlations between cognitive reactivity in vulnerable participants but not in non-
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vulnerable, in those experiencing similar levels of negative mood. The vulnerable 
individuals, as in the present research, are those vulnerable to depressed mood 
by virtue of a previous depressive illness. These individuals may have particular 
cognitive characteristics that are triggered by negative mood state and influence 
their cognitive processes, leading them to interpret ambiguous situations as 
negative and to regard representations of events and others in a biased way. The 
evidence from the present study suggests that vulnerable people do show 
changes in cognitive operations under transient low mood, while non-vulnerable 
people show increased negative mood without the change in cognitive 
characteristics. 
 
There is a difference between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable where cognitive 
content is concerned. Three aspects showed a significant difference in cognitive 
content in the vulnerable but not the non-vulnerable. There is some evidence of 
reduced specificity in that there was a decrease in typicalness, suggesting 
decreased perceptual origin and decreased clarity and vividness of associated 
memories. This indirect measure of overgeneral memory under mood stress is 
evident for the vulnerable but not the non-vulnerable group post mood 
manipulation. There is enough evidence from the present study to accept 
Hypothesis 4.2 (i, iii and iv). 
 
5.4.2 Symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
The result from this study suggests that stable symptomatic mood over the 
previous two weeks differentially activates certain cognitive characteristics under 
transient mood stress. The participants who were reporting initial symptomatic 
states over the previous two weeks showed no significant difference in cognitive 
characteristics pre manipulation but went on to demonstrate significant change in 
cognitive appraisals post mood manipulation. The finding supports the differential 
activation hypothesis (Gotlib and MacLeod, 1997; Williams et al., 1997), 
indicating that patterns of cognitive characteristics activated in negative mood 
state (Teasdale, 1983 & 1988) happen differentially in those with symptomatic 
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states over the previous two weeks. This suggests that symptomatology is an 
important factor in the effect of mood state on retrieved autobiographical content. 
 
The second key finding in the present study suggests that symptomatic and non-
symptomatic individuals have different specificity of cognitive content following a 
mood induction procedure. This supports Hypothesis 4.3 that there would be a 
difference between the symptomatic and the non-symptomatic. The results 
suggested that the symptomatic group showed a change in cognitive content 
under mood stress, with typicalness showing less perceptual origins, other 
people being seen as less important, and future events being evaluated as less 
certain. This supports hypotheses 4.1 & 4.3 (i, iii and iv) that there would be a 
change in these characteristics. There is a suggestion of reduced specificity in 
that a decrease in typicalness was observed, suggesting a decrease in the clarity 
and vividness of associated memories. This indirect measure of overgeneral 
memory under mood stress is evident for those reporting symptomatic states 
over the previous two weeks but not the non-symptomatic group post mood 
manipulation. This suggests reduced specificity and increased overgeneral 
memory under mood stress for the symptomatic group but not the non-
symptomatic group. There is enough evidence to accept Hypothesis 4.3 (i, iii and 
iv) that symptomatic versus non-symptomatic do show changes in cognitive 
processes under transient low mood. 
 
The findings in this section might be down to those reporting symptomatic states 
over the previous two weeks being those participants who might be more likely to 
report being vulnerable (previously depressed). The correlation between the BDI 
and vulnerable measures demonstrated a positive correlation, suggesting that 
this could be a possible confound in the interpretation of the observed data. To 
test whether a combined effect between vulnerability and symptomatic states 
was influencing the results, univariate analysis was undertaken. The univariate 
analysis suggested that there was no combined effect on the observed change 
scores for each of the cognitive characteristics on the cued autobiographical 
questionnaire. This finding suggests that there was no added effect by the 
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inclusion of those individuals who had a symptomatic state over the previous two 
weeks. 
 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
The present findings are congruent with previous studies by Miranda et al. 
(1998), Miranda & Persons (1988), and Segal et al. (1999), which report a 
significant correlation between cognitive reactivity in vulnerable participants but 
not in non-vulnerable participants in temporary negative mood. Similarly, the 
present findings are congruent with previous research by Gotlib & MacLeod 
(1997) and Williams et al. (1997) indicating that patterns of cognitive 
characteristics activated in negative mood state differ in symptomatic participants 
and non-symptomatic participants (Teasdale, 1983 & 1988). 
 
The results suggest that it is transient mood state combined with previous 
vulnerability or current symptomatology which seems to be important in 
producing cognitive reactivity. Cognitive reactivity seems to act differentially in 
these populations. This would account for the change in typicalness, support 
from other people and endorsements on future expectancy. This supports 
Hypothesis 4.1 (i, iii and iv) that there would be a difference in cognitive 
characteristics. The presence of vulnerability seems to increase cognitive 
reactivity and increase access to certain cognitive characteristics (hypotheses 2 i, 
iii and iv in section 5.1.1).  
 
The presence of a previous history seems to demonstrate a slight increase in 
rumination in the vulnerable in negative mood state rather than the observed 
decrease in the non-vulnerable. This, along with the observed decrease in 
typicalness, suggests a decrease in clarity and vividness in associated 
memories. This indirect measure of overgeneral memory in negative mood state 
was evident for those reporting vulnerability but not the non-vulnerable group. 
The overgeneral memory could account for the changes in cognitive 
characteristics in negative mood state. The symptomatic demonstrated a similar 
decrease in typicalness, indicating an increase in overgeneral memory in 
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negative mood state for the symptomatic group but not the non-symptomatic 
group. The presence of symptomatology also seems to increase cognitive 
reactivity and increase access to certain cognitive content (Hypothesis 3 i, iii and 
iv in section 5.1.1).  
 
The present research has highlighted that self-focused memories in the 
symptomatic and the vulnerable are acting as potential moderators in cueing 
autobiographical content in negative mood state. The present research has also 
highlighted that there is change in autobiographical cognitive content in the 
vulnerable and the symptomatic, but has not distinguished between the effects of 
cognitive reactivity versus the effects of overgeneral memories. Given the 
evidence from this study and its limitations, it was considered fruitful to examine 
specifically overgeneral memories that occur within the retrieved autobiographical 
memories in the vulnerable and the symptomatic in the same study. It was 
thought that overgeneral memories might be present in the vulnerable and the 
symptomatic due to the effects of self-focused rumination and targeted memory 
search rather than activation of latent cognitive content. This was consequently 
addressed in the next study. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STUDY 5: Autobiographical memory responsiveness to an induced 
negative mood state: Self-focused overgeneral memories in those self-
reporting vulnerability or depressive symptoms. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Study 4 found that autobiographical retrieval showed non-diffuse reactivity in 
vulnerable and symptomatic groups compared to the diffuse reactivity in those 
non-vulnerable and non-symptomatic. A similar pattern of non-diffuse cognitive 
reactivity was observed in cognitive content in both vulnerable and symptomatic 
groups. This pattern was not repeated in the content for non-vulnerable and non-
symptomatic groups. Overall, the vulnerable and symptomatic group showed a 
non-diffuse negative bias in cognitive reactivity. 
 
The present study builds on this initial evidence for low mood affecting 
autobiographical retrieval by examining whether memory generality following a 
negative mood induction procedure is sensitive to mood change in self-focused 
memories. Self-focused attention has been associated with increased cognitive 
reactivity and overgeneral memory (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010). In the 
present study, the researcher sought to add to the literature by looking at 
autobiographical memories in vulnerable and symptomatic groups to determine 
the effects of negative mood on autobiographical memory specificity. The focus 
in the present study, as in Study 4, was observing the entity of negative mood 
state rather than individual negative mood components, which were studied 
previously in Studies 1-3.  
 
There is evidence linking overgeneral memory and autobiographical recall of 
content (Yeung et al., 2006). Overgeneral memory focuses on cognitive 
processes involved in memory retrieval and reduced memory specificity (Raes et 
al., 2007). It is thought that overgeneral memories can change cognitive 
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characteristics by increased recall of categoric content (Williams et al., 2007; van 
Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). Overgeneral memories are known to be relapse 
markers for depression (Brittlebank et al., 1993), which might represent a 
possible moderating factor for autobiographical content. Overgeneral memories 
were operationally defined as a moderator variable as it might be helpful in 
explaining the strength of the relationship that exists between mood and cued 
autobiographical memory. Yeung et al. (2006) suggest that overgeneral memory 
is multifaceted, with some facets being mood state dependent and other facets 
being a stable function of depression. Figure 7 shows the potential for 
overgeneral memories acting as a moderator on mood state affecting 
autobiographical recall. 
 
Figure 7: Overgenerality as a moderator in symptomatic and vulnerable groups 
Negative Mood Autobiographical recall
Overgenerality of 
memories
 
To date, however, little research has investigated the effects of mood state and 
moderating factors on cued autobiographical content. Therefore the present 
study turns its attention to overgenerality of memories, a factor that might be 
implicated in mood state effects on autobiographical recall. 
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6.1.1Theoretical background 
There is consistent evidence of the role of depression, as a clinical category, 
biasing cognitive functioning, such as ability to retrieve specific autobiographical 
memories, but it is unclear what other factors mediate this phenomenon. 
Research into overgeneral memory suggests that the lack of specificity in 
autobiographical memory remains once the severity of depressive symptoms 
declines, which indicates that overgeneral memory is not a mood state 
dependent phenomenon but a trait-like marker (Williams, 1996). It is interesting 
to note that other cognitive functioning such as biases in recalling negative 
events and self-evaluation seem to be mood state dependent and return to 
normal with remission from depression (Persons & Miranda, 1992; Segal & 
Ingram, 1994). 
 
The sparse research that directly addresses the effects of induced mood on 
overgeneral memory may represent more about past history of depression or on-
going clinical mood disorders rather than temporary mood state because of the 
tendency of previous research to focus on these areas. However, temporary 
mood state could possibly be an important variable that could be influenced by or 
mediated by the presence of vulnerability or depressive symptomatology. The 
first study by Maccallum et al. (2000) manipulated current mood in a non-clinical 
group by hypnotically inducing negative mood, and found increased overgeneral 
memories relative to induced neutral or positive mood states. Similar findings by 
Svaldi & Mackinger (2003) indicate increased overgeneral memories after a 
musical mood induction procedure combined with remembering and focusing on 
negative autobiographical events. Yeung et al. (2006) used both musical and film 
mood induction procedures to induce neutral, positive and negative mood, and 
found that overgeneral memory increased following the negative mood induction.  
 
However, the study by McBride & Cappeliez (2004) used the Velten procedure to 
instill an elated and depressed mood in participants, but found no increase in 
overgeneral memories within the group. The studies to date have used the 
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standard autobiographical memory test to measure overgeneral memory, and 
only Yeung et al. (2006) controlled for current and past levels of depression. The 
studies have also used limited proxy for measuring mood and emotion by 
employing visual analogue scales to measure ‘happiness’ and ‘sadness’, as in 
Yeung et al. (2006). While these analogue scales measure mood on a unipolar 
dimension and provide a good approximation, they may lack the 
comprehensiveness of recent mood scales, which measure mood on two 
dimensions as used in the present research. The UWIST-MACL measures 
emotional state along two dimensions: ‘valence’, which indicates how pleasant or 
unpleasant the emotion is, and ‘arousal’, which measures how activated or 
deactivated the participant is in that emotion.  
 
The equivocalness as to whether overgeneral memory is a function of mood state 
may be down to a number of possible explanations as put forward by Yeung et 
al. (2006). They suggest that overgeneral memory is multifaceted, with some 
facets being mood state dependent and other facets being a stable function of 
depression. Alternatively, it could be that positive results are a function of a 
vulnerability to or a history of depression. The explanation for this is that the 
induction of negative mood could be differentially increasing overgeneral 
memories in the vulnerable via the negative mood state as suggested by the 
differential activation hypothesis (Lau, Segal & Williams, 2004). The differential 
activation hypothesis suggests that the first episode of depression establishes 
changes in cognitive modes (Segal et al., 1996) and establishes a link between 
these cognitive modes and mood state in following episodes of negative mood. 
Once recovered, the individuals will be vulnerable to the same cognitive 
characteristics and will be reactivated by negative mood which triggers previous 
cognitive modes established during the first episode of depressed mood 
(Williams et al., 1997). 
 
The multifaceted account and the alternative explanation of overgeneral memory 
being a function of depression or previous episode of depression provide credible 
accounts for the observed data. It could also be that mood directly accounts for 
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overgeneral memory. It could be that previous research looking at overgeneral 
memory has not found a link with temporary induced mood states because of 
various methodological reasons. Raes et al. (2007) note that previous research 
has almost exclusively used the Autobiographical Memory Test to measure 
overgeneral memory in depressed and formerly clinically depressed groups. The 
Autobiographical Memory Test surprisingly leads to a very low frequency of 
overgeneral memories in student populations, who would normally be expected 
to achieve higher levels of overgeneral memory given the incidence of 
depression in this population (Raes et al., 2007). This finding could be down to 
the autobiographical memory test administration, which provides extensive 
instructions, practice trails and repeated prompting for specificity. This could 
result in individuals with a propensity to retrieve memories in an overgeneral 
manner still being able to obtain high specificity scores because of the 
explicitness of the cognitive task that is being administered. 
 
6.1.2 Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test 
The recently developed Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test 
(SCEPT; Raes et al., 2007) to assess overgeneral memory was developed to 
increase sensitivity in non-clinical populations. The SCEPT is an alternative to 
the cued autobiographical memory paradigm for assessing overgeneral memory 
in non-clinical populations (Raes et al., 2007). Participants are instructed to 
provide continuations to the eleven incomplete sentences. Afterwards, the 
researcher codes each response into specific and overgeneral memories. The 
test as mentioned does not provide explicit prompts for specific memories, and 
hence relies on the increased implicitness of the task to increase the likelihood of 
collecting automatic responses rather than conscious ones from participants. 
 
This study investigated the possible increased sensitivity of the sentence 
completion method to assess overgeneral memory over the cued 
autobiographical method. The rationale for expecting increased sensitivity in 
measuring overgeneral memories was that the sentence completion method 
would elicit more automatic responses rather than conscious ones from 
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participants than the cued autobiographical technique. The other reason for the 
expectation was that the sentence completion method is related to personal 
semantic events compared to the free recall cued autobiographical method, 
which may inadvertently focus on generic categoric rather than personal 
semantic information. 
 
The present study examined whether overgeneral memory could be induced in a 
non-clinical population using a negative mood manipulation. This would be of 
interest as overgeneral memory has been suggested to be a stable trait-like 
marker. The expectation from findings and observations in Studies 1-4 within this 
thesis is that cognitive characteristics do vary with mood state. The current 
research aimed to extend the understanding of the relationship between transient 
mood and overgeneral retrieval. 
 
 
6.1.3 Purpose of the study 
This study sought to understand the effect of negative mood on memory 
specificity within self-focused autobiographical memories in those self-reporting 
vulnerability or depressive symptoms. The idea of the present study was to evoke 
self-focused memories by asking participants to complete sentence stems for 
events from the past test to assess overgeneral memory (SCEPT; Raes et al., 
2007). The test does not provide explicit prompts for specific memories, and 
hence relies on the implicit nature of the task to increase the automatic 
responses. The rationale for using the sentence completion task is related to its 
target of personal semantic events in contrast to the free recall autobiographical 
method used hitherto in the present research, which could inadvertently focus on 
generic categoric rather than personal semantic information. 
 
To address the general aim of how mood affects autobiographical retrieval, 
participants rated a number of characteristics, which the individual endorsed on 
an analogue scale. The endorsements were observed pre and post mood 
induction, and overall mood was measured with the UWIST-MACL (Matthews et 
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al., 1990). The general aim was propagated in response to the lack of research 
investigating how mood affects the recalled content retrieved in autobiographical 
memories. Furthermore, by examining the influence of vulnerability and its effects 
on accessibility of the cognitive products it was hoped to elucidate the importance 
of previous history and depressive symptomatology in the presence of temporary 
mood state. There appears to be little research available to demonstrate how 
overgeneral memory and cognitive products are influenced by current negative 
mood in those self reporting vulnerability or depressive symptoms in one study.  
 
The present study employed a non-clinical sample to examine the mean 
difference in change scores at t1 and t2 of autobiographical memory content 
whilst examining the influence of vulnerability and depressive symptomatology. A 
sample of students underwent a sentence completion test focusing on the 
memory appraisal before and after a negative mood induction procedure. The 
content held within autobiographical memory may be affected by such negative 
mood shifts. 
 
In summary, the influence of negative mood on autobiographical memory 
appears to be generally consistent with the expectations in this section; negative 
mood may result in overgeneral memories. The characteristic of overgenerality 
may be more pronounced in individuals with vulnerability and depressive 
symptomatology. The present research investigated overall mood as measured 
by the UWIST-MACL and its effects on both content-based attributes and 
memory changes on the free recall of sentence stems in those with a previous 
history of depression and those with depressive symptomatology. The categoric 
and personal semantic aspects of autobiographical memory highlighted have 
emerged from research (Raes et al., 2007) and opened up further questions on 
the effects of negative mood state on autobiographical retrieved content. 
 
The present study was designed to address two areas of uncertainty concerning 
mood effects on autobiographical retrieval: 
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(a) Is autobiographical retrieval reactive to the personal semantic nature of the 
memory stems? 
 
(b) Is there a change in specificity of autobiographical memories between those 
self-reporting vulnerability or non-vulnerability and in those self-reporting 
depressive symptoms or no depressive symptoms? 
 
H 5.1 It was hypothesised that negative mood would predict a change from pre to 
post mood induction in the endorsements in specific memories (Williams et al., 
2007).  
 
H 5.2 It was hypothesised that negative mood would predict a change from pre to 
post mood induction in the endorsements of overgeneral autobiographical 
memories (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004).  
 
H 5.3 It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between the vulnerable 
and non-vulnerable endorsements for the characteristics in 1 and 2 above (Gibbs 
& Rude, 2004; Hipwell, Sapotichne, Klostermann, Battista & Keenan, 2011) 
 
H 5.4 It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between the 
symptomatic and non-symptomatic endorsements for the characteristics in 1 and 
2 above (Yeung et al., 2006). 
 
 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
The participants were made up of 34 student volunteers from the University of 
Chester, providing reasonable power for statistical and correlational analysis. 
Students in the present study had not participated in the previous studies. The 
students were recruited from the Faculty of Health and Social Care. Participants 
were recruited in groups of approximately twelve and underwent the group 
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procedure (detailed in the procedures section). 8 participants were excluded for 
their own protection on the basis of their high BDI-2 score (see section 2.2.3 for 
ethical procedure and support offered to all participants). A power calculation was 
conducted on GPOWER, a general power analysis program (Erdfelder et al., 
1996). Sample size of 34, with alpha level set at p = 0.05, a large effect size (r = 
0.5), gives 95% power to detect real difference due to treatment effect rather than 
chance. Ethical approval was granted by the Psychology Departmental Ethics 
Committee prior to data collection, and ethical approval for access to students 
was granted from the Faculty of Health and Social Care Ethics Committee before 
recruitment of participants.  
 
 
6.2.2 Materials and measures 
The measures administered were the same as detailed in Study 4, with the 
exception of the substituted SCEPT measure for overgeneral memory instead of 
the CAMQ for cognitive content. The Sentence Completion for Events from the 
Past Test (SCEPT; Raes et al., 2007) was designed to assess overgeneral 
memory in a non-clinical population. This sentence completion procedure 
comprises eleven sentence stems probing for past experiences (Appendix 10). 
The SCEPT is an alternative to the cued autobiographical memory paradigm for 
assessing overgeneral memory in a non-clinical population (Raes et al., 2007). 
Participants were instructed to provide continuations of the eleven incomplete 
sentences. The researcher coded the responses on a continuum from semantic 
associates to specific memories. The predictor and outcome variables were 
defined and are listed in Table 34 (on the next page). 
 
The outcome variables are obtained from the Sentence Completion for Events 
from the Past Test. The responses are coded by the following categories: 
semantic associate (referring to personal overgeneral semantic information), 
categoric memory (referring to a category of similar, repeated events), extended 
memory (referring to an extended period of time), specific memory (referring to a 
single personal event not longer than a day). 
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Table 34: List of predictor and outcome variables 
 
Independent/predictor/ 
explanatory 
Variable(s) 
Dependent/outcome  
Variable(s) 
 
 
The University of Wales Institute 
of Science and Technology Mood 
Adjective Checklist (UWIST-
MACL) 
 
Energetic Arousal (EA) 
Tense Arousal (TA) 
Hedonic Tone (HT) 
Anger/frustration (AF) 
 
Sentence completion for Events from the Past 
Test (SCEPT) 
 
SCEPT 
Overgeneral category 
Specific category 
Semantic associates 
Categoric memories 
Extended memories 
Specific memories 
 
 
6.2.3 Procedure 
The same procedure was followed as detailed in Study 4, with the exception of 
the inclusion of the sentence completion procedure instead of the Cued 
Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire. The sentence completion procedure 
was administered without the explicit instruction to focus on specific memories as 
in Study 4. Participants were instructed to provide continuations to incomplete 
sentence stems. The sentence stems were coded using the following coding 
categories as reported in Raes et al., 2008 page 750-751: semantic associate 
(referring to personal overgeneral semantic information; e.g., "…I used to be a 
very shy girl"), categoric memory (referring to a category of similar, repeated 
events; e.g., "…my grandmother used to play games with me when I was little"), 
extended memory (referring to an extended period of time; e.g., "…my time in 
junior high"), specific memory (referring to a specific personal past experience that 
did not last longer than a day; e.g., "…sad I was the day my grandfather died"), 
and omission. The content of autobiographical memories were quantitatively 
coded as semantic associates scored (1), categoric memories scored (2), 
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extended memories scored (3), specific memories scored (4) and omission. The 
mean score was taken over the 11 sentence stems. The assignment of scores 0 - 
4 to each sentence stem was discussed with a colleague and followed the same 
procedure detailed by Raes et al., 2008 which demonstrated easy assignment of 
categories to sentence stems. Good inter-rater reliability was shown by Raes et 
al., 2007 as 87%, K% 0.82. 
 
6.2.4 Design and analysis strategy 
Design and analysis followed the same procedure as detailed in Study 4, with the 
exception that the outcome variable was the autobiographical memory which was 
measured by the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT; 
Raes et al., 2007) instead of the Cued Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire 
(CAMQ; adapted version of the Autobiographical Memory Test by Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986). The analysis involved t-tests as in Study 4 due to the insights 
already gained from Studies 1-3. The focus in the present study was observing 
and measuring the change scores against the entity of negative mood state 
rather than individual negative mood components, which were reported in 
Studies 1-3.   
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
The minimum and maximum for the UWIST-MACL sub-scales are 8 to 32 for 
energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone. The minimum score for anger 
sub-scale is 5 and the maximum is 20. The results from the present study show a 
minimum score of 8 to a maximum score of 32 on the three main bipolar, and 5 
minimum and 20 maximum on the monopolar scale. Therefore, there is a good 
range demonstrated on all mood components as measured by the UWIST-
MACL. Table 35 (on the next page) presents the means and standard deviations 
for scores on the UWIST-MACL sub-scales for pre and post mood induction. 
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Table 35: Mean and standard deviation scores on the UWIST-MACL sub-scales pre 
and post mood induction 
 
     Mean   Std. Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction 
 
Energetic arousal   22.29   4.17   
 
Tense arousal    14.91   4.04   
 
Hedonic tone    26.85   3.68   
 
Anger/frustration     7.24   2.82 
 
Post mood induction 
 
Energetic arousal   19.97   5.53  
 
Tense arousal    15.76   4.53  
 
Hedonic tone    23.76   4.70  
 
Anger/frustration     9.15   4.08  
 
Table 35 shows the mean the UWIST-MACL scores for participants. Scores on 
the hedonic tone and energetic arousal scale are negatively related to the level of 
negative mood (low-scaled scores represent greater negative mood), whereas 
higher values reflect a greater negative mood on tense arousal and 
anger/frustration scales. The post mood induction scores show increased 
negative mood on each of the four sub-scales of the UWIST-MACL.  
 
Table 36 (on the next page) presents the means and standard deviations for 
scores on the sentence completion procedure. 
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Table 36: Mean and standard deviation scores for the sentence completion 
procedure 
 
      Mean   Std. Deviation 
 
Pre mood induction  
 
SCEPT     2.42   0.42 
 
Overgeneral category    5.62   1.95 
 
Specific category    5.21   1.87 
 
Semantic associates    3.06   2.20 
 
Categoric memories    2.56   1.89 
 
Extended memories    2.88   1.47 
 
Specific memories    2.32   1.45 
 
Post mood induction   
 
SCEPT     2.31          0.45 
 
Specific category    4.41   2.18 
 
Semantic associates    2.79   2.56 
 
Categoric memories    3.59   2.69 
 
Extended memories    2.71   1.64 
 
Specific memories    1.71   1.49 
 
Table 36 above represents the mean score over the eleven cued memories on 
SCEPT and the five sub-scales. The minimum score on the SCEPT was 1.00 
and maximum score 11.00. The minimum score was zero and the maximum 
score was 11.00 for each of the six sub-scales. The SCEPT scores ranged from 
1.00 to 3.18, overgeneral category ranged from 2.00 to 11.00, specific category 
from 0.00 to 9.00, semantic associate from 0.00 to 11.00, categoric memories 
from 0.00 to 11.00, extended memories from 0.00 to 11.00 and specific 
memories from 0.00 to 11.00. Therefore, there is a good range demonstrated on 
all memory specificity measures.  
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6.3.2 Inferential analysis 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used for the analysis. The 
paired sample t-test was used to test the difference between pre and post mood 
induction scores for each sub-scale on the sentence completion procedure for 
memories of the past. 
 
6.3.2.1 Manipulation check 
The UWIST-MACL was used for subjective evaluation in this study, both as a 
general indicator of mood state and, more specifically, to evaluate changes in 
energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration. Lowered 
energetic arousal equals less active and alert. Increased tense arousal is 
consistent with being more anxious and nervous. Lowered hedonic tone equals 
loss of interest and diminished pleasure response. Increased anger/frustration is 
consistent with more emotional feelings of anger and frustration. Table 37a 
presents paired sample t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL 
and sub-scales. 
 
  
Table 37a: Paired sample t-tests in the predictor variables on the UWIST-MACL 
                                   Pre mood induction  Post mood induction 
  
   Mean Std.   Mean Std.  t (df)              Sig. 
    Deviation   Deviation           (2-tailed) 
 
Energetic arousal  22.29 4.17  19.97 5.53  2.46 (33) .019* 
 
Tense arousal      14.91 4.04  15.76 4.53            -0.99 (33) .328 
 
Hedonic tone        26.85 3.68  23.76 4.70   3.51 (33) .001*** 
 
Anger/frustration   7.24 2.82   9.15 4.08            -3.42 (33) .002** 
*** significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).     
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
 
There was a significant difference between pre manipulation and post 
manipulation mood ratings on the UWIST-MACL. The results demonstrated that 
 190 
energetic arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration showed significant increase 
in negative mood (t (33) = 2.46, p < 0.05), (t (33) = 3.51, p < 0.001) and (t (33) = -
3.42, p < 0.01) respectively. Tense arousal showed a non-significant increase in 
negative mood (t (33) = -0.99, p = .328, n.s.). This was in the expected direction 
but non-significant. The explanation for the result observed with tense arousal 
may be due to the test-retest effect i.e. tense arousal measures anxiety, which 
may increase less than expected with retest due to it being a more familiar task 
and counteracting the effects of the increase in anxiety due to the effects of the 
mood induction procedure.  
 
6.3.2.1.1 Chi squared to indicate whether vulnerability and being symptomatic 
were associated or independent 
The chi squared statistic was used to indicate whether vulnerability and being 
symptomatic were associated or independent. Table 37b presents chi squared 
test in 2 x 2 matrix grid indicating where each participant fell in terms of 
vulnerability and symptomatology. 
 
Table 37b: Chi squared to indicate whether vulnerability and being symptomatic 
were associated or independent  
 
 Symptomatic 
Non 
Symptomatic 
 
Total 
 
Vulnerable 
 
2 8 10 
Non 
Vulnerable 
 
9 15 24 
 
Total 
 
11 23 34 
       x2 = 0.988, df = 1, p > 0.05, non significant 
 
The predetermined alpha level of significance was 0.05 and chi square statistic 
was x2 = 0.988, the df is 1 for a 2 x 2 grid. This is bigger than the conventionally 
accepted significance level of 0.05, so the null hypothesis that the two 
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distributions are the same is accepted. Since the x2 statistic (0.988) did not 
exceed the critical value for 0.05 probability level (0.988) the researcher can 
accept the null hypothesis that depressive symptoms are independent of 
vulnerability (i.e. vulnerability had no effect on depressive symptoms). The result 
contrasts with the finding from Study 4 chi squared showing depressive 
symptoms are not independent of vulnerability. The possible reason is the 
smaller number of participants in the present study who are both vulnerable and 
symptomatic compared to Study 4. 
 
6.3.2.2 Independent sample t-tests on the sentence completion procedure 
between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable  
To examine the differences in vulnerable and non-vulnerable cognitive 
characteristics under transient negative mood, baseline checks using 
independent sample tests to check for difference before mood manipulation were 
carried out. Table 38 presents the independent samples test between the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable on the sentence completion procedure. 
 
Table 38: Independent sample t-tests on the sentence completion procedure 
between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable (Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances) 
 
 
    t  df   Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
SCEPT     1.29  32   0.21 
    
General category    1.23  32   0.23 
    
Specific category  -1.33  32   0.19 
    
Semantic associates  -1.10  32   0.28 
    
Categoric memories  -0.08  32   0.94 
    
Extended memories    0.98  32   0.34 
    
Specific memories    0.57  32   0.57 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
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Observation of the data suggested that there was no significant difference 
between cognitive characteristics in the vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups 
prior to the mood manipulation. 
 
6.3.2.3 Paired sample t-tests on the sentence completion procedure between the 
non-vulnerable and vulnerable pre and post mood manipulation 
There was a significant difference in the vulnerable but not the non-vulnerable 
group in overgeneral memory. Table 39 (on the next page) presents paired 
sample tests between the non-vulnerable and the vulnerable on the sentence 
completion procedure. 
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Table 39: Paired sample t-tests between the non-vulnerable and the vulnerable pre 
and post mood manipulation 
 
Paired mean differences 
(pre and post mood induction)  t  df  Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
Non-vulnerable   
 
SCEPT       1.74  23  0.10 
 
General category    -1.80  23  0.09 
 
Specific category      1.75  23  0.09 
 
Semantic associates      1.12  23  0.27 
 
Categoric memories    -1.53  23  0.14 
 
Extended memories      0.00  23  1.00 
 
Specific memories      1.66  23  0.11 
 
Vulnerable   
 
SCEPT       4.48    9  0.01** 
 
General category    -4.02    9  0.01** 
 
Specific category      3.21    9  0.01** 
 
Semantic associates    -0.17  9  0.87 
 
Categoric memories    -1.74  9  0.12 
 
Extended memories      1.26  9  0.24 
 
Specific memories     2.54    9  0.03* 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
Hypothesis 5.3: There was a significant difference in total SCEPT in the 
vulnerable group (t (9) = 4.48, p < 0.01). This indicates that there was a 
significant decrease in specificity post mood induction. This suggests reduced 
specificity and increased overgeneralness of memory under mood stress.  
 
Hypothesis 5.2: There was a significant difference in general category in the 
vulnerable group (t (9) = -4.02, p < 0.01). This indicates that there was a 
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significant increase in semantic associates and categoric memories post mood 
induction. This suggests that there is an increase in overgeneral memory under 
mood stress.  
 
Hypothesis 5.1: There was a significant difference in specific category in the 
vulnerable group (t (9) = 3.21, p < 0.01). This suggests that there is a decrease in 
specific category of memory under mood stress. There was a further significant 
difference in the specific memories in the vulnerable group (t (9) = 2.54, p < 
0.05). This indicates that there was a significant decrease in specific memories 
post mood induction. This suggests decreased specificity of memory under mood 
stress. 
 
 
6.3.2.4 Independent sample t-tests on the sentence completion procedure 
between symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
To examine the differences in symptomatic and non-symptomatic cognitive 
characteristics on the sentence completion test under transient negative mood, 
baseline checks using independent samples tests to check for differences before 
mood manipulation were carried out. Following the example of Levine et al. 
(2006), participants were categorised into BDI scores of 0-7 as non-symptomatic, 
and scores of 8-12 as indicative of symptomatic. Table 40 (on the next page) 
presents independent sample tests between the symptomatic and non-
symptomatic on the sentence completion procedure. 
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Table 40: Independent sample t-tests on the sentence completion procedure 
between the symptomatic and non-symptomatic (Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances) 
 
    t  df   Sig.  
         (2-tailed) 
 
SCEPT    2.00  32   0.054 
    
General category   1.66  32   0.11 
    
Specific category  -1.37  32   0.18 
    
Semantic associates  -1.41  32   0.17 
    
Categoric memories   0.22  32   0.83 
    
Extended memories   0.17  32   0.86 
    
Specific memories   1.99  32   0.054 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
There is no significant difference between cognitive characteristics in the 
symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups prior to the mood manipulation. 
 
 
6.3.2.5 Paired sample t-tests on the sentence completion procedure between the 
non-symptomatic and the symptomatic pre and post mood manipulation 
There was a significant difference between the pre-existing symptomatic but not 
in the non-symptomatic group. Table 41 (on the next page) presents paired 
sample tests between the non-symptomatic and the symptomatic on the 
sentence completion procedure. 
 
Hypothesis 5.4: There was a significant difference in total SCEPT in both the 
non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups (t (22) = 2.30, p < 0.05 and t (10) = 
3.01, p < 0.01 respectively). This indicates that there was a significant decrease 
in specificity in both groups post mood induction. This suggests reduced 
specificity 
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Table 41: Paired sample t-tests on sentence completion procedure between the 
non-symptomatic and the symptomatic pre and post mood manipulation 
 
Paired mean differences    t  df  Sig. 
(pre and post mood induction)       (2-tailed) 
  
Non-symptomatic    
 
SCEPT        2.30   22  0.03* 
 
General category     -2.60   22  0.02* 
 
Specific category       2.15   22  0.04* 
 
Semantic associates       0.45  22  0.66 
 
Categoric memories    -1.45  22  0.16 
 
Extended memories       0.00  22  1.00 
 
Specific memories      1.66  22  0.11 
 
Symptomatic    
 
SCEPT       3.01    10  0.01** 
 
General category    -2.75   10  0.02* 
 
Specific category      2.43   10  0.04* 
 
Semantic associates      0.70  10  0.50 
 
Categoric memories    -1.75  10  0.11 
 
Extended memories      0.94  10  0.37 
 
Specific memories      3.11    10  0.01** 
** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
*  significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).         
 
in both the non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups, and increased over-
generalness of memory under mood stress.  
 
Hypothesis 5.2: There was a significant difference in general category in both 
the non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups (t (22) = -2.60, p < 0.05 and t (10) 
= -2.75, p < 0.05 respectively). This indicates that there was a significant 
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increase in semantic associates and categoric memories in both groups post 
mood induction. This suggests that there is an increased overgeneral memory in 
both non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups under mood stress. 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: There was a significant difference in specific category in both 
the non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups (t (22) = 2.15, p < 0.05 and t (10) 
= 2.43, p < 0.05 respectively). This indicates that there was a significant 
decrease in extended memories and specific memories in both groups post mood 
induction. This suggests that there is a decrease in specificity of memory in both 
non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups under mood stress. There was a 
further significant difference in the specific memories in the symptomatic group (t 
(10) = 3.11, p < 0.01). This indicates that there was a significant decrease in 
specific memories post mood induction. This suggests decreased specificity of 
memory under mood stress. 
 
To summarise, the paired samples t-test indicated an overall significant 
difference between pre and post mood induction procedure in the vulnerable. The 
vulnerable group showed a significant increase in overgeneral memories. 
Univariate analysis indicated an increase in overgeneral memories in the 
vulnerable. Interestingly this was not shown in the non-vulnerable group. The 
result from this study suggests that these cognitive characteristics in the non-
symptomatic and symptomatic are similarly affected by transient negative mood 
state. Both the non-symptomatic group and the symptomatic group demonstrated 
a significant increase in generic memories when in negative mood state. 
Univariate analysis demonstrated a non-significant effect on the increase in 
overgeneral memories. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This study examined the relationship between negative mood and overgeneral 
memory. The first analysis suggested that the vulnerable showed a significant 
increase in overgeneral memories (Hypothesis 5.3). Specifically, an overall 
reduction in specific memories was seen in the vulnerable group (Hypothesis 
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5.1). Interestingly, this was not shown in the non-vulnerable group. This supports 
the differential activation hypothesis (Lau et al., 2004), which indicates that 
negative mood would differentially increase overgeneral memories in the 
vulnerable group. The differential activation hypothesis suggests that, unlike the 
non-vulnerable group, the vulnerable will have latent cognitive characteristics that 
will be reactivated by negative mood (Williams et al., 1997). The result from the 
second analysis suggests that the symptomatic and non-symptomatic are 
similarly affected by transient negative mood state, with both groups 
demonstrating a significant increase in generic memories (Hypothesis 5.2). 
Overgeneral memory therefore seems to be a marker of vulnerability of 
depressive rather than a marker of depressive symptomatology per se. 
 
6.4.1 Vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
The key finding in the present study suggests that vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
individuals have different specificity of memories following a mood induction 
procedure. This supports Hypothesis 5.3 that there would be a difference 
between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable. The evidence from the present 
study suggests that vulnerable people do show overgeneral recall under transient 
negative mood state, while non-vulnerable people show no change in specificity 
of recall. The present findings suggest that mood is an important factor in 
memory specificity and that changes in specificity occurred under mood stress 
differentially in the vulnerable group but not the non-vulnerable group. There was 
an increase in general category memories in the vulnerable when in negative 
mood state (Hypothesis 5.2). There was also a decrease in specific category 
memories in the vulnerable when in negative mood state (Hypothesis 5.1). The 
Gibbs & Rude (2004) study indicates evidence for an increase in overgeneral 
memories in the vulnerable when in negative mood, and provides supports for a 
differential activation hypothesis (Teasdale, 1983). The differential activation 
hypothesis suggests that vulnerable individuals have particular cognitive styles 
that are triggered by negative mood state and bias their cognitive processes in 
encoding, storage and retrieval of memory that would have important implications 
for over general recall. This was supported by a univariate analysis which 
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suggests that vulnerability as a fixed variable accounted for some of the increase 
in overgeneral memories (F = 11.29, p < 0.05). This supports Hypothesis 5.2 that 
there would be a difference in overgeneral memories. 
 
6.4.2 Symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
The second key finding in the present study suggests that symptomatic and non-
symptomatic individuals are similarly influenced following a mood induction 
procedure. This does not support Hypothesis 5.4 that there would be a difference 
between the symptomatic and the non-symptomatic. This second analysis 
demonstrated that both non-symptomatic and symptomatic groups showed a 
significant increase in overgeneral memories and a reduction in specific 
memories. This demonstrates that current induced negative mood state has an 
impact on overgeneral memory which is unaffected by depressive 
symptomatology over the last two weeks. The present findings suggest that 
transient mood state affects overgeneral memories in both symptomatic and non-
symptomatic groups. Both groups demonstrated a significant increase in generic 
memories when in negative mood state (Hypothesis 5.2). There was also a 
decrease in specific category memories in both symptomatic and non-
symptomatic groups when in negative mood state (Hypothesis 5.1). This is 
similar to findings by Wessel, Meeren, Peeters, Arntz, & Merckelbach (2001). 
This was further supported by a univariate analysis in the present study which 
suggested that symptomatic symptoms over the last two weeks as a fixed 
variable had a non-significant effect on increase in overgeneral memories (F = 
1.08, p = 0.43, n.s.). LIke the t-test contrast between the symptomatic and non-
symptomatic, the univariate analysis does not support Hypothesis 5.4 that there 
would be a difference in overgeneral memories. 
 
The symptoms of depression reported in the study, as would be expected, were 
mild and therefore non-clinical. It could reasonably be argued that they would be 
similarly affected by transient negative mood state. These findings could have 
been different in a clinically depressive population, such groups having been 
reported to show increased overgeneral memory compared to the non-depressed 
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(Moffitt, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson & Vyse, 1994; Sampson, Kinderman, Watts & 
Sembi, 2003). 
 
6.4.3 Comparative discussion: Studies 4 and 5 
Study 4 provided evidence that present cognitive appraisals are differentially 
effected by transient mood state in the vulnerable vs. the non-vulnerable 
(Hypothesis 4.2) and the symptomatic vs. the non-symptomatic (Hypothesis 4.3), 
while the present study suggests that overgeneral autobiographical memory is 
differentially affected in the vulnerable vs. the non-vulnerable (Hypothesis 5.3) 
but is undifferentiated in the symptomatic and the non-symptomatic (Hypothesis 
5.4) group, but shows increased overgeneral memory in both groups.  
 
The interpretation of the data would suggest that the SCEPT is sensitive to the 
changes in negative mood state. The reduced specificity seems to be visible in 
the vulnerable but not the non-vulnerable group. This finding seems to lend 
support for the differential activation hypothesis. It was further demonstrated that 
the SCEPT was able to assess reduced specificity in both the symptomatic state 
and non-symptomatic group under transient mood stress. Hitherto, the literature 
suggests this phenomenon was present in the depressed and previously 
depressed while in the never depressed it was absent (Mackinger et al., 2000; 
Nandrino, Pezard, Poste, Reveillere & Beaune, 2002). The present finding that it 
is present in both the symptomatic and the non-symptomatic under mood stress 
might suggest that SCEPT as an instrument in measuring overgeneral memory is 
more sensitive than traditional measures of overgeneral memory as suggested 
by the authors (Raes et al., 2007).  
 
Making sense of the results would suggest that it is transient mood state and 
vulnerability rather than presence of symptomatology that are likely to be 
important in moderating overgeneral memories. The presence or absence of 
symptomatology did not affect the associated overgeneral memory seen in 
negative mood state. The finding was that the non-vulnerable in negative mood 
state showed no overgeneral memory but retained memory specificity. This 
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would account for the presence of overgeneral memory after remission for 
depression in which symptomatology has gone but vulnerability for depression 
ensues. It would also answer the question why overgeneral memory can be 
induced in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Raes et al., 2007). 
Overgeneral memory acts differentially in the vulnerable i.e. those with a previous 
history of depression. 
 
The interpretation of the comparative procedure with the CAMQ suggests that 
cognitive characteristics under investigation are sensitive to the changes in 
transient mood. The observed changes in cognitive characteristics were visible in 
the vulnerable but not the non-vulnerable group. The interpretation is that 
induced negative mood seems to facilitate or prime certain cognitive 
characteristics selectively in the vulnerable. This finding seems to lend support 
for the differential activation hypothesis. It was further demonstrated that the 
CAMQ was able to assess changes in cognitive characteristics in the 
symptomatic but not the non-symptomatic group under transient mood stress. 
This finding contrasts with the SCEPT, which has a focus on overgeneral 
memory, rather than cognitive reactivity in CAMQ. 
 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
It would seem likely that the SCEPT is directly assessing overgeneral retrieval, 
while the CAMQ is predominantly assessing broader cognitive characteristics 
within autobiographical memory. It would also seem that CAMQ is assessing 
broader cognitive characteristics which imply increased or reduced reactivity of 
those operations following mood manipulation. The SCEPT would seem to be 
focusing on cognitive processes and memory specificity involved in memory 
retrieval. It is also likely that the SCEPT and CAMQ are both tapping into 
automatic responses, as opposed to strategic. However, it would seem likely that 
the CAMQ is focusing on cognitive operations rather than cognitive processes. 
Ingram et al. (1998) define cognitive operations as the way individuals deal with 
negative mood and focus on important cognitive changes that take place under 
mood stress. Cognitive operations focus on shifts in attention, rumination, self-
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evaluation and future predictions, whereas cognitive processes focus on how 
information is encoded, altered, combined and stored in memory (Hollon & Garb, 
1988). 
  
The present research has highlighted that overgeneral memories might be acting 
as a potential moderator in cued autobiographical content. It would seem that 
negative mood might serve to activate the depressive content with the increased 
endorsement of certain cognitive characteristics. Some cognitive processes 
dominate during the presence of depressive symptoms, such as increased 
access to negative automatic thoughts or cognitive biases, and others seem to 
endure when non-symptomatic but persist in those with a previous history, such 
as increases in overgeneral memory style. The suggestion is that mood state 
effect on autobiographical content and memory is multifaceted, with some facets 
being mood state dependent and other facets being a stable function of 
vulnerability to depression. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis now turns to the discussion of the research presented in the previous 
empirical chapters. The present research investigated the autobiographical 
responsiveness to negative mood state in terms of cognitive content and 
overgeneral memories. In the previous five chapters, the findings from the 
separate studies were discussed and interpreted separately in the light of the 
relevant literature. The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the studies 
as a whole, to draw general conclusions and discuss implications for theory and 
practice. The key findings are summarised and theoretical and practical 
implications of these findings are discussed following each study. This is followed 
by a consideration of methodological limitations, and a number of suggestions for 
future investigations which expand on the present research are discussed.  
 
The present research studies were aimed at addressing the question of whether 
autobiographical recall is affected by negative mood state and at suggesting 
what factors other than mood might mediate the mood state effects in memory 
recall. Specifically, the present research investigated which components of 
negative mood state determined a change from pre to post mood induction in the 
cued autobiographical memory. Two main theories to be discussed are Bower’s 
(Bower 1981) associative network theory and the Beck et al. (1979) schema 
theory. The first theory suggests that accessibility of the cognitive products 
emerging from autobiographical retrieval are intrinsically in an associative 
network joining memory and mood. This theory would predict that mood change 
will result in autobiographical memory biases in a congruent direction with the 
induced mood. An alternative way to understand the accessibility of the cognitive 
products from autobiographical recall is by the Beck et al. (1979) schema theory, 
which suggests that latent cognitive aspects from previous episodes of 
depression are activated by mood states, and further suggests that temporary 
mood change would have little effect in the absence of stable trait-like 
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vulnerability in terms of a previous history of depression or current depressive 
symptoms. This latter theory indicates that cognitive reactivity is to do with some 
aspect of the depressive syndrome. 
 
The purpose of the present research series was to test the relationship between 
negative mood and its effect on autobiographical recall, including the relative 
accessibility of cognitive content, so-called cognitive reactivity and generality of 
memory in a non-clinical population. The series of studies is also designed to 
build insight in relation to one another and to bring together the various factors 
involved. The research was unique in three respects. Firstly, Studies 1-3 
investigated four different mood variables as measured by the UWIST-MACL: 
energetic arousal, tense arousal, hedonic tone and anger/frustration (Matthews 
et al., 1990). Studies 1 - 3 to an extent were exploratory, because there was 
some evidence on the effects of depressed mood, but less evidence on the 
effects of individual negative mood components on autobiographical retrieval. A 
number of emotional aspects of autobiographical content formed the focus of 
Study 1, while Studies 2 and 3 looked at cognitive aspects of autobiographical 
content. The second unique aspect to the research was that symptomatology 
and vulnerability were investigated in Studies 2 and 3 respectively as 
moderators. Studies 4 - 5 contrast with the exploratory nature of studies 1 – 3, 
which investigated individual mood components rather than overall negative 
mood change as in studies 4 -5. The t – test was used in studies 4 - 5 to 
investigate overall mood change rather than exploratory correlational analysis 
which was used to investigate the individual negative mood components. Finally, 
the third unique aspect was that autobiographical aspects were looked at from 
the emotional and cognitive content in Studies 1-4 and of memory generality in 
Study 5.  
 
Study 1 investigated autobiographical sensory and emotional aspects following a 
negative mood induction. A manipulation check supported the validity of the 
experimental procedure as a means to induce a negative mood response. 
Miranda & Persons (1998) argued that internal mood states, as well as external 
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events, might facilitate or inhibit autobiographical processes. The question asked 
was whether there is a transitory mood effect on sensory and emotional aspects, 
such as feelings and emotions, attached to memories. This was done by looking 
at evaluative judgements on feelings and emotions attached to memories rather 
than specific cognitive content, which was the focus of the following series of 
studies.  
 
The hypothesis that change in mood would result in changes in evaluative 
judgements yielded some support. The key significant change was the evaluative 
judgement of emotionality, which showed significant negative correlations with 
energetic arousal and hedonic tone. The dimension of energetic arousal 
indicates decreased psychomotor activities, while hedonic tone is associated with 
affective mood state indicating increased negative affective tone. This supports 
Hypothesis 1.3, which suggested that there would be a difference in emotional 
intensity.  This suggests that negative mood may be influencing autobiographical 
retrieval and its consequent appraisal. The external detail and the appraisal are 
seen as autobiographical memory content. The relationship is possibly 
bidirectional as suggested by Oei et al. (2005). This means that mood may effect 
autobiographical retrieval and, in turn, effect the appraisal and content which, in 
turn, may effect further autobiographical retrieval. The terms content and 
appraisal have been used in the present research. The content can be defined as 
either external detail or an appraisal of the detail in the recalled memory 
(Bokhari, 2011). External detail includes time, place and person. The appraisal of 
the detail includes all internal content in terms of subjective interpretations of the 
external event such as emotionality and vividness (Johnson et al., 1988). This 
key finding between emotionality and energetic arousal and hedonic tone shows 
the potential availability of autobiographical events and their accessibility to the 
more evaluative knowledge contained in memory. This finding is consistent with 
the literature (Lau et al., 2004; Segal et al., 1999) suggesting that reactivity of 
cognitive content in memory is affected by negative mood.  
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The two central predictors were energetic arousal and hedonic tone, which seem 
to act as key influences to shifts in autobiographical content, especially in 
memories with increased emotionality. There was a further significant change 
score intercorrelation between emotionality and personal importance. Therefore, 
it would seem that emotional memories are cued by negatively affected mood 
states, which are likely to increase personal relevance (Alea & Bluck, 2007). This 
concurs with mood congruent theories on autobiographical recall; memories with 
high personal importance and those high in emotional significance would be 
recalled under similar congruent affective states (Conway, 1990; Conway & 
Bekerian, 1987). Emotional intensity, therefore, could be an important factor in 
autobiographical recall (McBride, Cappeliez, 2004; Talarico, LaBar & Rubin, 
2004).  
 
The implications from this study are that sensory and emotional content in 
autobiographical memories can be influenced by negative mood state. The link 
between mood and autobiographical content only existed for symptomatic and 
vulnerable in the Studies 2 and 3 respectively. This apparent contradiction may 
be due to the fact that Study 1 focused on the sensory and emotional 
components and additionally, the likelihood is that the sample in Study 1 
contained participants that were symptomatic and vulnerable which became 
more salient when divided into symptomatic and vulnerable groups, as in Studies 
2 and 3. The results indicate that negative mood might have influenced a shift 
towards emotional aspects of memory. There is some evidence that particular 
mood components underlie this shift: emotional arousal and hedonic tone. 
Tentatively, there is some evidence for Bower’s (Bower, 1981) associative 
network theory, in that similar emotional and affective aspects are evoked by 
similar negative mood state. This could have important theoretical and clinical 
implications for treatment. The cognitive theory of depression suggests that 
negative mood states encourage the selection and interpretation of emotional 
information differently from those in non-negative mood states (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010). Research into negative mood and memory processes could 
possibly focus on how retrieval is functionally associated with the early stages of 
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information processing and in what way in might bias memory. If 
autobiographical memory is influenced by mood state, then techniques at 
targeting mood change might have a beneficial impact on memories.  
 
It is clear that not all sensory and emotional content in autobiographical 
memories is similarly influenced by negative mood state. The lack of significant 
correlation between the four mood dimensions and valence of memory suggests 
that valence does not significantly correlate with increase in negative mood. This 
did not support Hypothesis 1.4 – that there would be a difference in valence. This 
finding was unexpected, as the literature shows an association between valence 
and memory recall (Bower, 1981; Watkins, Vache, Vernay, Muller & Mathews, 
1996). The four mood components did not yield any further statistically significant 
intercorrelations between any of the remaining aspects: evaluative judgements, 
personal importance and how recent the event was (Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2 & 1.5). 
This supports the idea that mood fails to be an explanation in terms of a single 
unitary connection but rather demonstrates a multifaceted response, with some 
variables showing moderate correlations and others showing weak or non-
significant correlations with mood components. A possible explanation for the 
smaller yield of significant correlations in this study may be that previous studies 
have predominately used depressed subjects, who seem more vulnerable to 
mood stress. The present study has used a non-clinical student population, 
which could have a rather different response to a sudden negative mood 
induction (Laney, Campbell, Heuer & Reisberg, 2004; Williams, Watts, MacLeod 
& Mathews, 1988). The idea that depressive symptomatology could possibly act 
as a moderating variable was taken up in the following study, which investigated 
the cognitive content rather than the emotional and sensory components of 
autobiographical memory.  
 
Study 2 therefore investigated the effects of mood manipulation on the cognitive 
content of cued autobiographical memories in non-symptomatic and symptomatic 
groups. The aim was to assess whether the cognitive products following a 
negative mood induction procedure are sensitive to temporary mood change. 
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The design enabled assessment of pre-standing symptoms and the possible 
effects on accessibility of the cognitive products pre and post mood stress. The 
existence of depressive symptoms was measured by Beck’s’ Depression 
Inventory (BDI). There are several explanatory and conceptual models that 
explain the cognitive reactivity under negative transient mood change. Cognitive 
reactivity refers to the phenomenon whereby negative mood states reactivate 
negative cognitive styles (Segal et al., 2006). Theory is that a history of 
depression establishes an association between cognitive modes and mood (Lau 
et al., 2004). It follows that current negative mood states, whatever their origins, 
would act to make these modes more prominent or available (Raes, Dewulf, Van 
Heeringen & Williams 2009).  
 
An important finding from this study suggests that negative mood, as measured 
by hedonic tone, may be acting as a significant predictor of autobiographical 
content in the non-symptomatic group. The key significant changes were in 
autobiographical appraisals of rumination, expectancy and personal importance, 
which all showed significant positive correlations with hedonic tone, suggesting a 
reduction in all three characteristics. This supports Hypotheses 2.1 ii, iv and v 
that there would be a change in these characteristics. This finding supports the 
empirical finding from Lyubomirsky et al. (1999), which suggested that non-
symptomatic individuals rated their thoughts as significantly more positive, 
optimistic and less personally related. The results would tentatively suggest that 
valence of mood (indexed by hedonic tone) is activating autobiographical content 
in the non-symptomatic group. The results are also consistent with theory of a 
hierarchical search that culminates in access to specific event memories being 
more likely in non-symptomatic individuals (Williams et al., 2006b). It may be 
possible that memory specificity is present in the non-symptomatic, which 
enables a targeted memory search and results in cognitive reactivity. It is 
suggested by Williams et al. (2007) that memories which are high in sensory and 
perceptual detail are being accessed by the non-symptomatic.  
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In the symptomatic group, the present research found associations between the 
depressive symptom group and rumination. This supports Hypothesis 2.2 that 
there would be a difference in the symptomatic versus the non-symptomatic 
groups. This key finding suggests that negative mood may be evoking an 
increase in rumination in those with current depressive symptomatology. The 
present findings concur with previous research looking at groups with current 
depressive symptomatology (Golden, Dalgleish & Spinks, 2006; Power Duggan, 
Lee & Murray, 1995). The results demonstrate that autobiographical cognitive 
content shows reactivity in those self-reporting depressive symptomatology 
(indexed by a significant change score correlation between energetic arousal and 
rumination). The results also support findings from the literature that pre-standing 
depressive symptoms and rumination are correlated in negative mood states 
(Williams, 1996). There was no association between mood and rumination in the 
asymptomatic group, indicating that mood and cognitive characteristics are 
unaffected in participants who do not have current depressive symptomatology. 
 
The implication from this study is that negative mood, as measured by hedonic 
tone, may be acting as a significant predictor of autobiographical content in the 
non-symptomatic group. The key significant changes were in autobiographical 
appraisals of rumination, expectancy and personal importance, which all showed 
significant positive correlations with hedonic tone, suggesting a reduction in all 
three characteristics. The presence of stable depressive symptoms seemed to 
act to increase ruminative content. The evidence in the literature suggests that 
negative mood state in those showing current depressive symptomatology can 
have a negative impact on cognitive processes such as rumination (Oei et al., 
2005). The resultant change score correlation between hedonic tone and 
ruminative content was strong. The evidence from this study may indicate that 
hedonic tone as a mood component is an important aspect in autobiographical 
recall. There is some evidence for valence (indexed by hedonic tone) activating 
increased ruminative content rather than arousal (indexed by energetic and tense 
arousal). Tentatively, this looks to support the Beck et al. (1979) schema theory, 
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indicating that cognitive aspects are activated by temporary negative mood state 
in the presence of stable depressive symptoms.  
 
The study also supports the theory that negative mood state might reactivate 
negative ruminative styles in the symptomatic (Segal et al., 2006). The 
implication is that pre-existing negative cognitive styles make the individual more 
vulnerable at a time of increased negative mood, which makes the available 
negative modes more accessible (Lau et al., 2004 for a review). Theories of 
mood regulation suggest that the experience of a negative mood state may 
trigger cognitive styles that may exacerbate or lock the individual into a 
prolonged negative mood state (Joormann & Siemer 2004; Rusting & DeHart 
2000). The implication is that reducing ruminative cognitive styles could have a 
consequent effect on reducing negative mood state and depressive interlock 
(Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007; Williams et al., 2007). 
 
The present findings are in line with previous published research (Derry & Kuiper, 
1981; Miranda & Persons, 1988), in that cognitive content responded to negative 
mood state. There is a clear suggestion in the literature that level of trait 
depressive symptoms as well as acute transient shift in mood could be 
associated with shifts in cognitive aspects (Miranda & Persons, 1988). It might be 
that baseline threshold levels and acute negative mood changes have an 
increased cognitive consequence due to the presence of relatively stable 
symptoms. There is some support for this in that the symptomatic group 
responded by an increase in ruminative content, whereas there was no such 
response in the non-symptomatic group. Studies such as Clark et al. (1999) 
demonstrate that individuals showing current symptoms report more 
dysfunctional cognitive content than those not currently showing trait symptoms, 
but the authors did not exclude the possibility that the finding might be due to 
participants having a previous history of depression rather than current 
symptoms to account for the cognitive reactivity. The idea that a history of 
depression could possibly act as a moderating variable was considered in the 
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following study, which investigated the cognitive content of autobiographical 
memory in vulnerable and non-vulnerable groups.  
 
Study 3 investigated the effects of mood on the cognitive content of cued 
autobiographical memories in non-vulnerable and vulnerable groups. The aim 
was to assess whether the cognitive products following a negative mood 
induction procedure are sensitive to temporary mood change. The design 
enabled assessment of previous depressive episodes and the possible effects on 
accessibility of the cognitive products pre and post mood stress. Miranda & 
Persons (1988) suggest that depressive cognitive aspects are potentially 
inaccessible in those that are vulnerable until activated by negative mood. Beck 
(1996) argued that cognitive, affective, motivational, behavioural, and 
physiological symptoms of depression are linked together as a ‘mode’. These 
modes vary in activation, or what Beck (1996) called charge. They are highly 
charged during depression, but continue to exist after depression remit, with the 
mode being far less activated and charged. This mood state hypothesis has been 
advanced by Persons & Miranda (1992) & Segal & Ingram (1994), and suggests 
that there are individual differences that exist in the availability of modes, but that 
the accessibility of these structures varies with present mood. 
 
The findings suggest that the vulnerable (those with a previous history of 
depression) and non-vulnerable (those without a history of depression) have 
different reactivity of cognitive content following a negative mood induction 
procedure. This supported Hypothesis 3.2 that there would be a difference 
between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable. The present study found that 
rumination was higher in memories for past appraisals in the vulnerable group 
(Hypothesis 3.1 ii). The results also yielded evidence that the vulnerable but not 
the non-vulnerable group showed cognitive bias under mood stress, with other 
people being seen as less important and future events being evaluated as less 
certain. This supports Hypothesis 3.1 (iii and iv) that there would be a change in 
these characteristics. It would seem that induced negative mood during retrieval 
has an impact on cognitive processes which seems to be associated with both 
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internal persistent structures in the vulnerable and external mood states. It 
therefore seems likely that the change in cognitive aspects observed post mood 
induction has resulted from both trait- and state-like phenomena due to the 
changes being observed in the trait-like vulnerable group and after the state-like 
negative mood induction (Fresco et al., 2006). 
 
The implications of this study support the idea that cognitive vulnerability exists in 
those who have a history of depression, and seems to emerge during transitory 
negative mood states. Evidence from this study may indicate that arousal 
(indexed by tense arousal) is an important aspect in autobiographical recall in 
those with a previous history of depression. The resultant change score 
correlations in the vulnerable for other people being seen as less important and 
future events being evaluated as less certain were moderate compared to the 
weaker correlates seen in the non-vulnerable. The study also found a difference 
in the amount of vulnerable compared to non-vulnerable rumination, especially 
for past events, with rumination being a dominant mode for the vulnerable. 
 
Tentatively, this looks to support the Beck et al. (1979) schema theory, in that 
cognitive aspects are activated by temporary negative mood state in the 
presence of vulnerability. Gemar et al. (2001) suggest that a temporary negative 
mood state in those with a previous history of depression can reinstate some of 
the cognitive features observed in depression itself. Similarly, Persons & Miranda 
(1992) and Segal & Ingram (1994) have suggested that vulnerable individuals 
are activated by negative mood, which evokes an increase in the accessibility of 
cognitive modes from previous episodes. The present study and Gemar et al. 
(2001) study could also be interpreted as support for Bower’s (Bower, 1981) 
associative network theory, in that similar emotional and affective aspects are 
evoked by similar negative mood state. Thus it is possible that autobiographical 
memory may have some longer term trait aspects in conjunction with state 
aspect that is influenced by the arousal component of mood.  
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The present research supports previous findings which suggest the presence of 
vulnerable modes that are sensitive to the mood state (Roberts & Gamble, 2001). 
The so-called cognitive reactivity seems to be more pronounced in the vulnerable 
and for aspects that have some degree of self-focused content (indexed by 
rumination), suggesting the need for the presence of a persistent trait such as 
previous vulnerability and transitory negative mood state. It is not possible in this 
study to rule out the role of dispositional depressive symptoms present in the 
vulnerable that may be the consequence of having had a previous episode of 
depression. The moderate change score correlations between mood and 
cognitive characteristics in the vulnerable group show a decrease in the 
importance of other people and expectancy, with increase in tense arousal and 
also a change in valence of recalled memories with increased hedonic tone. It 
would seem from this that the arousal aspect of mood is an important component 
in activating autobiographical content in the vulnerable, while hedonic tone is 
important in the valence of memory. Due to the findings that vulnerability seems 
to be an important moderator in recalled memories from this study, and that 
current symptomatology seems to increase ruminative cognitive characteristics 
under temporary negative mood, it was thought necessary to examine both 
vulnerability and current symptomatology in the same study. 
 
Study 4 therefore investigated the effects of mood on the cognitive content of 
cued autobiographical memories in non-vulnerable and vulnerable and 
symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups in the same study. Given the results 
in self-referent aspects (indexed by rumination) in the previous study, the present 
study introduces a self-focus manipulation task to enhance the personally 
important cognitive content and its reactivity. These self-focused events within 
the ‘working self’ may be closer to relevant cognitive vulnerability (Williams et al., 
2008). A variety of investigators have elaborated on the exact nature of the 
cognitive biases, suggesting that a system of self-focused attention gives rise to 
idiographic patterns of information processing that activate cognitive styles, such 
as the increased probability of self-blame, pessimism about the future and own 
inferiority compared to others (Williams et al., 2008). The questions that have not 
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fully been resolved in the literature are whether autobiographical memory is 
influenced by mood state or independent, as argued by Williams (1996). Williams 
(1996) contends that autobiographical memory is a trait attribute of the individual 
due to a previous history of depression or some aspects of depressive 
psychopathology. There is consistent evidence of the role of cognitions in 
depression, but it is unclear whether these are a result of depressogenic trait-like 
markers or more mood-state-like phenomena or both. These questions were 
investigated in Studies 4 and 5. 
 
The key finding in Study 4 suggests that vulnerable versus non-vulnerable and 
symptomatic versus non-symptomatic individuals have different specificity of 
cognitive content following a mood induction procedure. This supported 
Hypotheses 4.2 and 4.3 that there would be a difference between the vulnerable 
versus non-vulnerable and symptomatic versus non-symptomatic. The present 
findings suggested that differences existed between vulnerable and non-
vulnerable which were only observable in primed negative mood state. The 
results suggested that the vulnerable group showed cognitive bias under mood 
stress with typicalness showing less perceptual origins and other people being 
seen as less important, and future events being evaluated as less certain. This 
supports Hypotheses 4.1 i, iii and iv that there would be a change in these 
characteristics. Similar differences existed in those with stable depressive 
symptomatology compared to those who were asymptomatic, which was only 
observable in primed negative mood state. The evidence from this study 
supports theory that, in addition to vulnerability or mild stable symptomatic mood, 
current negative mood is a necessary condition to measure and observe bias 
cognitive styles. The results suggested that the symptomatic group showed 
cognitive bias under mood stress, with typicalness showing less perceptual 
origins and other people being seen as less important, and future events being 
evaluated as less certain. This supports Hypotheses 4.1 i, iii and iv that there 
would be a change in these characteristics. 
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The implications from the study suggest that autobiographical content can be 
prone to negative mood in participants with current depressive symptomatology 
(indexed by BDI) and those participants with a previous history of depression. 
This study looked at overall mood change rather than individual mood 
components as done in Studies 1 to 3. Investigating the affects of overall mood 
change on memory characteristics between two points in time could add weight 
to the argument for causality when added to the results of individual mood 
components. The individual mood components have already been examined in 
Studies 1 to 3. The hypothesis that cognitive aspects are dependent on mood 
state would gain in strength if it could be shown that there is an overall mean 
change in cognitive aspects post manipulation. If accepted, there is a stronger 
argument that cognitive aspects are dependent to some degree on transient 
mood state. The significant results in typicalness, importance of other people and 
valence both in vulnerable and symptomatic groups suggested that cognitive 
aspects are somewhat dependent on both mood state and ‘traitness’ in terms of 
a present vulnerability. The vulnerability seems to be either a previous 
depressive history or current symptomatology.  
 
The results lend some support for the differential activation hypothesis 
(Teasdale, 1988), in that cognitive content or modes seem to be evoked by 
temporary mood state. This seems to be activating cognitive content in people 
who have a present vulnerability factor. The cognitive content hypothesis 
suggests that negative mood activates negative bias that then propagates 
negative mood (Moulds, Kandris, Williams, Lang, Yap & Hoffmeister, 2008). The 
finding from the previous research and present study supports this theory and 
indicates that the cognitions involved centre around negative evaluation about 
future events and the importance of other people (Williams et al., 2008). 
 
The research highlighted that self-focused memories might be acting as a 
potential moderator in cued autobiographical content. The present research has 
also highlighted that there is a change in autobiographical cognitive content in 
the vulnerable and symptomatic, but has not distinguished between the effects of 
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cognitive reactivity versus the effects of generality of memories. Research into 
autobiographical memory suggests that negative mood can instigate vulnerable 
individuals to focus on self-related knowledge which is retrieved in a more 
overgeneral fashion (Just & Alloy, 1997; Roberts et al., 1988). Given that the 
evidence from this study and Study 2 related to the uncertainty whether the 
observed cognitive reactivity was due to memory specificity or activation of latent 
cognitive content, it was thought prudent to examine memory generality within 
the retrieved autobiographical memories in the vulnerable and symptomatic in 
the same study. It could be possible that memory generality is present in the 
vulnerable and symptomatic due to the effects of self-focused rumination, and 
this would have consequences for targeted memory search and could result in 
change in cognitive content by virtue of an incomplete memory search rather 
than the alternative explanation of activation of latent cognitive content. This was 
consequently investigated in the next study. 
 
Study 5 investigated the relationship between autobiographical memory 
specificity in negative mood by evoking a transient primed negative mood state, 
the explanation being that the induction of negative mood could be differentially 
increasing memory generality in the vulnerable, as suggested by the differential 
activation hypothesis (Lau et al., 2004). The memory generality explanation 
would be an alternative explanation to the standard view that cognitive content is 
a latent trait that becomes primed in a negative mood state. There is consistent 
evidence of the role of depression biasing cognitive functioning to elicit more 
overgeneral autobiographical memories, but it is unclear what other factors 
mediate this phenomenon. Evidence from the literature suggests that memory 
generality might not be a trait-like marker, which it has hitherto been 
conceptualised as, but partly dependent on mood state (McBride & Cappeliez, 
2004) and therefore can be seen as a mood-state-dependent phenomenon. 
 
The key finding in Study 5 suggests that vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
individuals have different specificity of memories following a mood induction 
procedure. This supports Hypothesis 5.3 that there would be a difference 
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between the vulnerable and non-vulnerable. There was an increase in general 
category memories in the vulnerable when in negative mood state (Hypothesis 
5.2). There was also a decrease in specific category memories in the vulnerable 
when in negative mood state (Hypothesis 5.1). This suggests that mood is an 
important factor in memory specificity, and that changes in specificity occurred 
under mood stress differentially in the vulnerable group but not the non-
vulnerable. Also, in the vulnerable, the present research found associations 
between history of depression and overgeneral memories. This latter finding 
supports previous research observing previous vulnerability (Svaldi & Mackinger, 
2003 & 2004) and its effect on memory generality when under mood stress. The 
second key finding suggests that symptomatic and non-symptomatic individuals 
are similarly influenced following a mood induction procedure. This did not 
support the hypothesis that there would be a difference between the symptomatic 
and non-symptomatic. The present findings suggest that transient mood state 
affects overgeneral memories in both symptomatic and non-symptomatic groups. 
The findings suggest that it is transient mood state and previous history, but not 
the presence of current symptoms per se, which seem to account for changes in 
memory generality in autobiographical recall.  
 
The implications from this study suggest that autobiographical memory specificity 
can be manipulated by negative mood state in participants with a reported history 
of depression but not in those without reported history. Secondly, the results 
suggest that autobiographical memory specificity can be manipulated in 
participants with depressive symptomatology and in participants without current 
symptoms. The findings suggest that reduced autobiographical memory 
specificity can be a function of current mood state, and could be independent of 
levels of depressive symptomatology. 
 
Taken together, the results support the possibility that autobiographical memory, 
specifically overgeneral memory style, might be influenced by temporary mood 
state. This finding does challenge the position that overgeneral memory is only 
contingent on long-term vulnerability (Williams, 1996). This research suggests 
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that mood state results in overgeneral memory and that previous vulnerability 
seems to be an important factor in the process. Theory that explains overgeneral 
memory style (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) indicates that individuals 
possibly start with a generic memory search of life events. It is possible that such 
a search evokes aversive memories or negative associations and results in the 
search being aborted at the categoric stage. The resultant search is described as 
a ‘truncated search strategy’ (Williams et al., 2007). It is hypothesised that 
because categoric memories are searched over and over again, they become 
over-rehearsed and more readily available next time. It has also been 
hypothesised that this iterative process encourages negative cognitive biases 
and self-reference (McIiwain, Taylor & Greeves, 2010). This clearly links 
overgeneral memory style with cognitive processes. 
 
The present research has highlighted that cognitive content (e.g. decreased 
ability to evaluate future events and increase in self-focused worries about the 
self) and overgeneral memory (e.g. increase in general memories and decrease 
in specific memories) are affected by temporary induced negative mood state. 
Overgeneral memory and cognitive content would seem to be two facets of mood 
state effects on autobiographical recall which might interact or be separate 
phenomena. It would seem that negative mood serves to activate the depressive 
content with the increased endorsement of certain cognitive characteristics. 
Some cognitive processes dominate during the presence of depressive 
symptoms, such as increased access to negative automatic thoughts or cognitive 
biases, and others, such as increases in overgeneral memory style, seem to 
endure when non-symptomatic but persist in those with a history of depression. 
The suggestion is that mood state effect on autobiographical content and 
memory is multifaceted, with some facets being mood-state-dependent and other 
facets being a stable function of vulnerability to depression. 
 
7.2 Collective findings and interpretations 
The present research involves several studies focused on the effects of negative 
mood on autobiographical content and memory generality. Mood has been seen 
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to influence cognitive reactivity and memory generality. The present research has 
found that cognitive reactivity, specifically content about the importance of other 
people and expectancies about the future, seems to respond to negative mood in 
the vulnerable and symptomatic. Secondly, memory generality – how individuals 
recall their past in an overgeneral way – tends to recall a number of events 
without retrieving specific event memories. These two facets of mood on 
autobiographical recall might interact or be separate phenomena in influencing 
state autobiographical retrieval within the individual. It can be seen that 
overgeneral recall might prevent previous information from past memories being 
accessed or make helpful cognitive content unavailable to generate additional 
helpful cognitive content. 
 
So, what can be interpreted from the key findings from each study and the 
collective findings from all five studies in this research? Study 1 suggested that 
the affective and emotional aspects of autobiographical memory were altered by 
negative mood, specifically that there was greater evidence for the emotional 
aspects being altered by energetic arousal and hedonic tone. Study 2 indicates 
that hedonic tone was acting as a significant predictor of autobiographical 
content in the non-symptomatic group. The key significant changes were in 
autobiographical appraisals of rumination, expectancy and personal importance. 
It also suggests that the cognitive aspect, specifically rumination, was sensitive to 
temporary mood change and that this was seen in the symptomatic group. The 
suggestion is that current symptoms might be acting as a moderating factor. In 
Study 3, the vulnerable group compared to the non-vulnerable group showed 
cognitive shift under negative mood state, with other people being seen as less 
important and future events being evaluated as less certain. The study also 
found that rumination was higher in memories for past appraisals and indicated 
that vulnerability might also be acting as a moderating factor. Studies 2 & 3 
collectively suggest that differences in cognitive characteristics in 
autobiographical content are seen most clearly when activated by negative mood 
in the presence of vulnerability or in those displaying current symptomatology. It 
would tentatively seem that valence of mood (indexed by hedonic tone) is 
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activating autobiographical content in the non-symptomatic. The arousal 
component of mood (indexed by tense arousal) would seem to be more 
important in activating autobiographical content in those with a history of 
depression. 
 
Tentatively, Studies 1 to 3 provide evidence that autobiographical recall has state 
aspects that are triggered by low arousal (indexed by energetic and tense 
arousal). Study 3 suggests that those with a previous depressive history would 
seem to be more reactive to a tense arousal component and those with 
depressive symptomatology would seem to be more reactive to a hedonic tone 
component, which seems to increases ruminative content in those with current 
depressive symptomatology. Other aspects of hedonic tone – i.e. valence 
attribute of mood – seem to affect the non-symptomatic in a beneficial fashion by 
a reduction in rumination and other key cognitive attributes such as expectancy 
and personal importance. This is speculative but invites future research into the 
key component of mood found in this research.  
 
Study 4 investigated the effects of mood on the self-focused cognitive content of 
cued autobiographical memories in vulnerable and symptomatic groups in the 
same study. The results suggested that the vulnerable and symptomatic groups 
showed similar cognitive characteristics change under mood stress, with 
typicalness showing less perceptual origins, other people being seen as less 
important, and future events being evaluated as less certain. Study 5 investigated 
the relationship between autobiographical memory generality in primed negative 
mood state. The autobiographical memory model proposed by Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggests that overgeneral memory may be due to the 
memory search being abandon early in the retrieval stage. The finding from this 
study support Conway & Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) hierarchical model that the 
negative mood state maybe cueing memories that are higher up the memory 
search than the event specific memories. The findings indicated that transient 
mood state influences overgeneral memories in both symptomatic and vulnerable 
groups. The present research has highlighted that overgeneral memories might 
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be acting as a potential moderator in cued autobiographical content. Studies 4 & 
5 collectively suggest that overgeneral memory might interact with negative mood 
state in a similar way that negative mood state acts on cognitive characteristics in 
the vulnerable and symptomatic. The collective findings might indicate that 
negative mood state influences recall of autobiographical memories by changes 
in cognitive reactivity and overgenerality of memories.  
 
Therefore, Studies 4 and 5 provide tentative evidence that autobiographical 
memory has state aspects that are triggered by negative mood shift in those with 
a previous depressive episode.  The findings present a challenge to the claim 
that autobiographical memory generality is independent of mood state (Williams, 
1996). Secondly, they suggest that current symptomatology is less important in 
triggering overgeneral memory style in low mood states than in triggering 
cognitive aspect. This is speculative, but again invites future research into the 
key mediating factors in producing state changes found in this research. 
 
In relation to all the evidence available from the studies in this research, 
experimentally inducing negative mood state leads to a shift in autobiographical 
content and overgeneral memory style when a history of depression or current 
symptomatology are present. Thus, overgeneral memory and autobiographical 
content seem have some state reactivity in the presence of more trait-like 
characteristics, and seem to be closely related in their outcome in response to a 
negatively primed mood state. 
 
7.3 Study limitations 
This study was unique in its efforts to identify the mood state effects in the recall 
of autobiographical content and memory. Previous research has induced 
negative mood, but none has made efforts to account for symptomatology and 
vulnerability in the same study. While the research has strengths, there were 
some limitations that must be acknowledged in light of the present findings. As 
the first three studies largely deal with change score correlation, no causal 
relationship between mood and autobiographical characteristic can be 
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suggested. However, the change score intercorrelations added clarity to the 
current literature when many questions about the nature of the relationship 
between negative mood and autobiographical memory remain uncertain.  
 
There is also a second possibility that the sample size was inadequate to detect 
a real effect. The sample size was determined based on a power analysis to 
detect a moderate effect size. The percentages of symptomatic and vulnerable 
compared to non-vulnerable and non-symptomatic were small due to the 
exclusion criteria based on BDI scores. The restrictive range on the BDI meant 
that depressive symptomatology was minimal and subclinical. The BDI is well 
established at detecting depressive symptomatology and clinical caseness (Kim 
& Park, 2010). Only when higher scoring participants are included can further 
inferences about the nature of depression and state effects be made. 
Subsequently, analyses which used this restricted subset of participants suffered 
from reduced power to detect significant effects. However, future research should 
aim to recruit a larger number of participants with higher BDI scores and a match 
sample of those with a history of depression to strengthen the sample sizes. 
 
Studies reported in this thesis rely on multiple correlations without correction for 
multiple comparisons. Several tests exist for corrections for multiple comparisons 
or type I errors such as Bonferroni, Scheffe and Sidak methods. However, these 
tend to be far too conservative with large correlation matrices and result in an 
increase in type II errors (Saville, 1990). The researcher reported the size of the 
correlation matrix, number of correlations and corresponding p values, and was 
transparent about leaving them uncorrected as recommended by Saville (1990). 
It suggests that corrections for multiple comparisons should not be performed, 
but simply report all data and let the readers make their conclusions (Saville, 
1990). It is recognised that this approach could increase the probability of type I 
errors, yielding association where no true association exists, but conducting a 
correction would have resulted in significant loss of power. Nevertheless the 
resultant interpretations have necessarily been reported with this consideration. 
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There was also an assumption made in the research of continuity between non-
clinical depressive mood and clinical depression. The concept of depression 
includes a continuum of symptoms ranging from dysphoria, which most people 
experience, to clinical depression that requires treatment (Paykel & Priest, 1992). 
It has to be acknowledged that there could be features of depression that are 
discontinuous, which might have differential impacts on information processing 
(Flett et al., 1997), and therefore inferences from studies related to clinical 
depression might bear little or no relationship to present findings. However, past 
researchers have used the continuity model of depression to related studies 
using a continuity model of symptoms. 
 
The population from which the sample was selected may limit the generalizability 
of the present findings. All participants were university students selected from a 
restricted cap on depressive symptoms. The sample was comprised mainly of 
female gender, which again might contain some gender effects such as 
increases in vulnerability and symptomatology due to increased prevalence rates 
recorded among the population (WHO, 2011).  
 
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
Finally, some possible limitations of the present research need some elaboration, 
and at the same time suggestions for future research will be discussed. While the 
current research yielded valuable evidence regarding mood state effects and 
potential moderators in the relationship between negative mood components and 
autobiographical recall, some restrictions to conclusions deserve to be 
addressed. The issues of fidelity regarding mood induction, demand 
characteristics and issues around cueing and measuring autobiographical 
memories have been elaborated on in the first chapter, so only those that have 
not been addressed so far will be discussed.  
 
The dividing of the sample into those who were vulnerable and those who 
showed current depressive symptoms reduced the overall sample size and 
power to interpret significant results. Also, relatively large number of outcome 
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variables and exploratory nature required several correlational analyses and  
t-tests. This could have increased the probability of Type I errors, yielding 
association where no true association exists. The relatively small samples in the 
vulnerable and symptomatic groups could also have increased the chance of 
Type II errors, yielding no association where one existed. Larger sample sizes of 
symptomatic and vulnerable participants with higher levels of dysphoric 
symptoms would increase power to detect significant effects. 
 
Future studies might want to consider assessing the effects of negative mood 
state in the presence of a vulnerability to depression and current 
symptomatology. Several studies have found a history of depression to be a 
significant factor in autobiographical reactivity and memory generality (Gemar et 
al., 2001; Scher et al., 2005; Raes et al., 2007; Yeung et al., 2006 respectively). 
Clinical population could be studied to see if there could be features of 
depression that are discontinuous, which might have differential impacts on 
autobiographical content or memory rather than rely on the continuity principle 
between dysphoric and depressive symptoms. Furthermore, investigating a 
clinically depressed population and comparing it to a non-clinical population could 
enable separation and clarification of the effects of transitory mood states and 
stable mood states on cognitive reactivity and memory generality. 
 
The generalizability of this study might be increased by utilising a more diverse 
population and including a greater match in men as well as women. The present 
research was skewed for gender, with female students dominating each study. 
This is an important issue given the recent research finding which indicates 
gender difference in autobiographical retrieval (Piefke, Weiss, Markowitsch & 
Fink, 2005; Pillemer, Wink, DiDonato & Sanborn, 2003). These studies suggest 
that the present finding cannot readily be applied to skewed male populations or 
other populations with more diverse gender mix and socio-economic factors. 
Future research should seek to address gender differences by examining female 
and male genders both separately and combined from a diverse socio-economic 
population.  
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Despite the limitations of the current research, the question of how negative 
mood affects autobiographical content and memory remains a timely and useful 
question, especially in light of the recent interest in targeting autobiographical 
aspects such as ruminative content and overgeneral memory styles. Ultimately, 
increasing understanding of the degree to which types of negative mood states 
affect autobiographical content and memory may allow for more effective and 
efficient treatment interventions. 
 
The present findings confirm that mood state response is not unitary, but 
multidimensional in nature. Negative mood state seems to elicit increased 
cognitive reactivity in the vulnerable and an increase in disruptive reactivity i.e. 
rumination in those with current depressive symptomatology. It would seem that 
cognitive reactivity is not merely vulnerability- or symptom-related, but is mood-
state-dependent on negative mood in the presence of either of these 
vulnerabilities, both operating as independent provoking factors. Similarly, 
overgeneral memory is not merely vulnerability-related but is mood-state-
dependent on negative mood in the presence of a previous history of depression. 
In contrast, current depressive symptomatology is less important in triggering 
overgeneral memory style in low mood states and seems to appear whether or 
not depressive symptoms are present, but seems to be related to negative mood 
state. The research highlights the importance of assessing the autobiographical 
response to negative mood state and identifying cognitive styles. The focus on 
prevention and coping strategies that directly target mood state effects on 
autobiographical recall would likely reap benefits to those with a vulnerability or 
depressive symptomatology. 
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Appendix 1 
Consent form 
 
 
 
Title of Project: 
 
 
Name of Researcher: 
 
 
 
     Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
     dated ………….for the above study and have had the opportunity  
     to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
     withdraw at any time, without giving any reason or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
 
___________________                _________________   _____________ 
Name of Participant Date  Signature 
 
 
    
Name of person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from researcher) 
 
 
 
Researcher Date Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
(1 for participant; 1 for researcher) 
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Appendix 2 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Instructions 
You are about to take part in an experiment that will involve filling out several 
questionnaires on mood. You will then be asked to read a series of statements to 
yourself that will be presented on a screen, and for some participants the 
procedure may lead to a mood change. This will be followed by several short 
questionnaires to finish the experiment and a second series of statements. 
 
The first questionnaire will assess depressive symptoms and mood. Some 
questions you will answer are about signs of depression. If your answers show 
you may be helped by an evaluation for depression, we will let you know and 
suggest that you talk with your health care provider about an evaluation. There 
will be somebody available to discuss any questions that you have after leaving 
the lecture room. If you have any questions at all, then please ask. 
 
In the actual experimental procedure participants will be asked to complete a 
series of mood measures before reading a series of statements. The procedure 
will be conducted under experimental conditions so there will be no talking whilst 
filling out the questionnaire or when reading the series of statements. If you have 
questions, please raise your hand and I will come and speak to you. Please could 
you be silent so that others can concentrate on the tasks provided and so that 
you don’t unduly influence the other volunteers. 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw at any stage of the 
experiment and no penalties or loss will incurred by non-participation.  
 
Confidentiality will be assured by using a random 6-digit number that will be given 
to you by the researcher.  
 
Debriefing will take place once the experimental procedure has been completed. 
Once the experiment has finished the researcher will hand out contact details for 
support and advice.  
 
Please sign the consent slip below and detach from this form.  
 
 
I consent to the above procedure and I understand that my participation is strictly 
voluntary and I can withdraw from the experiment at any stage without question.  
I am happy with the information provided. 
 
Full name: 
 
Signature: 
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Appendix 3 
Research Approval forms 
 
Study 1 
 
IMPORTANT. PLEASE NOTE:    
(1) You should check with your supervisor before carrying out each part of your 
research; (2) All applications must be assessed by 2 reviewers and discussed by 
departmental ethics committee before approval can be granted.  (3) Any change of 
plans after approval is given must be discussed with your supervisor; (4) 
Supervisors can approve minor changes on behalf of the Ethics Committee, but a 
further application to the Ethics Committee will be necessary for non-minor 
changes; (5) You must append additional information as necessary (e.g., informed 
consent form, copies of questionnaires or other measures to be used, 
experimental protocols, interview schedules, etc.).  If you do not give sufficient 
information for the Committee to make a decision, your application will be delayed 
pending further information;  (6) If you require a CRB check, your supervisor must 
sign that they have seen the clearance.  Failure to include a signature will involve 
an unnecessary delay; (7 ) If you require a risk assessment form, you must obtain 
the appropriate signatures.  Failure to include appropriate signatures will involve 
an unnecessary delay; (8) You must submit this form TYPED.  Failure to do so will 
result in form rejection and unnecessary delay. 
 
I confirm that I have read: (1) the current version of Ethical Principles in 
Psychological Research with Human Participants produced by the British 
Psychological Society;  (2) the Code of Practice Concerning Ethical Principles for 
Research produced by University of Chester. (Both documents are available in the 
Psychology Department.)   
 
Signed:  (Applicant) Date: 15-10-04 
************************************************************************** 
Supervisor’s comments:    (this will normally be the lead supervisor) 
Have you discussed ethical issues with the applicant?  Please comment on how the applicant 
intends to deal with ethical issues arising: ( If this is a re-submission please comment on how the 
student has dealt with resubmission conditions.) 
 
 
 
 
 
• ACCEPTABLE             
• ACCEPTABLE SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS LISTED.  RESUBMIT WITH SUPERVISOR 
COMMENTS AND SIGNATURE                                      
• REVISE AND RESUBMIT.  SEEK SUPERVISOR  ADVICE       
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Appendix 3 Continued 
Research Approval forms 
 
Study 2 
 
IMPORTANT. PLEASE NOTE:    
(1) You should check with your supervisor before carrying out each part of your 
research; (2) All applications must be assessed by 2 reviewers and discussed by 
departmental ethics committee before approval can be granted.  (3) Any change of 
plans after approval is given must be discussed with your supervisor; (4) 
Supervisors can approve minor changes on behalf of the Ethics Committee, but a 
further application to the Ethics Committee will be necessary for non-minor 
changes; (5) You must append additional information as necessary (e.g., informed 
consent form, copies of questionnaires or other measures to be used, 
experimental protocols, interview schedules, etc.).  If you do not give sufficient 
information for the Committee to make a decision, your application will be delayed 
pending further information;  (6) If you require a CRB check, your supervisor must 
sign that they have seen the clearance.  Failure to include a signature will involve 
an unnecessary delay; (7 ) If you require a risk assessment form, you must obtain 
the appropriate signatures.  Failure to include appropriate signatures will involve 
an unnecessary delay; (8) You must submit this form TYPED.  Failure to do so will 
result in form rejection and unnecessary delay. 
 
I confirm that I have read: (1) the current version of Ethical Principles in 
Psychological Research with Human Participants produced by the British 
Psychological Society;  (2) the Code of Practice Concerning Ethical Principles for 
Research produced by University of Chester. (Both documents are available in the 
Psychology Department.)   
 
Signed:  (Applicant) Date: 15-03-05 
************************************************************************** 
Supervisor’s comments:    (this will normally be the lead supervisor) 
Have you discussed ethical issues with the applicant?  Please comment on how the applicant 
intends to deal with ethical issues arising: ( If this is a re-submission please comment on how the 
student has dealt with resubmission conditions.) 
 
 
 
 
 
• ACCEPTABLE             
• ACCEPTABLE SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS LISTED.  RESUBMIT WITH SUPERVISOR 
COMMENTS AND SIGNATURE                                      
• REVISE AND RESUBMIT.  SEEK SUPERVISOR  ADVICE       
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Appendix 3 Continued 
Research Approval forms 
 
 
Study 3 
 
IMPORTANT. PLEASE NOTE:    
(1) You should check with your supervisor before carrying out each part of your 
research; (2) All applications must be assessed by 2 reviewers and discussed by 
departmental ethics committee before approval can be granted.  (3) Any change of 
plans after approval is given must be discussed with your supervisor; (4) 
Supervisors can approve minor changes on behalf of the Ethics Committee, but a 
further application to the Ethics Committee will be necessary for non-minor 
changes; (5) You must append additional information as necessary (e.g., informed 
consent form, copies of questionnaires or other measures to be used, 
experimental protocols, interview schedules, etc.).  If you do not give sufficient 
information for the Committee to make a decision, your application will be delayed 
pending further information;  (6) If you require a CRB check, your supervisor must 
sign that they have seen the clearance.  Failure to include a signature will involve 
an unnecessary delay: (7 ) If you require a risk assessment form, you must obtain 
the appropriate signatures.  Failure to include appropriate signatures will involve 
an unnecessary delay; (8) You must submit this form TYPED.  Failure to do so will 
result in form rejection and unnecessary delay. 
 
I confirm that I have read: (1) the current version of Ethical Principles in 
Psychological Research with Human Participants produced by the British 
Psychological Society;  (2) the Code of Practice Concerning Ethical Principles for 
Research produced by University of Chester. (Both documents are available in the 
Psychology Department.)   
 
Signed:  (Applicant) Date: 28-04-06 
************************************************************************** 
Supervisor’s comments:    (this will normally be the lead supervisor) 
Have you discussed ethical issues with the applicant?  Please comment on how the applicant 
intends to deal with ethical issues arising: ( If this is a re-submission please comment on how the 
student has dealt with resubmission conditions.) 
 
 
 
 
 
• ACCEPTABLE             
• ACCEPTABLE SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS LISTED.  RESUBMIT WITH SUPERVISOR 
COMMENTS AND SIGNATURE                                      
• REVISE AND RESUBMIT.  SEEK SUPERVISOR  ADVICE       
 248 
Appendix 3 Continued 
Research Approval forms 
 
 
Studies 4 & 5 
 
 
IMPORTANT. PLEASE NOTE:    
(1) You should check with your supervisor before carrying out each part of your 
research; (2) All applications must be assessed by 2 reviewers and discussed by 
departmental ethics committee before approval can be granted.  (3) Any change of 
plans after approval is given must be discussed with your supervisor; (4) 
Supervisors can approve minor changes on behalf of the Ethics Committee, but a 
further application to the Ethics Committee will be necessary for non-minor 
changes; (5) You must append additional information as necessary (e.g., informed 
consent form, copies of questionnaires or other measures to be used, 
experimental protocols, interview schedules, etc.).  If you do not give sufficient 
information for the Committee to make a decision, your application will be delayed 
pending further information;  (6) If you require a CRB check, your supervisor must 
sign that they have seen the clearance.  Failure to include a signature will involve 
an unnecessary delay: (7 ) If you require a risk assessment form, you must obtain 
the appropriate signatures.  Failure to include appropriate signatures will involve 
an unnecessary delay; (8) You must submit this form TYPED.  Failure to do so will 
result in form rejection and unnecessary delay. 
 
I confirm that I have read: (1) the current version of Ethical Principles in 
Psychological Research with Human Participants produced by the British 
Psychological Society;  (2) the Code of Practice Concerning Ethical Principles for 
Research produced by University of Chester. (Both documents are available in the 
Psychology Department.)   
 
Signed:  (Applicant) Date: 11-03-09 
************************************************************************** 
Supervisor’s comments:    (this will normally be the lead supervisor) 
Have you discussed ethical issues with the applicant?  Please comment on how the applicant 
intends to deal with ethical issues arising: ( If this is a re-submission please comment on how the 
student has dealt with resubmission conditions.) 
 
 
 
 
 
• ACCEPTABLE             
• ACCEPTABLE SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS LISTED.  RESUBMIT WITH SUPERVISOR 
COMMENTS AND SIGNATURE                                      
• REVISE AND RESUBMIT.  SEEK SUPERVISOR  ADVICE       
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Appendix 4 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
 
Date………………….   
 
 Name………………………………………………..  
 Cohort………………………………. 
 
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group 
of statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that 
best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, 
including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If 
several statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the highest 
number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one statement 
for any group. 
 
 
1. Sadness 
0.  I do not feel sad.                                          
1  I feel sad much of the time.                         
2  I am sad all of the time.                               
3  I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.         
  
2. Pessimism 
0. I am not discouraged about my future.          
1 I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
2 I do not expect things to work out for me.      
3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
  
3. Past Failure 
0 I do not feel like a failure.                      
1 I have failed more than I should have. 
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
  
4. Loss of Pleasure 
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
1 I do not enjoy things as much as I used to. 
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
3 I cannot get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
  
5. Guilty Feelings 
0 I do not feel particularly guilty. 
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
3 I feel guilty all of the time. 
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
 
6. Punishment Feelings 
0 I do not feel I am being punished. 
1 I feel I may be punished. 
2 I expect to be punished. 
3 I feel I am being punished.  
 
7. Self-Dislike 
0. I feel the same about myself as ever. 
1 I have lost confidence in myself. 
2 I am disappointed in myself. 
3 I dislike myself. 
  
8. Self-Criticalness  
0 I don’t criticise or blame myself more than usual. 
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
2 I criticise myself for all my faults. 
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.  
 
9. Suicidal Thoughts and Wishes 
0. I do not have any thoughts of killing myself. 
1 I have thoughts of killing myself but would not carry them out. 
2 I would like to kill myself. 
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
  
10. Crying 
0 I do not cry any more than I used to. 
1 I cry more than I used to. 
2 I cry over every little thing. 
3 I feel like crying but I can’t.  
 
11. Agitation 
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
1 I feel more restless and wound up than usual. 
2 I am so restless or agitated that it is hard to stay still. 
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing  
 something.  
 
12. Loss of Interest 
0 I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
1 I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
3 It is hard to get interested in anything. 
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
 
 
13. Indecisiveness 
0 I make decisions about as well as ever. 
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
2 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
3 I have trouble making any decisions. 
  
14. Worthlessness 
0 I do not feel that I am worthless. 
1 I do not consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
3 I feel utterly worthless.  
 
15. Loss of Energy 
0 I have as much energy as ever. 
1 I have less energy than I used to have. 
2 I do not have enough energy to do very much. 
3 I do not have enough energy to do anything. 
 
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
0 I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
1 I sleep somewhat more/less than usual. 
2 I sleep a lot more/less than usual. 
3 I sleep most of the day/I wake up 1-2 hours early and cannot get back to  
 sleep.  
 
17. Irritability 
0 I am no more irritable than usual. 
1 I am more irritable than usual. 
2 I am much more irritable than usual. 
3 I am irritable all the time. 
  
18. Changes in Appetite 
0 I have not experienced any changes in my appetite. 
1 My appetite is somewhat less/greater than usual. 
2 My appetite is much less/greater than usual. 
3 I have no appetite/crave food all the time. 
  
19. Concentration Difficulty 
0 I can concentrate as well as ever. 
1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
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Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) 
 
 
  
20. Tiredness or Fatigue 
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
 
21. Loss of interest in Sex 
0 I have not noticed any recent changes in my interest in sex. 
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
2 I am much less interested in sex now. 
3 I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist 
 
Instructions 
This questionnaire is concerned with your current feelings.  Please answer every 
question, even if you find it difficult.  Answer, as honestly as you can, what is true of you.  
Please do not choose a reply just because it seems like the 'right thing to say'. Your 
answers will be kept entirely confidential.  Also, be sure to answer according to how you 
feel AT THE MOMENT. Don't just put down how you usually feel. You should try and 
work quite quickly:  there is no need to think very hard about the answers.  The first 
answer you think of is usually the best.  
 
Before you start, please provide some general information about yourself. 
Age ............. (years)                                         Sex   M  F   (Circle one)       
Date .....................                                Participant No. 
 
Here is a list of words which describe people’s moods or feelings. Please indicate how 
well each word describes how you feel AT THE MOMENT. For each word, circle the 
answer from 1 to 4 which best describes your mood. 
 
      Definitely             Slightly                Slightly         Definitely 
                                      Not              Not 
 1. Happy   1  2  3  4 
 2. Dissatisfied   1  2  3  4 
 3. Energetic   1  2  3  4 
 4. Relaxed   1  2  3  4 
 5. Alert    1  2  3  4 
 6. Nervous   1  2  3  4 
 7. Passive   1  2  3  4 
 8. Cheerful   1  2  3  4 
 9. Tense   1  2  3  4 
 10. Jittery   1  2  3  4 
 11. Sluggish   1  2  3  4 
 12. Sorry   1  2  3  4 
 13. Composed  1  2  3  4 
 14. Depressed  1  2  3  4 
 15. Restful   1  2  3  4 
 16. Vigorous   1  2  3  4 
 17. Anxious   1  2  3  4 
 18. Satisfied   1  2  3  4 
 19. Unenterprising  1  2  3  4 
 20. Sad   1  2  3  4 
 21. Calm   1  2  3  4 
 22. Active   1  2  3  4 
 23. Contented   1  2  3  4 
 24. Tired   1  2  3  4 
 25. Impatient   1  2  3  4 
 26. Annoyed   1  2  3  4 
 27. Angry   1  2  3  4 
 28. Irritated   1  2  3  4 
 29. Grouchy   1  2  3  4 
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Cued Autobiographical recall instructions 
 
Participants were asked to rate each memory triggered by the neutral cue word 
on a 7-point Likert scale. 
 
 
Study 1 
 
How clearly can you remember the event? 
Approximately how long ago did the event happen (in years)? 
How personally important was this event? 
How emotional was the event? 
How positive or negative was this emotionality (- or +)? 
 
Study 2 
 
How typical is the event in your life?  
How often do you think about the event?  
How did you feel about the event at the time?  
How important were other people in the event?  
Was the event expected?  
How desirable was the event?  
How important was the event for you?  
Approximately how long ago was the event? 
 
Study 3 
 
Statement answered for ‘present’ and ‘past’ memories. 
 
How typical is the event in your life?   
How often do you think about the event?  
How did you feel about the event?  
How important were other people in the event? 
How would you rate the expectancy of the event?  
How would you rate the desirability of the event?  
How important was the event for you?  
Approximately how long ago was the event? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255 
Appendix 6 Continued 
Cued Autobiographical recall instructions 
 
Participants were asked to rate each memory triggered by the neutral cue word 
on a 7 point Likert scale. 
 
Study 4 
 
How typical is the event in your life?  
How often do you think about the event?  
How did you feel about the event at the time?  
How important were other people in the event?  
How would you rate the expectancy of the event? 
How would you rate the desirability of the event?  
How important was the event for you?  
Approximately how long ago was the event? 
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Instructions for Velten Mood Induction procedure 
 
Instructions: Negative Mood Induction statements 
Read each of the following statements to yourself. As you look at each 
statement, focus your observation only on that one. 
1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 
2. However, I feel a little low today. 
3. I feel rather sluggish now. 
4. Sometimes I wonder if university is all that worthwhile. 
5. Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy that I’d rather just sit than 
do anything. 
6. I can remember times when everybody but me seemed full of energy. 
7. Too often I have found myself staring listlessly into the distance, my mind 
a blank, when I definitely should have been studying. 
8. It has occurred to me more than once that study is basically useless, 
because you forget almost everything you learn anyway. 
9. People annoy me; I wish I could be by myself. 
10. I’ve had important decisions to make in the past, and I’ve sometimes 
made the wrong ones. 
11. I do feel somewhat discouraged and drowsy – maybe I’ll need a nap when 
I get home. 
12. Perhaps College takes more time, effort, and money than it’s worth. 
13. I’m afraid the war in the Middle East may get a lot worse. 
14. I just don’t seem to be able to get going as fast as I used to. 
15. There have been days when I felt weak and confused, and everything 
went miserably wrong. 
16. Just a little bit of effort tires me out. 
17. I’ve had daydreams in which my mistakes kept occurring to me –  
sometimes I wish I could start all over again. 
18. I’m ashamed that I’ve caused my parents needless worry.  
19. I feel terribly tired and indifferent to things today. 
20. Just to stand up would take a big effort. 
21. I’m getting tired out. I can feel my body getting exhausted and heavy. 
22. I’m beginning to feel sleepy. My thought are drifting. 
23. At times I’ve been so tired and discouraged that I went to sleep rather than 
face important problems. 
24. My life is so tiresome – the same old things day after day depresses me. 
25. I couldn’t remember things well right now if I had to. 
26. I just can’t make up my mind; it’s so hard to make simple decisions. 
27. I want to go to sleep – I feel like just closing my eyes and going to sleep 
right here. 
28. I’m not very alert; I feel listless and vaguely sad. 
29. I’ve doubted that I’m a worthwhile person. 
30. I feel worn out. My health may not be as good as it’s supposed to be. 
 257 
Appendix 7a Continued 
Instructions for Velten Mood Induction procedure 
31. It often seems that no matter how hard I try, things still go wrong. 
32. I’ve noticed that no one seems to really understand or care when I 
complain or feel unhappy. 
33. I’m uncertain about my future. 
34. I’m discouraged and unhappy about myself. 
35. I’ve lain awake at night worrying so long that I hated myself. 
36. Things are worse now than when I was younger. 
37. The way I feel now, the future looks boring and hopeless. 
38. My parents never really tried to understand me. 
39. Some very important decisions are almost impossible for me to make. 
40. I feel tired and depressed; I don’t feel like working on the things I know I 
must get done. 
41. I feel horribly guilty about how I’ve treated my parents at times. 
42. I have the feeling that I just can’t reach people. 
43. Things are easier and better for other people than for me; I feel like there 
is no use in trying again. 
44. Other people make me very upset: I don’t like to be around them. 
45. It takes too much effort to convince people of anything. There’s no point in 
trying. 
46. I fail in communicating with people about my problems. 
47. It’s so discouraging the way people don’t really listen to me. 
48. I’ve felt so alone in the past that I could have cried. 
49. Sometimes I’ve wished I could die. 
50. My thoughts are so slow and downcast. I don’t want to think or talk. 
51. I’ve don’t care about anything. Life just isn’t any fun. 
52. Life seems too much for me anyhow – my efforts are wasted. 
53. I’m so tired. 
54. I don’t concentrate or move. I just want to forget about everything. 
55. I have too many bad things in my life. 
56. Everything seems utterly futile and empty. 
57. I feel dizzy and faint. I need to put my head down and not move. 
58. I don’t want to do anything. 
59. All of the unhappiness of my past life is taking possession of me. 
60. I want to go to sleep and never wake up. 
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Appendix 7b 
Instructions for Velten Mood Induction procedure 
 
Positive Mood Induction statements  
Instructions 
Read each of the following statements to yourself. As you look at each 
statement, focus your observation only on that one. 
 
1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day. 
2. I do feel pretty good today, though. 
3. I feel light-hearted. 
4. This might turn out to have been one of my good days. 
5. If your attitude is good, then things are good, and my attitude is good. 
6. I’ve certainly got energy and self-confidence to spare. 
7. I feel cheerful and lively. 
8. On the whole, I have very little difficulty in thinking clearly. 
9. My parents are pretty proud of me most of the time. 
10. I’m glad I’m in College – it’s the key to success nowadays. 
11. For the rest of the day, I bet things will go really well. 
12. I’m pleased that most people are so friendly to me. 
13. My judgement about most things is sound. 
14. It’s encouraging that, as I get further into my studies, it’s going to take less 
study to get good grades. 
15. I’m full of energy and ambition. I feel like I could go a long time without 
sleep. 
16. This is one of those days when I can grind out academic work with 
practically no effort at all. 
17. My judgement is keen and precise today. Just let someone try to put 
something over on me. 
18. When I want to, I can make friends extremely easily. 
19. If I set my mind to it, I can make things turn out fine. 
20. I feel enthusiastic and confident now. 
21. There should be opportunity for a lot of good times coming along. 
22. My favorite song keeps going through my head. 
23. Some of my friends are so lively and optimistic. 
24. I feel talkative … I feel like talking to almost anybody. 
25. I’m full of energy, and am really getting to like the things I’m doing on 
campus. 
26. I’m able to do things accurately and efficiently. 
27. I know good and well that I can achieve the goals I set. 
28. Now that it occurs to me, most of the things that have depressed me 
wouldn’t have if I’d just had the right attitude. 
29. I have a sense of power and vigor. 
30. I feel so vivacious and efficient today … sitting on top of the world. 
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Appendix 7b Continued 
Instructions for Velten Mood Induction procedure 
 
31. It would really take something to stop me now! 
32. In the long run, it’s obvious that things have become better and better 
during my life. 
33. I know that in the future I won’t over-emphasise so-called ‘problems’. 
34. I’m optimistic that I can get along very well with most of the people I meet. 
35. I’m too absorbed in things to have time for worry. 
36. I’m feeling amazingly good today! 
37. I am particularly inventive and resourceful in this mood. 
38. I feel superb! I think I can work to the best of my ability. 
39. Things look good. Things look great! 
40. I feel that many of my friendships will stick with me in the future. 
41. I can find the good in almost anything. 
42. I feel so happy and playful today. I feel like surprising someone by telling a 
silly joke. 
43. I feel an exhilarating animation in all I do. 
44. I feel highly perceptive and refreshed. 
45. My memory is in rare form today. 
46. In a buoyant mood like this one, I can work fast and do it right the first 
time. 
47. I can concentrate hard on anything I do. 
48. My thinking is clear and rapid. 
49. Life is so much fun; it seems to offer so many sources of fulfilment. 
50. Things will be better and better today. 
51. I can make decisions rapidly and correctly; and I can defend them against 
criticism easily. 
52. I feel really industrious – I want something to do! 
53. Life is firmly in my control. 
54. I wish somebody would play some good loud music! 
55. This is great – I really do feel good. I am elated about things. 
56. I’m really feeling sharp now. 
57. This is just one of those days when I’m ready to go! 
58. I feel like bursting with laughter – I wish somebody would tell a joke and 
give me an excuse! 
59. I’m full of energy. 
60. God, I feel great! 
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Appendix 8a  
Cue word list A 
 
 
 
Instructions 
 
You are about to take part in an autobiographical memory cueing experiment. 
You will be presented with a series of words describing everyday events. The 
words will be presented one at a time, and your task is to try to recall a discrete 
personal event which could be associated with each word. These events should 
be the first specific memory that comes to mind when you see each word. The 
events should have lasted seconds, minutes, or hours, but not days, weeks, or 
years. Upon recall of a memory associated with each word, you should write 
down a phrase, or sentence, which describes the memory. You will not have to 
reveal the exact nature of your memories to anyone else. Therefore, there is no 
need to censor, or sanitise, any of the memories. If you cannot recall a memory 
for any of the words, leave a blank space for that word. If you have any questions 
at all, please ask. 
 
 
 
Bike 
Tree 
Shed 
Supermarket 
 261 
 
Appendix 8b 
Cue word list B 
 
 
 
Instructions 
 
You are about to take part in an autobiographical memory cueing experiment. 
You will be presented with a series of words describing everyday events. The 
words will be presented one at a time, and your task is to try to recall a discrete 
personal event which could be associated with each word. These events should 
be the first specific memory that comes to mind when you see each word. The 
events should have lasted seconds, minutes, or hours, but not days, weeks, or 
years. Upon recall of a memory associated with each word, you should write 
down a phrase, or sentence, which describes the memory. You will not have to 
reveal the exact nature of your memories to anyone else. Therefore, there is no 
need to censor, or sanitise, any of the memories. If you cannot recall a memory 
for any of the words, leave a blank space for that word. If you have any questions 
at all, please ask. 
 
Car 
Flower 
Garage 
Shop 
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Appendix 8c 
Cue word list 
 
 
 
Instructions 
 
You will be presented with a series of words describing everyday things. Please write 
down a phrase, or sentence, which describes your recalled event. There is no need to 
censor, or sanitise, any of the events. If you cannot recall an event for any of the words, 
leave a blank space for that word. If you have any questions at all, please ask. 
 
 
Bike 
Tree 
Shed 
Supermarket 
Car 
Flower 
Garage 
Shop 
House 
Road 
Garden 
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Appendix 9 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-30) 
 
Listed below are a variety of thoughts that pop into people’s heads. Please read 
each thought and indicate how frequently, if at all, each thought occurred to you 
over the last week. Please read each item carefully and circle the number which 
best matches your answer. 
 
       Not  Some-  Fairly  Often      All  
       at all times often               the time 
1.     I feel like I’m up against the world  1 2 3 4 5  
2.     I’m no good     1 2 3 4 5  
3.     Why can’t I ever succeed?    1 2 3 4 5  
4.     No one understands me.    1 2 3 4 5  
5.     I’ve let people down.     1 2 3 4 5  
6.     I don’t think I can go on.   1 2 3 4 5  
7.     I wish I were a better person   1 2 3 4 5  
8.     I’m so weak     1 2 3 4 5  
9.     My life’s not going the way I want it to 1 2 3 4 5  
10.   I’m so disappointed in myself  1 2 3 4 5  
11.   Nothing feels good anymore   1 2 3 4 5  
12.   I can’t stand this any more   1 2 3 4 5  
13.   I can’t get started    1 2 3 4 5  
14.   What’s wrong with me?    1 2 3 4 5  
15.   I wish I were somewhere else.   1 2 3 4 5  
16.   I can’t get things together   1 2 3 4 5  
17.   I hate myself.      1 2 3 4 5  
18.   I’m worthless.      1 2 3 4 5  
19.   I wish I could just disappear   1 2 3 4 5  
20.  What’s the matter with me?    1 2 3 4 5  
21.   I’m a loser     1 2 3 4 5  
22.   My life is a mess.     1 2 3 4 5  
23.   I’m a failure     1 2 3 4 5  
24.   I’ll never make it.     1 2 3 4 5  
25.   I feel so helpless.     1 2 3 4 5  
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Appendix 9 Continued 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-30) 
 
      Not  Some  Fairly  Often    All  
                    at all       times     often                   the time 
 
26.   Something has to change.    1 2 3 4 5  
27.   There must be something wrong with me. 1 2 3 4 5  
28.   My future is bleak.     1 2 3 4 5  
29.   It’s just not worth it.     1 2 3 4 5  
30.   I can’t finish anything.    1 2 3 4 5  
 
 265 
 
 
Appendix 10 
Sentence completion for events from the past test (SCEPT) 
 
 
 
Instructions 
Please answer every question, even if you find it difficult. Your answers will be 
kept entirely confidential. You should try to work quite quickly: there is no need to 
think very hard about the answers. The first answer you think of is usually the 
best. 
 
1 I still remember well how 
 
2 I still recall how/that I  
 
3 Last year  
 
4 In the past  
 
5 Last week I  
 
6 I can still picture how  
 
7 When I think back to/of  
 
8 I will never forget  
 
9 The most important thing that I have ever  
 
10 Last year I  
 
11 At the time when I  
 
 
Scoring: The content of autobiographical memories could be quantitatively coded as 
suggested by Williams and based on the Conway structure of autobiographical recall: 
 
Semantic associates should score (1)  
Categoric memories should score (2)  
Extended memories should score (3)  
Specific memories should score (4) 
 266 
 
Appendix 11 
Vulnerability screening questionnaire 
 
 
 
Instructions 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and all the information that you provide is 
confidential and will not be used for any other purpose other than the research 
project. Confidentiality will be assured by using your 6-digit random number 
which is only known by you. 
 
 
 
Have you been prescribed treatment for depression in the past or present? 
(Please circle) 
 
 Yes  No 
 
If yes, were you treated by (Please circle one or more):- Pharmacology  
 
 Cognitive therapy 
 
 Counselling 
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Appendix 12 
Scatter plot graphs 
 
Scatter plot for change scores between energetic arousal and vividness 
5.002.500.00-2.50
Vividness
5.00
0.00
-5.00
-10.00
-15.00
E
n
e
rg
e
ti
c
A
ro
u
s
a
l
 
 
Scatter plot for change scores between tense arousal and vividness 
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Appendix 12 
Scatter plot graphs (Continued) 
 
Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and vividness 
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Scatter plot for change scores between anger/frustration and vividness 
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Appendix 12 
Scatter plot graphs (Continued) 
 
Scatter plot for change scores between energetic arousal and personal 
importance 
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Scatter plot for change scores between hedonic tone and personal  
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